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Abstract
In our economy, many interactions between individuals involve one party possessing
more or better information than the other party (i.e., private information). For example,
in asset markets, sellers often have better knowledge about the quality of the assets than
buyers. Private information also exists when governments collect taxes, because taxpay-
ers typically have more information about their income compared to the government. In
my thesis, I explore the implications of private information in three novel contexts.
In Chapter 2, I study the implications of tax evasion for the design of central bank
digital currency, which is an emerging payment instrument. I build a general equilibrium
framework to explicitly allow tax evasion by agents and tax audits by a government. I
find that introducing a deposit-like CBDC can increase welfare and reduce tax evasion.
Furthermore, a deposit-like CBDC needs not increase the funding costs of private banks
or decrease bank lending and investment. However, paying a high interest rate on CBDC
will decrease the central bank’s net interest revenue, which may jeopardize central bank
independence.
Chapter 3 examines how multi-dimensional private information a ects asset market
equilibrium. I find that when asset quality is the only source of private information,
sellers with high-quality assets signal their quality to buyers through partial retention of
assets if and only if their liquidity holdings are large. However, when sellers’ valuations
of liquid assets are also private information, some sellers with high-quality assets signal
their quality even if their liquidity holdings are small. I extend the model to study of the
implications for discount window lending and government asset purchases.
Chapter 4 contains a study of illiquidity and partial retention of assets as signals
of asset quality in markets with private information. I find that both signals are used
in equilibrium. However, sellers with high-quality assets prefer illiquidity over partial
retention in the sense that among these sellers, those with higher-quality assets sell
marginally fewer assets but with significantly lower probability. In comparison, sellers
with low-quality assets prefer partial retention over illiquidity in the sense that among
these sellers, those with higher-quality assets sell significantly fewer assets but with only
marginally lower probability.
Keywords: Private Information, Monetary Policy, Tax Compliance, Central Bank
Digital Currency, Financial Markets, Competitive Search, Signaling
ii
Summary for Lay Audience
People face information disadvantages and advantages in everyday life. For example,
when buying a used car, one recognizes that there is typically hidden information (i.e.,
private information) about the quality of the car. In contrast, when filing tax returns,
taxpayers usually have more information about their income compared to the govern-
ment. There is a large literature that studies private information in various contexts,
and my thesis contributes to this literature by investigating how private information
a ects monetary policy and asset pricing.
Chapter 2 of my thesis studies the implications of tax evasion for the design of central
bank digital currency, which is a digital form of central bank money and an emerging
payment instrument. I find that introducing a deposit-like CBDC can increase welfare
and reduce tax evasion. Furthermore, competition from a deposit-like CBDC needs not
increase the deposit rate and reduce bank lending. However, paying a high interest rate on
CBDC will increase the expense of the central bank and may jeopardize its independence.
Chapter 3 examines how asset markets are a ected by two types of private information
that may coexist in markets. The first type of private information considered is asset
quality, while the second type is how much sellers value liquid assets. I find that asset
prices and the quantities of assets for sale depend not only on how much liquid assets
sellers need but also on what private information is present in the market. Building on
the findings, I study the monetary and fiscal policies during financial crises.
Chapter 4 studies two types of signals of asset quality that are often observed em-
pirically in asset markets, i.e., signaling via illiquidity (that is sellers with high-quality
assets sell with a lower probability) and signaling via partial retention (that is sellers
with high-quality assets sell a smaller quantity). I find that, for sellers with high-quality
assets, illiquidity is preferred over partial retention, while the opposite is true for sellers
with low-quality assets. Building on these results, I study aggregate liquidity and quality
shocks that often happen during financial crises.
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In our economy, many interactions between individuals involve one party possessing
more or better information than the other party. The most cited example is used car
markets, where sellers have better knowledge of the quality of the cars than buyers.
Private information, however, does not only exist in asset markets. For example, when
reporting income for tax purposes, taxpayers also have better information regarding their
income compared to the government. The literature on private information spurred by
the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) has demonstrated that compared to environments
with complete information, the existence of private information often leads to drastically
changes in economic outcomes and policy prescriptions.
My thesis contains three chapters that explore private information in three di erent
contexts. In Chapter 2, I study the implications of tax evasion for the design of central
bank digital currency, an emerging payment instrument. In Chapter 3, I study multi-
dimensional private information in asset market equilibrium and policy implications for
discount window lending and government asset purchases. In the final chapter, I study
how private information interacts with search friction in asset markets, and how such
interactions may help explain some puzzling phenomena observed in asset markets.
Central bank digital currency is a digital form of central bank money and is typically
referred to as CBDC. A survey by the Bank for International Settlements finds that
currently, more than 80% of central banks are actively researching CBDC (Boar et al.,
2020). Although there is not yet a consensus on how CBDC should be designed, many
central bankers argue that the potential use of CBDC in illicit activities should be taken
into account. One of the frequently mentioned illicit activities is tax evasion, which
is an important problem in many countries. A report by the Internal Revenue Service
estimates that between 2011 and 2013, the loss in tax revenue in the US due to tax evasion
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
was 14.2% of total Federal tax revenue and 2.4% of US GDP (Internal Revenue Service,
2019). The same report also finds that the tax evasion is closely related to the use of cash
as a payment instrument. Specifically, nearly half of the loss in tax revenue came from
individual businesses that were cash-intensive. To study the implications of tax evasion
for the design of central bank digital currency, I build a general equilibrium framework to
explicitly allow tax evasion by agents and tax audits by a government. I find that as long
as CBDC o ers less anonymity than cash, introducing CBDC will decrease tax evasion.
However, if CBDC is “cash-like” in the sense that it still o ers relatively high level of
anonymity but low interest rate, then introducing CBDC will decrease the output from
not only agents who evade taxes but also agents who report their income truthfully. If
CBDC is instead “deposit-like” in the sense that it o ers low anonymity but high interest
rate, then introducing CBDC will increase output and aggregate welfare. Furthermore,
introducing deposit-like CBDC needs not increase the funding costs of private banks or
decrease bank lending and investment. However, paying a high interest rate on CBDC
will decrease the central bank’s net interest revenue, which may jeopardize the central
bank’s independence.
Chapter 3 examines how the liquid assets sellers possess before they trade in asset
markets a ect the equilibrium when sellers also have private information about asset
quality and how much they value liquidity.1 To see why sellers’ liquidity is important for
asset market outcomes, consider a firm trying to issue equity to fund a new project. It
may choose to o er investors fewer shares at a (potentially) higher price if it already has
some liquid assets on hand. Conversely, consider a hedge fund facing sudden redemptions
during a financial crisis. It may deplete its liquidity reserves and be forced to sell large
quantities of assets at a loss. Most papers that study private information in asset markets,
especially those that study two-dimensional private information, shut down the liquidity
channel completely by assuming either indivisible assets or linear preferences. The main
result of this chapter is that depending on sellers’ liquidity holdings, they may or may not
reveal the quality of their assets to buyers through prices of the assets and the quantities
for sale. I find that when asset quality is the only source of private information, sellers
with high-quality assets signal their quality to buyers through partial retention of assets
if and only if their liquidity holdings are large. However, when sellers’ valuations of
liquid assets are also private information, some sellers with high-quality assets signal their
quality even if their liquidity holdings are small. The model is then extended to study the
implications for discount window lending and government asset purchases. I find that it
is possible to have only sellers with high-quality assets borrow from the discount window
even though the discount window does not attempt to screen the borrowers. I also find
1A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Economic Theory (Wang, 2020).
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that after a negative quality shock causes the asset market to freeze, the government
can unfreeze the market by purchasing bad assets. However, it is not optimal for the
government to purchase all bad assets from the market.
Chapter 4 studies how search frictions interact with private information about asset
quality. This chapter is motivated by the observations that signaling via illiquidity (i.e.
sellers with high-quality assets sell with a lower probability) and signaling via partial
retention (i.e. sellers with high-quality assets sell a smaller quantity) are both observed in
asset markets. However, the di erences between these two signals are not well-understood
because it is di cult to induce sellers to use both signals in a theoretical framework. In
this chapter, I find that both signals are used in equilibrium. However, among sellers with
relatively high quality assets, those with higher-quality assets sell marginally fewer assets
but with significantly lower probability. In comparison, among sellers with relatively low
quality assets, those with higher-quality assets sell significantly fewer assets but with only
marginally lower probability. Building on these results, I study aggregate liquidity and
quality shocks. For sellers with high-quality assets, the shocks generate larger changes
in trading probability than in trading volume, while the opposite happens to sellers with
low-quality assets.
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Chapter 2
Tax Compliance and Central Bank
Digital Currency
2.1 Introduction
Central bank digital currency (CBDC), which is a digital form of central bank money, has
attracted worldwide attention in recent years. A survey by the Bank for International
Settlements finds that currently, more than 80% of central banks are actively researching
CBDC (Boar et al., 2020). Although there is not yet a consensus on how CBDC should be
designed, many central bankers argue that the potential use of CBDC in illicit activities
should be taken into account.1 One of the frequently mentioned illicit activities is tax
evasion, which is an important problem in many countries. A report by the Internal
Revenue Service estimates that between 2011 and 2013, the loss in tax revenue in the
US due to tax evasion was 14.2% of total Federal tax revenue and 2.4% of US GDP
(Internal Revenue Service, 2019).2 The same report also finds that the tax evasion is
closely related to the use of cash as a payment instrument. Specifically, nearly half of the
loss in tax revenue came from individual businesses that were cash-intensive. The goal
of this chapter is therefore to study how CBDC should be designed when tax evasion
is a concern in the economy. I ask how the introduction of CBDC a ects the choice of
payment methods, economic output, and aggregate welfare.
1See for example Lagarde (2018), Powell (2020), Bank of England (2020), and Bank of Canada (2020).
See also Bank of Canada et al. (2020) for an overview of central banks’ motivations for introducing CBDC.
2Rogo  (2017) argues that tax evasion in Europe is likely to be more severe compared to the US due
to Europe’s larger informal economy. Canada Revenue Agency (2017, 2019) estimates that in 2014, tax
evasion in corporate income tax, Goods and Services Tax, and personal income tax amounts to $26B or
9.6% of the total federal tax revenue. See Rogo  (2017) for discussions about other countries.
4
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To answer these questions, I develop a general equilibrium framework based on the
model of Lagos and Wright (2005) to allow tax evasion by agents and tax audits by a
government. A key feature of the framework is that the problems of tax evasion and
tax audits are studied jointly with the problem of payment choice. Specifically, in the
economy, there are buyers and sellers who trade a consumption good, and sellers can
choose the payment instrument(s) they accept. After each period, sellers are required
to file income reports to the government and pay an income tax. The government may
collect the tax based on reported income, or it can conduct costly audits on sellers. After
an audit, the probability of the government observing a seller’s income depends on the
payment instrument(s) in which the income is received. If sellers are found evading taxes,
the government can punish them by confiscating their income.
As a benchmark, I study a scenario where only cash and bank deposits are available
as payment instruments. In equilibrium, some sellers choose to evade taxes, while other
sellers choose to report their income truthfully. The benefit of evading taxes is that
sellers can potentially have a higher income, while the cost is the risk of being audited
and punished by the government. I find that the risk of punishment acts as a proportional
tax on sellers who evade taxes and creates distortions in sellers’ production decisions. As
a result, sellers who evade taxes produce less and receive smaller payments compared
to sellers who report their income truthfully. I also find that as long as it is su ciently
easier to hide cash income compared to deposit income, sellers who evade taxes accept
cash despite its lower return.
The main results of this chapter concern the optimal design of CBDC when tax
evasion creates ine ciency and cash facilitates tax evasion. I define central bank digital
currency (CBDC) to be another payment instrument (in addition to cash) that is issued
by the central bank. It is stored in accounts managed by the central bank, and it can be
held by all agents. CBDC can be di erent from cash and bank deposits depending on
two design choices of the central bank: the first is the interest rate on CBDC, and the
second is how much anonymity CBDC o ers.3 In the context of tax evasion, the degree
of anonymity of CBDC will determine the probability of the income received in CBDC
being observed by the government after an audit.
I find that as long as CBDC o ers less anonymity than cash, then introducing CBDC
will decrease tax evasion. However, if CBDC is “cash-like” in the sense that it still o ers
relatively high level of anonymity but low interest rate, introducing CBDC will decrease
3The anonymity of CBDC can indeed be a choice of the central bank. For example, Darbha and Arora
(2020) show that combinations of cryptographic techniques and operational arrangements can be used
to achieve fine-grained privacy designs. ESCB (2019) demonstrates that through “anonymity vouchers”,
CBDC can o er anonymity while also complying with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism laws.
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the output from not only sellers who evade taxes but also sellers who report their income
truthfully. Specifically, in equilibrium, although CBDC o ers less anonymity, sellers who
evade taxes substitute cash with CBDC because the latter pays a positive interest rate.
However, because the visibility of sellers’ income increases, the government has more
incentive to conduct audits, which decreases tax evasion. For sellers who evade taxes,
higher audit probability increases the risk of being punished by the government, so they
produce less for buyers and receive smaller payments.
Perhaps more interestingly, the output from sellers who report their income truthfully
will also decrease. In equilibrium, because the interest rate on cash-like CBDC is low,
sellers who report truthfully prefer to accept bank deposits. The decrease in tax evasion
prompts more sellers to switch to bank deposits. As a result, the demand for bank
deposits increases, which drives down the deposit rate. This lowers the income of sellers
who report truthfully and reduces their output. In addition, a higher interest rate on
CBDC will further reduce tax evasion, because it increases the income of sellers who evade
taxes, which gives the government more incentive to audit. However, in equilibrium, the
higher audit probability will o set the increase in the return on CBDC and causes the
output from sellers who evade taxes to decrease. A decrease in tax evasion will also
worsen the shortage of bank deposits and further lower the deposit rate. As a result, the
output from sellers who report truthfully will decrease.
It is, however, possible to design CBDC in a way that decreases tax evasion while also
avoiding a shortage of bank deposits. Specifically, the central bank sets the interest rate
on CBDC to be su ciently high so that sellers who report their income truthfully are
willing to accept CBDC. Meanwhile, CBDC o ers the least amount of anonymity such
that sellers who evade taxes are also willing to accept CBDC. In equilibrium, the deposit
rate will be equal to the interest rate on CBDC. As a result, sellers who report their
income truthfully are indi erent between accepting deposits and CBDC, while sellers
who evade taxes prefer CBDC to cash. I refer to this type of CBDC as “deposit-like”.
Similar to cash-like CBDC, introducing deposit-like CBDC will decrease tax evasion and
increase the demand for bank deposits. However, because the interest rate on CBDC is
equal to the deposit rate, some sellers who report their income truthfully are willing to
substitute bank deposits with CBDC. This avoids a shortage of bank deposits and there-
fore facilitates the transactions between buyers and sellers. Consequently, introducing
CBDC increases the output and aggregate welfare by reducing the distortions created by
tax evasion and the real resources devoted to tax audits.
It has been argued that CBDC may compete with bank deposits and increase the
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funding costs of private banks.4 Indeed, Keister and Sanches (2019) show that while
CBDC tends to promote e ciency in exchange, it also crowds out bank deposits and
decreases investment in the economy. However, I find that this is not the case no matter
CBDC is cash-like or deposit-like. When CBDC is cash-like, introducing CBDC will
lower the deposit rate and decrease the funding costs of private banks. When CBDC is
deposit-like, it indeed competes with bank deposits. However, introducing CBDC also
increases the demand for payment instruments by increasing the output of the economy.
I show that it is possible for private banks’ funding costs to remain unchanged after the
introduction of CBDC.
Although aggregate welfare is higher with deposit-like CBDC, the central bank has to
pay higher interest, which may decrease the central bank’s net interest revenue. Specif-
ically, the central bank in the model, similar to its counterparts in reality (e.g., the
Federal Reserve), earns revenue through the interest payments on its assets (i.e., govern-
ment bonds). The central bank’s expenses include the interest payments on its liabilities
(CBDC) and the costs of operating the central bank (e.g., personnel costs). To ensure
a central bank’s independence of the fiscal authority, it may be necessary for the central
bank to cover the expenses with its revenue rather than rely on transfers from the fiscal
authority. For example, when discussing its independence, the Federal Reserve empha-
sizes that it “does not receive funding through the congressional budgetary process”.
I find that if CBDC is cash-like, introducing CBDC decreases the central bank’s net
interest revenue. This is because, firstly, the demand for central bank money is lower
due to fewer sellers evading taxes. Secondly, the decrease in tax evasion increases the
demand for bank deposits, which are partially backed by government bonds in equilib-
rium. Higher demand for government bonds then decreases the bond rate and reduces
interest payments the central bank receives. If CBDC is deposit-like, the reduction in
the central bank’s net interest revenue will be even larger because the interest rate on
CBDC is higher. Hence, no matter CBDC is cash-like or deposit-like, introducing CBDC
will have a negative impact on the central bank’s net interest revenue. While introduc-
ing deposit-like CBDC will increase output and aggregate welfare, it may jeopardize the
central bank’s independence.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter is related to the vast theoretical literature on tax compliance.5 Some of the
earliest work includes Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Reinganum and Wilde (1985,
4See for example Garcia et al. (2020), Bank of England (2020), and Bank of Canada (2020).
5For reviews of this literature, see Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod (2007), and Alm (2019).
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1986). Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assume the audit probability is exogenous and
study how tax evasion responds to tax rates. Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986) as-
sume the income distribution is exogenous and study the strategic interactions between
taxpayers and the tax authority. Building on Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Erard and
Feinstein (1994) assume that a portion of agents are honest and always report truthfully.
More recently, Bassetto and Phelan (2008) also assume an exogenous income distribu-
tion and study optimal taxation using a mechanism design approach. They find that
there exists an equilibrium where households under-report their incomes because other
households are expected to do so as well. Compared to the theoretical literature on tax
compliance, the main contribution of this chapter is to incorporate the choice of payment
methods and the audit game into a general equilibrium framework. Such a setup allows
me to study how the intention to evade taxation a ects the choice of payment methods,
and how the characteristics of payment instruments a ect tax evasion.
Papers that also study tax evasion and informal economy in the Lagos and Wright
(2005) framework include Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014), Aruoba (2018), Aı̈t Lahcen
(2020), Bajaj and Damodaran (2020), and Kwon et al. (2020).6 Gomis-Porqueras et al.
(2014) assume that cash transactions are not observable to the government but credit
transactions are, and that the government cannot audit agents. They find a negative
relationship between tax evasion and inflation. Aruoba (2018) studies a Ramsey optimal
taxation problem with a focus on tax enforcement capabilities. The government can
choose to audit agents but does so randomly because agents do not report their income.
Similar to Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014), Aı̈t Lahcen (2020) does not allow the govern-
ment to audit agents and obtains a similar negative relationship between tax evasion and
inflation. Bajaj and Damodaran (2020) assume that the fiscal authority can observe all
transactions in cash, and that it only chooses the e ort spent in collecting taxes. They
find that the e ective tax rate is low because cash payments tend to be small, which
reduces the fiscal authority’s incentive to collect taxes. Lastly, Kwon et al. (2020) also
assume the government cannot observe transactions in cash but can observe perfectly
transactions in CBDC and deposits. They find that the distortion from tax evasion can
be corrected by implementing high inflation on cash and using the seigniorage income to
finance a high interest rate on CBDC.
This chapter is also related to the emerging literature on CBDC. Using a dynamic
general equilibrium model, Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) find that introducing CBDC
can stimulate macroeconomic activity as well as bank lending. By focusing on the digital
nature of CBDC, Davoodalhosseini (2018) shows that the central bank can in princi-
6For more work on informal economy, see Canzoneri and Rogers (1990), Nicolini (1998), Cavalcanti
and Villamil (2003), and Yesin (2004, 2006).
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ple cross-subsidize di erent types of agents and improve welfare, which is not possible
with cash. Keister and Sanches (2019) find that CBDC can help alleviate frictions that
prevent the e cient level of investment, but it also competes with bank deposits and
increases the funding cost of financial institutions. Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019)
derives conditions under which the issuance of CBDC does not alter equilibrium alloca-
tions. This suggests that CBDC does not have to reduce credit or crowd out investment.
Chiu et al. (2019) and Andolfatto (2020) drop the assumption of competitive banking
markets common in the literature. Chiu et al. (2019) find that CBDC can promote the
competition in the deposit market and increase bank lending. Andolfatto (2020) shows
that although the introduction of CBDC increases the deposit rate and reduces bank
revenue, it also increases deposit demand and promotes saving. Williamson (2019a)
considers an environment where privacy is demanded in some transactions and banks
are subject to limited commitment. CBDC may be designed to o er privacy like cash
while being more e cient than bank deposits because the central bank is immune from
limited commitment. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2020), Keister and Monnet (2020),
and Williamson (2020) study CBDC and financial stability. Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2020) find that CBDC may attract deposits away from the commercial banking sector
because it is more stable during bank runs. Keister and Monnet (2020) show that CBDC
is beneficial because real-time information on transactions is available to the central bank
and regulators. Such information mitigates the moral hazard problem and improves fi-
nancial stability. Williamson (2020) studies flight to safety when CBDC is designed to
be a safe asset. CBDC is found to reduce the damages resulted from a banking panic as
it is less disruptive of retail payments.7
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the environment.
Section 2.3 solves a benchmark model. Section 2.4 introduces CBDC. Section 2.5 discuss
aggregate welfare and central bank net revenue. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Model Environment
The model builds on the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework. Time is discrete and
continues forever. Each period is divided into two subperiods: the decentralized market
(DM) and the centralized market (CM). There is measure one of infinitely-lived buyers
and measure – > 1 of infinitely-lived sellers. In the DM, buyers consume a DM good
that can only be produced by sellers. In the CM, sellers consume a CM good that can
7For more discussions on the benefits and costs of CBDC, see Bordo and Levin (2017), Berentsen
and Schar (2018), Ricks et al. (2018), and Kahn et al. (2020).
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be only produced by buyers. The CM good also serves as the numéraire. A buyer’s
instantaneous utility is given by
u(gt) ≠ lt, (2.1)
where gt is the consumption of DM good, and lt is the labor supplied in the CM. One
unit of labor can be turned into one unit of CM good. I assume uÕ(g) > 0, uÕÕ(g) < 0,
u(0) = 0, uÕ(Œ) = 0, uÕ(0) = Œ, and ≠guÕÕ(g)/uÕ(g) < 1. A seller’s instantaneous utility
is given by
≠ht + xt, (2.2)
where ht is the labor supplied in the DM, and xt is the consumption of CM good. I
assume one unit of labor in the DM can be turned into one unit of DM good. All agents
discount future utility using — œ (0, 1). Neither good can be carried across periods.
In the DM, buyers and sellers trade the DM good, and the terms of trade are de-
termined via price posting. Specifically, the market in the DM consists of di erent
submarkets. Each submarket is identified by its terms of trade, (q, p), where q represents
the quantity of DM good a seller in this submarket o ers to produce, and p © (m, c, d)
represents the payment that the seller expects to receive, with m, c, and d denoting pay-
ments in cash, central bank digital currency (CBDC), and bank deposits, respectively.
The terms of trade for the DM of period t are posted in the CM of period t≠1, and sellers
can commit to the terms of trade they post. Buyers observe all terms of trade before
they decide which market they will visit and how much cash, CBDC, and bank deposits
they will carry. Let n(q, p) denote the buyer-to-seller ratio in each submarket. I assume
a buyer meets a seller with probability min{1, 1/n(q, p)} and a seller meets a buyer with
probability min{1, n(q, p)}. Because by assumption there are more sellers than buyers,
some sellers may not meet a buyer in the DM. This means that although all agents are
ex ante homogeneous, sellers may be ex post heterogeneous in their income.
Next, at the beginning of the CM, sellers are required to report their income to a fiscal
authority and pay an income tax. After receiving the income reports, the fiscal authority
can choose to either collect the tax based on reported income or audit sellers. Each audit
costs the fiscal authority C units of CM good. I assume that after an audit, the fiscal
authority observes sellers’ income received in the form of bank deposits with probability
one. However, the income received in cash is only observed with exogenous probability
flm œ (0, 1). As for CBDC, I consider various regimes where income in CBDC is more
or less likely to be observed compared to other payment methods (see Section 2.4). If a
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seller is found evading taxes, the fiscal authority may confiscate his or her income. After
the tax is collected and all audits are finished, a perfectly competitive market opens for
agents to trade the CM good. Sellers may use their post-tax and post-audit income to
purchase the CM good for consumption, while buyers may sell the CM they produce to
acquire cash, CBDC, and bank deposits for the next DM.
In the CM, there is also measure one of bankers and entrepreneurs who are active.
Bankers create deposits that are used by buyers to purchase the DM good. They derive
linear utility from the CM good like sellers, and they can produce the CM good with the
same linear technology that buyers use. I assume bankers have limited commitment and
can choose to default on their deposit liabilities Therefore, bank deposits must be backed
by other assets such as cash, CBDC, government bonds, and loans to entrepreneurs. I
assume entrepreneurs are born in each CM with a one-period project that takes the CM
good as input (denoted by k) and yields the CM good in the CM of the next period
as output (denoted by f(k)), where f Õ(k) > 0, f ÕÕ(k) < 0, f Õ(0) = Œ, and f Õ(Œ) = 0.
Entrepreneurs derive linear utility from consuming the CM good in the second CM of
their lives before they die and are replaced with a new set of entrepreneurs. I assume
entrepreneurs are born without any funds and they cannot work in the CM. Therefore,
they must borrow from bankers and use the output of their projects as collateral. I
assume both the loan market and the deposit market are perfectly competitive.
The government in the model consists of the fiscal authority and the central bank.
In addition to taxing sellers, the fiscal authority issues one-period nominal government
bonds that are traded in a competitive bond market in the CM. Following Andolfatto
and Williamson (2015), Williamson (2016), Williamson (2019a), and Williamson (2019b),
I assume the fiscal authority determines the supply of government bonds, while the
central bank determines the supply of cash and CBDC through open market purchases
and sales of government bonds. Let price of the CM good be pt. The central bank’s
objective is to adjust the supply of cash and CBDC to achieve a certain inflation target
µ = (pt+1 ≠ pt)/pt. Now, let Mt and Ct denote the total supply of cash and CBDC
in period t. Let Bct denote the government bonds held by the central bank. Let the
nominal bond rate and the nominal interest rate on CBDC be Rb and Rc, respectively.
The central bank’s budget constraint is
Mt+1 ≠ Mt
pt
+ Ct+1 ≠ Ct
pt











+ Et + T ct . (2.3)
The left-hand side of (2.3) represents the per-period income of the central bank, which
consists of the revenue from issuing new cash and CBDC, and the revenue from redeeming
the government bonds purchased in the last period. The expenses of the central bank
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consist of the interest payment on CBDC, the purchase of government bonds, and the cost
of operating the central bank Et. After paying the expenses, the central bank transfers
the rest of its income to the fiscal authority (T ct ).
Finally, denote the total supply of government bonds in a period as Bt. The budget
constraint of the fiscal authority is
Bt+1
pt




The left-hand side of (2.4) denotes the per-period income of the fiscal authority, which
consists of the income from issuing new government bonds, net tax revenue, and the
transfer from the central bank. The right-hand side denotes the per-period expenses of
the fiscal authority, which consists of a non-negative lump-sum transfer to buyers in the
CM (Tt) and the redemption value of the government bonds issued in the previous period.
Throughout this chapter, I assume that the fiscal authority chooses the total amount of




) and the tax income schedule, and lets Tt adjust passively
so that (2.4) holds. In Appendix A.3, I consider an alternative setup where there is no
lump-sum transfer (i.e., Tt = 0), and the government balances the budget by adjusting
D instead.
2.3 A Benchmark Model: No CBDC
As a benchmark, I consider a scenario where the only government-issued money is cash.
I restrict my attention to stationary equilibria where all real variables remain constant.
2.3.1 Tax Compliance and Sellers’ Problem
First, let y denote the reported income of a seller, and let ·(y) : R+ æ R+ denote the
tax schedule. In the first part of this section, I solve sellers’ and the fiscal authority’s
problems with a general tax schedule, which is only required to satisfy ·(y) Æ y. In the
second part, I solve for the optimal tax schedule that maximizes the total surplus in the
DM subject to the fiscal authority raising a given amount of net tax revenue.
Let Rd denote the nominal interest rate on bank deposits. Suppose a buyer decides
that he or she will visit market (q, p) in the next DM, where p = (m, d) represents
the (real) amount of payment in cash and deposits. Accumulating (m, d) requires the
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following amount of labor in the CM.
(1 + µ)m + (1 + µ)d1 + Rd . (2.5)
Recall that a buyer meets a seller with probability min{1, 1/n(q, p)}. Then, the expected
surplus of a buyer choosing to visit (q, p) is given by
≠(1 + µ)m ≠ (1 + µ)d1 + Rd + — min{1, 1/n(q, p)}[u(q) ≠ (m + d)] + —(m + d). (2.6)
Sellers maximize their utility by choosing q, m, d, n, and y subject to (q, p) providing
expected surplus equal to S to buyers, where S is expected surplus a buyer can obtain
from his or her best alternative. Let Ey(÷) denote a seller’s expectation about the audit
probability ÷ conditional y. A seller’s problem is given by
max
q,m,d,y,n
{[(1 ≠ Ey(÷))(m + d ≠ ·(y)) + Ey(÷)(1 ≠ flm)(m + d ≠ ·(y))]1(d Æ y < d + m)
+ [(1 ≠ Ey(÷))(m + d ≠ ·(y)) + Ey(÷)(1 ≠ flm)m]1(y < d)
+ [m + d ≠ ·(y)]1(y = m + d) ≠ q} min{1, n} (2.7)
s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)m ≠ (1 + µ)d1 + Rd + — min{1, 1/n}[u(q) ≠ (m + d)] + —(m + d) = S. (2.8)
First, note that 1(.) is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the statement
in the bracket is true and zero otherwise. Second, recall that if a seller is audited, the
fiscal authority can observe directly income in bank deposits, but it can only observe
income in cash with probability flm. If y < d, the seller always loses his or her income in
bank deposits if he or she is audited, but he or she only loses his or her cash income if
it is observed. If d Æ y < d + m, a seller loses his or her entire income when he or she
is audited and his or her cash income is observed, but does not lose any income if his or
her cash income is not observed.
Next, after receiving the income reports, the fiscal authority chooses ÷ to maximize





Ey{(d + flmm ≠ ·(y))1(y < d) + flm(d + m ≠ ·(y))1(d Æ y < d + m)} ≠ C
È
+ ·(y), (2.9)
where the expectation is taken over m and d. Lastly, recall that there is measure one
of buyers and measure – of sellers. Let   denote the set of posted terms of trade. Let
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F (q, p) denote the distribution of (q, p). Then, n(q, p) must satisfy
⁄
(q,p)œ 
n(q, p) dF (q, p) = 1
–
. (2.10)
Now, I solve for the equilibrium for a given ·(y). The equilibrium concept is Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which requires that
(1) the choices of (q, m, d, y, n) and ÷ are sequentially rational given the fiscal authority’s
beliefs about m and d conditional on y; and
(2) the fiscal authority’s beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
For any y that is not reported in equilibrium, conditions (1) and (2) put no restrictions
on the fiscal authority’s beliefs. Therefore, there may exist many equilibria supported by
various o -equilibrium path beliefs, and some form of equilibrium refinement is necessary.
However, standard refinement methods such as the intuitive criterion may not apply in
this environment, because sellers’ true income is determined by sellers’ own choices (i.e.,
(q, m, d, n)).
To refine the equilibrium, I require that for any y, a seller’s choices of (q, m, d, n)
and the fiscal authority’s choice of ÷ constitute a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, given
(S, y, ÷), sellers solve
max
q,m,d,n
min{1, n}{[(1 ≠ ÷)(m + d ≠ ·(y)) + ÷(1 ≠ flm)(m + d ≠ ·(y))]1(d Æ y < d + m)
+ [(1 ≠ ÷)(m + d ≠ ·(y)) + ÷(1 ≠ flm)m]1(y < d)
+ [m + d ≠ ·(y)]1(y = m + d) ≠ q} (2.11)
s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)m≠(1 + µ)d1 + Rd + — min{1, 1/n}[u(q) ≠ (m + d)] + —(m + d) = S. (2.12)














= 0, if y Ø m + d or d + flmm ≠ ·(y) < C;
œ [0, 1], if y < d and d + flmm ≠ ·(y) = C, or d Æ y < m + d and flm[d + m ≠ ·(y)] = C;
= 1, if y < d and d + flmm ≠ ·(y) > C, or d Æ y < m + d and flm[d + m ≠ ·(y)] > C.
(2.13)
Note that for any y that is on the equilibrium path, (q, m, d, n) must solve problem (2.11)
and ÷ must satisfy expression (2.13). The proposed refinement simply requires the same
to be true for any o -equilibrium choice of y. This refinement is in the same vein of the
Reordering Invariance (RI) equilibrium proposed by In and Wright (2018). See Appendix
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A.1 for more discussion on equilibrium refinement.
In the next proposition, I describe all possible equilibria of the game between sellers
and the fiscal authority given ·(y), Rd, µ, and flm.
Proposition 2.1 Assume Rd > 0 and C/flm < q̃ where q̃ solves uÕ(q) = 1+µ— . Then,
(1) Sellers who fail to meet buyers in the DM report y = 0 and produce q = 0.
(2) Sellers who meet buyers in the DM randomize over strategies that include:
(a) q > 0, m > 0, d > 0, and y = d; (b) q > 0, m = 0, d > 0, and 0 < y < d;
(c) q > 0, m = 0, d > 0, and y = d; (d) q > 0, m = 0, d > 0, and y = 0;
(e) q > 0, m > 0, d = 0, and y = 0.
In particular, in any equilibrium, either (d) or (e) is played with probability strictly
between zero and one.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Note that if Rd = 0, there is no benefit from using bank deposits. To make the problem
interesting, I assume Rd > 0. If a seller fails to meet a buyer in the DM, it is his or her
dominant strategy to report y = 0 and produce q = 0 since sellers do not derive utility
from the DM good.
Now, suppose a seller meets a buyer in the DM. Consider strategies (a)-(e). Strategy
(a) says that the seller under-reports his or her income, and he or she accepts both cash
and bank deposits as payment. The amount of income the seller reports, y, is equal to
the amount he or she accepts in bank deposits. Accepting both cash and deposits allows
the seller to benefit from both the higher return of deposits and the feature of cash that
allows it to be hidden with probability 1 ≠ flm. To see why y = d, note that for all d Æ y,
the larger d is, the more the seller benefits from the higher return of deposits. If the seller
is audited, then as long as the fiscal authority fails to observe his or her cash income, he
or she does not lose any income (bar the tax due). However, if d > y and the seller is
audited, he or she will lose all income in bank deposits with certainty. If the following
relationship holds in equilibrium
Rd <
(1 ≠ flm)÷
1 ≠ ÷ , (2.14)
then the tax-evasion benefit of cash outweighs the higher return of deposits. Hence, the
seller chooses to receive the rest of the payment in cash. Note that (2.14) implies that
for cash to be used in equilibrium, the return on deposits must not be too high.
If Rd is instead high, i.e., Rd > (1≠fl
m
)÷
1≠÷ , then it is beneficial to accept only bank
deposits (strategy (b)). In this case, even though the seller loses all of his or her income
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if he or she is audited, the higher return on deposits outweighs the tax-evasion benefit
of cash. Depending on ·(y), it may be that reporting truthfully (i.e., strategy (c)) o ers
higher surplus compared to the under-reporting strategies of (a) and (b). In this case,
cash loses its tax-evasion benefit. Then, as long as Rd > 0, the seller accepts only bank
deposits.
Lastly, consider strategies (d) and (e). The proposition says that either one of (d)
and (e) must be played with probability strictly between 0 and 1. To see why, first note
that because there are more sellers than buyers, a positive measure of sellers do not meet
buyers in the DM and will report y = 0. If the fiscal authority does not audit sellers
who report y = 0, then all sellers including those who have met buyers will report y = 0.
However, if the fiscal authority audits sellers who report y = 0 with probability one, all
sellers will report truthfully, and then the fiscal authority will not have the incentive to
audit sellers. Hence, in equilibrium, it must be that the fiscal authority audits sellers
who report y = 0 with probability strictly between 0 and 1, and some (but not all) sellers
who have met buyers report y = 0.
Now, I am ready to solve for the optimal tax schedule that maximizes the total surplus
in the DM subject to raising a given amount of net tax revenue.
Proposition 2.2 The optimal tax schedule is · ú(y) = min{y, ·̃}.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
The tax schedule · ú(y) is optimal for two reasons. First, it does not distort sellers’
decisions in the DM as long as sellers report their income truthfully. Second, as shown
in the proof of Proposition 2.2, it eliminates strategies (a) and (b) from the equilibrium.
That is, under · ú(y), sellers who meet buyers in the DM either report y = 0 or report
truthfully. This way, · ú(y) lowers the audit costs and increases the fiscal authority’s net
tax revenue.
The equilibrium of the audit game under · ú(y) is given by the following.
(1) With probability 1≠“, a matched seller chooses q = qh, m = 0, and d = y = dh,
where qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) , (2.15)
and dh is given by
dh = 1 + R
d
1 + µ [—u(q
h) ≠ S]. (2.16)
2.3. A Benchmark Model: No CBDC 17
(2) With probability “, a matched seller chooses y = 0. Given Rb and ·̃ , there
exists flmÕ such that if flm < flmÕ, the seller accepts only cash and is audited with
probability ÷0. The seller chooses q = q0 and m = m0, where q0 solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷0) , (2.17)
and m0 is given by
m0 = 11 + µ [—u(q
0) ≠ S]. (2.18)
(3) S is such that dh ≠ qh ≠ ·̃ = 0. ÷0 is such that (1 ≠ flm÷0)m0 ≠ q0 = 0. The
fiscal authority does not audit sellers who report y = dh.
(4) “ solves
“flmm0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (2.19)
It should be noted that if flm Ø flmÕ, then sellers who report y = 0 may also use bank
deposits, and hence the demand for cash is zero. In what follows, I assume that flm is
su ciently small so that sellers who evade taxes use cash. Note also that the term “–≠1+“
in (2.19) represents the probability that a seller who reports y = 0 is evading taxes.
Hence, (2.19) guarantees that the fiscal authority is indi erent between auditing and not
auditing a seller who reports y = 0.
It is worth noting that because (by assumption) there are more sellers than buyers in
the economy and that matching is e cient, sellers’ surplus is driven to zero in equilibrium.
To see why, first note that in equilibrium there must not exist a submarket where sellers
are strictly better o  while buyers are at least as well o . Second, because there are
more sellers than buyers, it must be that n(q, p) < 1 for some (q, p). If sellers’ surplus is
positive, then consider a submarket with (q, p, nÕ) where nÕ > n(q, p). In this submarket,
buyers are as well o  but sellers are strictly better o , which is a contradiction. If
matching is not e cient, then both S and seller’s surplus may be strictly positive. In
such case, the determination of S is more complex, but the main findings in this chapter
remain unchanged.
The next proposition shows the e ects of ·̃ , Rd, and flm on equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 2.3 (1) An increase in ·̃ leads to a decrease in q0, no change in qh, and
an increase in “. (2) An increase in Rd leads to an increase in qh, an increase in q0, and
a decrease in “. (3) An increase in flm leads to a decrease in “ but no changes in q0 and
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qh.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
An increase in ·̃ makes tax evasion more attractive. Therefore, the audit probability
on sellers who report y = 0 must increase. This leads to a decrease in production by
these sellers (i.e., q0) and a decrease in payment to these sellers (i.e., m0). Then, there
must be more sellers who meet buyers in the DM reporting y = 0 so that (2.19) holds.
An increase in Rd has the opposite e ect: it makes reporting truthfully more attractive.
Therefore, the audit probability on sellers who report y = 0 must decrease. This then
leads to an increase in q0 and a decrease in “.
Notice that even though the tax schedule · ú(y) is optimal, it mitigates but does not
eliminate distortions in the economy. Specifically, for sellers who report y = 0 but have
met buyers in the DM, the risk of being audited by the fiscal authority acts e ectively
as a proportional tax. As a result, these sellers produce less in equilibrium. This means
that when tax evasion is possible, distortions caused by taxes cannot be eliminated solely
through the optimal design of the tax schedule.
Lastly, result (3) shows that a change in flm does not have any e ect on q0 and qh.
This is because any change in flm is o set by a change in ÷0 in the opposite direction
so that 1 ≠ flm÷0, the probability of successful tax evasion, is kept constant. In fact, q0
only depends on S in equilibrium. To see this, note that the surplus of sellers who report
y = 0 satisfies
(1 ≠ flm÷0)m0 ≠ q0 = 0, (2.20)
where
m0 = 11 + µ [—u(q
0) ≠ S], (2.21)
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷0) , (2.22)
S = —u(qh) ≠ (1 + µ)(q
h + ·̃)
1 + Rd . (2.23)
Hence, we have
S = —u(q0) ≠ 1 + µ1 ≠ flm÷0 q
0 = —u(q0) ≠ —q0uÕ(q0). (2.24)
That is, as long as S does not change, q0 will not change. And S will not change as long
as µ, Rd, and ·̃ do not change. This means that even if the increase in flm is su ciently
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large so that sellers who report y = 0 switch to accepting bank deposits, it will have no
e ect on q0 and qh. However, it is easy to show that “ will decrease and net tax revenue
will increase.
2.3.2 Bankers’ Problem in the CM
Recall that the markets for bank deposits and bank loans are perfectly competitive, so
bankers take the nominal deposit rate Rd and the nominal loan rate Rk as given.
I assume that if a banker chooses to default, he or she can abscond with a fraction ◊
of the collateral. Bankers’ problem is given by
max
dB ,mB ,bB ,kB
{—(kB + mB + bB ≠ dB) ≠ e} (2.25)
s.t. (1 + µ)k
B
1 + Rk + (1 + µ)m
B + (1 + µ)b
B
1 + Rb =
(1 + µ)dB
1 + Rd + e, (2.26)
(kB + mB + bB)(1 ≠ ◊) Ø dB, (2.27)
kB, mB, bB, dB Ø 0. (2.28)
The amount of bank deposits (in real term) created by a banker is dB, and e is the
amount of CM good produced by the banker using the same technology as buyers. This
means that, to satisfy the incentive constraint (2.27), bankers supply its own capital (i.e.,
“sweat equity”). Finally, a banker’s holdings of cash, government bonds, and loans are
mB, bB, and kB, respectively.
Next, given Rd, the demand for deposits by a buyer who decides to visit (qh, dh) is
dh = qh + ·̃ , (2.29)
where
uÕ(qh) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) . (2.30)
Since a fraction 1 ≠ “ of sellers accept deposits in the DM, to clear the deposit market,
Rd must be such that dB = (1 ≠ “)dh.
Given Rk, the demand for loans by entrepreneurs is given by
f Õ(k) = 1 + R
k
1 + µ . (2.31)
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Finally, depending on the return on loans, government bonds, and cash, the bankers
may hold one or more types of assets as collateral. In what follows, I focus on equilibria
where (2.27) binds. If bankers hold both government bonds and loans, then Rk and Rb
must satisfy
1 + µ
1 + Rb =
1 + µ
1 + Rk = —◊ +
(1 ≠ ◊)(1 + µ)
1 + Rd . (2.32)
2.3.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a vector {qh, q0, k, “, ÷0, Rd, Rb, Rk} that solves the audit game between
sellers and the fiscal authority and bankers’ problems in the CM, and satisfies the budget
constraints (2.3) and (2.4) given fiscal and monetary policies (·̃ , D, µ).
Proposition 2.4 There exists µÕ such that if (1) — ≠ 1 < µ < µÕ, (2) Cflm Æ ·̃ , and (3)
kf Õ(k) is increasing in k, then there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
To solve the equilibrium, one may first derive the total demand for cash from (2.19).
m̄ = (– ≠ 1 + “)C
flm
. (2.33)
This shows that the demand for cash only depends on other parameter values through
its dependence on “, the proportion of sellers who evade taxes. Next, the total demand
for government bonds by bankers is given by
b̄ = 1 ≠ “1 ≠ ◊ (q
h + ·̃) ≠ kB. (2.34)
In the proof, I show that if Cflm Æ ·̃ , then m̄ + b̄ is strictly increasing in R
b. Hence, there
exists a unique Rb such that m̄ + b̄ = D. For an equilibrium to exist, it is also necessary
that µ is not too large. This is because if µ is large, the cost of holding cash may be so
high that even if the fiscal authority conducts no audits, sellers accepting cash will not
be able to compete with sellers who accept bank deposits. In such case, the demand for
cash is zero.
Next, I consider the e ects of increasing the inflation target µ on the equilibrium. In
the model, this is achieved through open market purchases of government bonds.
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Proposition 2.5 Suppose the assumptions in Proposition 2.4 hold. Then, an increase
in µ leads to increases in both qh and q0. In addition, “ and 1+R
b




Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2.5 says that when µ is small, increasing µ will increase qh, q0, and the
proportion of sellers who evade taxes. This is because higher inflation reduces the income
of sellers who evade taxes. Tax evaders’ lower cash income means that even if they are
found evading taxes, the punishment the fiscal authority can impose is small. This
decreases the fiscal authority’s incentive to conduct audits. The drop in the level of tax
enforcement (i.e., ÷0) leads to a larger share of sellers evading taxes. It can be shown that
as long as Cflm Æ ·̃ , the drop in enforcement always o sets the increase in inflation. As a
result, sellers who accept cash and evade taxes can produce more for buyers. More sellers
accepting cash also means a lower demand for bank deposits. Consequently, the demand
for government bonds decreases, and the real bond rate increases. This allows sellers
who accept bank deposits and report truthfully to produce more for buyers. However, a
higher government bond rate crowds out bank lending to entrepreneurs, so k decreases.
The general equilibrium e ects of inflation on real allocations in Proposition 2.5
emerge in this environment for two reasons. First, the value of cash as a payment
instrument is determined not only by inflation but also by the fiscal authority’s audit
strategy. A change in inflation leads not only to a change in the cost of carrying cash
but also to a change in the audit probability. Second, the total supply of government
liabilities, D = m̄ + b̄, is too low to support e cient consumption in the DM. This means
that a decrease in demand for bank deposits will lead to an increase in government bond
rate and the deposit rate, and hence a higher qh. In comparison, if D is su ciently large
so that Rd = Rb = (1 + µ)/— ≠ 1, constraint (2.27) will not bind and bankers will be
indi erent between holding or not holding one extra unit of government bonds. In this
case, an increase in inflation will increase “ and q0, but will have no e ect on qh.
2.4 Central Bank Digital Currency: Equilibrium
I define central bank digital currency (CBDC) to be another type of payment instrument
(in addition to cash) that is issued by the central bank. It is stored in accounts managed
by the central bank, and it can be held by all agents. Throughout this section, I assume
that the central bank does not withdraw cash from circulation. However, I will show that
depending on the characteristics of CBDC, cash may not be used in equilibrium because
CBDC may be a superior payment instrument.
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It is also important to be clear about how CBDC is introduced into the economy.
Recall that in the benchmark model, the central bank can increase or decrease the supply
of cash through open market purchases or sales of government bonds. The central bank’s
balance sheet is
Assets of the central bank Liabilities of the central bank
Government bonds Cash
Table 2.1: Central Bank Balance Sheet: Before the Introduction of CBDC
Similar to cash, the central bank introduces CBDC by using it to purchase government
bonds from the bond market. The central bank’s balance sheet after the introduction of
CBDC is
Assets of the central bank Liabilities of the central bank
Government bonds Cash
Central bank digital currency
Table 2.2: Central Bank Balance Sheet: After the Introduction of CBDC
Now, I discuss the characteristics of CBDC. I assume that CBDC can be (potentially)
di erent from cash and bank deposits in two dimensions: the first is the interest rate
on CBDC (Rc), and the second is how much anonymity CBDC o ers. In the context of
tax evasion, the degree of anonymity of CBDC will a ect the probability of the income
received in CBDC being observed by the fiscal authority after an audit (flc). I assume that
both Rc and flc are the choices of the central bank.8 Specifically, I consider the scenarios
where (Rc, flc) œ R+ ◊ [flm, 1]. Recall that flm is the probability of income received in cash
being observed by the fiscal authority after an audit. Since CBDC competes with cash,
if flc Ø flm, then it must be that Rc Ø 0, because otherwise sellers will strictly prefer cash
over CBDC.9
In what follows, I first consider a scenario where both the interest rate on CBDC and
the degree of anonymity of CBDC are too low so that CBDC is not used in equilibrium.
I then show what other types of equilibria may exist depending on Rc and flc.
8Darbha and Arora (2020) show that combinations of several cryptographic techniques and oper-
ational arrangements can be used to achieve fine-grained privacy designs. ESCB (2019) demonstrates
that through “anonymity vouchers”, CBDC can o er anonymity while also complying with anti-money
laundering and anti-terrorism laws.
9If flc < flm, then even if the interest rate on CBDC is negative, it may still be accepted by sellers.
I discuss this case in Appendix A.4. I also consider a scenario where CBDC o ers less anonymity than
bank deposits. Specifically, I assume that the fiscal authority can costlessly observe any income sellers
receive in CBDC, but audits are necessary for the fiscal authority to observe cash and deposit income.
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2.4.1 Type-1 Equilibrium: CBDC is not Used
Denote deposit rate in the benchmark as Rbench. Denote the audit probability in the
benchmark as ÷bench. Recall that in the benchmark model, sellers who choose to evade
taxes accept only cash, and they solve the following problem
max
q,m
{(1 ≠ flm÷bench)m ≠ q} s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)m + —u(q) = S, (2.35)
where S is highest surplus buyers can obtain elsewhere in the market, and sellers take it
as given. If a seller chooses to accept CBDC, then he or she solves
max
q,c
{(1 ≠ flc÷bench)c ≠ q} s.t. ≠ 1 + µ1 + Rc c + —u(q) = S, (2.36)
where c represents the payment in CBDC. Then, it is easy to see that as long as
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) >
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench , (2.37)
sellers who evade taxes will strictly prefer cash over CBDC. The left-hand side of (2.37)
represents the marginal cost of accepting CBDC, while the right-hand side represents
the marginal cost of accepting cash. While CBDC may o er a positive interest rate (i.e.,
Rc > 0), it may also o er less anonymity compared to cash (i.e., flc > flm). If Rc is too
low and flc is too high, then after factoring the risk of being audited and punished by
the fiscal authority, the cost of accepting cash is strictly lower compared to the cost of
accepting CBDC.
Next, consider sellers who report their income truthfully. In the benchmark model,
these sellers accept bank deposits, and they solve
max
q,d
{d ≠ ·̃ ≠ q} s.t. ≠ 1 + µ1 + Rbench d + —u(q) = S. (2.38)
If a seller chooses to accept CBDC, then he or she solves
max
q,c
{c ≠ ·̃ ≠ q} s.t. ≠ 1 + µ1 + Rc c + —u(q) = S. (2.39)
Then as long as Rc < Rbench, sellers who report their income truthfully will have no incen-
tive to accept CBDC. If neither sellers who evade taxes nor sellers who report truthfully
accept CBDC, then the equilibrium will be identical to the benchmark equilibrium in
Section 2.3.
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Now, suppose that Rc and flc are such that
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) <
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench . (2.40)
This means that for sellers who evade taxes, the marginal cost of accepting CBDC is
lower compared to the marginal cost of accept cash. In this case, depending on Rc and
flc, sellers who report their income truthfully may accept only bank deposits (a type-2
equilibrium; see Section 2.4.2), or some of them may switch to accepting CBDC (a type-3
equilibrium; see Section 2.4.3).
Finally, suppose that
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) >
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench (2.41)
but Rc > Rbench. In this case, sellers who report their income truthfully have the incentive
to accept CBDC. However, for sellers who evade taxes, the marginal cost of accepting
cash is still lower compared to that of accepting CBDC (a type-4 equilibrium; see Section
2.4.4).
2.4.2 Type-2 Equilibrium: CBDC Replaces Cash
Assume that
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) <
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench . (2.42)
Then, sellers who evade taxes have the incentive to switch to accepting CBDC. Now,
suppose that Rc is low so that sellers who report truthfully prefer to accept bank deposits.
The equilibrium is given by the following.
(1) With probability 1 ≠ “, a matched seller produces q = qh, demands deposit
payment d = dh, and reports y = d, where qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) , (2.43)
and dh is given by
dh = 1 + R
d
1 + µ [—u(q
h) ≠ S]. (2.44)
(2) With probability “, a matched seller produces q = q0, demands CBDC payment
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c = c0, and reports y = 0, where q0 solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flc÷)(1 + Rc) , (2.45)
and c0 is given by
c0 = 1 + R
c
1 + µ [—u(q
0) ≠ S]. (2.46)
(3) S is such that dh ≠ qh ≠ ·̃ = 0. ÷0 is such that (1 ≠ flc÷)c0 ≠ q0 = 0.
(4) “ solves
“flcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (2.47)
A banker’s problem is similar to the benchmark model, but now the bankers can hold
CBDC. However, note that similar to the benchmark, in equilibrium,
1 + µ
1 + Rb =
1 + µ
1 + Rk = —◊ +
(1 ≠ ◊)(1 + µ)
1 + Rd , (2.48)
where Rb and Rk are government bond rate and nominal loan rate, respectively. Since
Rb > Rd and Rd > Rc, the interest rate on CBDC is lower than the interest rate on
government bonds. This means that bankers will not hold CBDC. Finally, let c̄ denote
the the demand for CBDC. Let b̄ denote the demand for government bonds from bankers.
Then
c̄ = (– ≠ 1 + “)C
flc
, (2.49)
b̄ = (1 ≠ “)(q
h + ·̃)





(1≠◊) is the total demand for bank deposits, k is the investment in each
entrepreneur’s project, and f Õ(k)k is the total value of loans. In equilibrium, Rd is such
that D = c̄ + b̄, where D is the total supply of government bonds.
Now I derive the e ects of Rc and flc on the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.6 Increasing Rc or flc while holding µ constant lowers qh and q0. In
addition, “, Rd, and Rb will decrease, while k will increase.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
First, a higher return on CBDC leads to larger payments to sellers who evade taxes,
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which gives the fiscal authority more incentive to audit sellers. Such an increase in tax
enforcement leads to fewer sellers evading the tax and lower output from those who choose
to evade. Because more sellers are accepting deposits, the demand for deposits increases.
This drives down the deposit rate and the government bond rate. Consequently, the
output produced by sellers who report truthfully decreases as well. A lower government















Partial equilibrium e ects General equilibrium e ects
Figure 2.1: E ects of Increasing Rc in a Type-2 Equilibrium
Second, a higher flc increases the visibility of sellers’ income, which also makes the fiscal
authority’s more willing to audit sellers. This decreases tax evasion and increases the
demand for deposits. Similar to increasing Rc, the deposit rate will be lower, and the
income and output of sellers who report truthfully will decrease.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the mechanism. Note that an increase in Rc or flc does not
directly a ect qh, since sellers who report truthfully do not use CBDC, and they are not
audited. In a partial equilibrium where the deposit rate is taken as given, increasing
Rc or flc will only a ect the level of tax evasion (“) and the output from sellers who
evade taxes (q0). However, in a general equilibrium, the decrease in tax evasion raises
the demand for bank deposits, which then a ects the output from sellers who report
truthfully through its e ect on the deposit rate.
Because Rd is decreasing in Rc and flc, for su ciently large Rc and flc, we will have
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Rc = Rd. In such case, sellers who report truthfully will be willing to switch to accepting
CBDC as well. I discuss this case in the next sub-section.
2.4.3 Type-3 Equilibrium: CBDC Replaces Cash and (some)
Bank Deposits
Before I discuss type-3 equilibria, it should be made clear that while CBDC may com-
pletely replace cash (a type-2 equilibrium), it will not completely replace bank deposits.
The reason is that if bank deposits are not used in equilibrium, bankers will have to
fund the loans to entrepreneurs through working in the CM. In such case, the real loan
rate 1+Rk
1+µ will be equal to
1
— , and the real deposit rate will be equal to
1
— as well. This
means that unless the real interest rate on CBDC is greater or equal to 1— , sellers will
prefer to use bank deposits. Note that the demand for CBDC will be infinite if the real
interest rate on CBDC is greater than 1— . Hence, in any equilibrium, sellers who report
their income truthfully will either strictly prefer bank deposits, or be indi erent between
accepting CBDC and accepting bank deposits.
Now, I discuss a type-3 equilibrium where some sellers who report truthfully accept
CBDC, while other sellers who report truthfully accept bank deposits. In such case, the
interest rate on CBDC must be equal to the deposit rate. Let R © Rc = Rd. The
equilibrium is given by the following.
(1) With probability 1≠“, a matched seller reports truthfully and produces q = qh,
where qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + R) . (2.51)
Among sellers who report truthfully, a fraction ‘ accept bank deposits, while the
rest accept CBDC. Let ah denote the payment received in bank deposits or CBDC
by these sellers. Then ah is given by
ah = 1 + R1 + µ [—u(q
h) ≠ S]. (2.52)
(2) With probability “, a matched seller produces y = 0, reports an income equal
to zero, and demands CBDC payment c = c0, where q0 solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flc÷0)(1 + R) , (2.53)
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and c0 is given by
c0 = 1 + R1 + µ [—u(q
0) ≠ S]. (2.54)
(3) S is such that ah ≠ qh ≠ ·̃ = 0, and ÷0 is such that (1 ≠ flc÷0)c0 ≠ q0 = 0.
(4) “ solves
“flcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (2.55)
(5) The demand for government bonds from bankers is given by
b̄ = ‘(1 ≠ “)(q
h + ·̃)





1≠◊ is the total demand for bank deposits, k is the investment in each
entrepreneur’s project, and f Õ(k)k is the total value of loans.
(6) The total demand for CBDC is given by
c̄ = (1 ≠ “)(1 ≠ ‘)(qh + ·̃) + (– ≠ 1 + “)C
flc
, (2.57)
where the first term represents the demand from sellers who report truthfully, and
the second term represents the demand from sellers who evade taxes.
(7) The fraction of sellers who report truthfully and accept deposits, ‘, is such that
b̄ + c̄ = D.
Finally, a banker’s problem is similar to the benchmark model. In equilibrium,
1 + µ
1 + Rb = —◊ +
(1 ≠ ◊)(1 + µ)
1 + Rd . (2.58)
Hence, Rb > Rd = Rc. This means that the interest rate on CBDC is lower than the
interest rate on government bonds, so bankers will not hold CBDC.
Now, I discuss the e ects of Rc and flc on the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.7 (1) Increasing Rc while holding µ and flc constant increases qh and q0.
In addition, “, ‘, and k will decrease. (2) Increasing flc while holding µ and Rc constant
has no e ect on qh, q0, and k. However, “, ÷0, and ‘ will decrease.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
First, higher Rc increases the income of sellers who accept CBDC and makes them willing
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to produce more for buyers. However, because sellers who evade taxes faces audits from
the fiscal authority (which e ectively serves as a proportion tax), they benefit less from
the increase in Rc compared to sellers who report truthfully. This means that more
sellers will choose to report truthfully. The decrease in tax evasion is su ciently large
to o set the increase in payment received by sellers who evade taxes. As a result, audit
probability decreases. Second, a higher flc has no direct e ect on sellers who report their
income truthfully because the interest rate on CBDC and bank deposits are unchanged.
However, because flc is larger, the visibility of sellers’ income increases. This decreases
sellers’ incentive to evade taxes and reduces tax evasions. Since fewer sellers are evading
taxes, the audit probability decreases, which compensates for the increase in flc. As a
result, q0 is also unchanged.
To understand why ‘ decreases with Rc and flc, first recall that CBDC is created
by the central bank through purchasing government bonds with CBDC, so one unit of
government bonds can be used to create one unit of CBDC. However, because bankers
have limited commitment and can abscond with a fraction ◊ of assets, they can only
create 1 ≠ ◊ units of bank deposits with one unit of government bonds. This means that
the central bank is more e cient at creating payment assets compared to bankers.10
Higher demand













Figure 2.2: E ects of Increasing Rc in a Type-3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, an increase in Rc or flc will lead to an increase in the demand for
bank deposits and CBDC. The central bank then increases the supply of CBDC by
purchasing more government bonds from the bond market. Since the total supply of
10I discuss this property in more details in Section 2.5.1.
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government bonds is fixed, bankers decrease their holdings of government bonds and
reduce the supply of deposits. In equilibrium, the total supply of CBDC and bank
deposits increases, and a larger share of sellers who report truthfully accept CBDC. The
mechanisms are summarized in Figure 2.2.
It should be noted that in both type-2 and type-3 equilibria, a higher Rc decreases tax
evasion. However, in a type-3 equilibrium, a higher Rc increases rather than decreases
Rd, qh, and q0. To see why, first note that in a type-2 equilibrium, CBDC is not accepted
by sellers who report their income truthfully. A higher Rc leads to more sellers accepting
deposits, which decreases the deposit rate and lowers the income and output of sellers who
report truthfully. In a type-3 equilibrium, an increase in Rc also increases the demand for
bank deposits, but because the interest rate on CBDC is high, some sellers who report
truthfully substitute CBDC for bank deposits. Since the central bank is more e cient
at creating payment assets, the total supply of CBDC and bank deposits increases. As
a result, the deposit rate and the government bond rate increase rather than decrease,
and all sellers produce more in equilibrium.
In Figure 2.3, I fix flc and show how Rd varies with Rc for a given flc. When Rc is low,
CBDC is not used in equilibrium, and Rd is equal to the deposit rate in the benchmark.
When Rd is large enough for sellers who evade taxes to be willing to accept CBDC, the
economy is in a type-2 equilibrium. In such case, Rd is decreasing in Rc. When Rd = Rc,
the economy transitions into a type-3 equilibrium, and Rd is decreasing in Rc. Notice
that Rc < Rbench when the equilibrium switches from type-2 to type-3. This means that
even if the interest rate on CBDC is lower than the deposit rate in the benchmark, sellers






Figure 2.3: Relationship Between Rd and Rc
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Finally, suppose Rc < Rbench and consider an increase in flc. If Rc and flc satisfy
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) >
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench , (2.59)
then sellers who evade taxes will switch back to accepting cash. Since Rc < Rbench,
sellers who report their income truthfully will not accept CBDC either. That is, the
equilibrium transitions from type-3 to type-1. Now, suppose Rc > Rbench and consider
again an increase in flc. If (2.59) holds, then sellers who report truthfully will accept
CBDC but sellers who evade taxes will not. I discuss this type of equilibria in the next
sub-section.
2.4.4 Type-4 Equilibrium: CBDC Replaces (some) Bank De-
posits
Assume that Rc > Rbench, and that Rc and flc satisfy
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) >
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench . (2.60)
Then, sellers who evade taxes prefer to accept cash, while sellers who report their income
truthfully have the incentive to accept CBDC. Recall that in any equilibrium, sellers who
report their income truthfully must either strictly prefer bank deposits or be indi erent
between accepting CBDC and accepting bank deposits (see Section 2.4.3). This means
that Rd must increase in equilibrium so that Rd = Rc. Now, define R © Rd = Rc. The
equilibrium is given by the following.
(1) With probability 1≠“, a matched seller reports truthfully and produces q = qh,
where qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + R) . (2.61)
Among sellers who report truthfully, a fraction ‘ accept bank deposits, while the
rest accept CBDC. Let ah denote the payment received in bank deposits or CBDC.
Then ah is given by
ah = 1 + R1 + µ [—u(q
h) ≠ S]. (2.62)
(2) With probability “, a matched seller produces y = 0, reports an income equal
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to zero, and demands CBDC payment m = m0, where q0 solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷0) , (2.63)
and m0 is given by
m0 = 11 + µ [—u(q
0) ≠ S]. (2.64)
(3) S is such that ah ≠ qh ≠ ·̃ = 0, and ÷0 is such that (1 ≠ flm÷0)m0 ≠ q0 = 0.
(4) “ solves
“flmm0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (2.65)
(5) The demand for government bonds from bankers is given by
b̄ = ‘(1 ≠ “)(q
h + ·̃)





1≠◊ is the total demand for bank deposits, k is the investment in each
entrepreneur’s project, and f Õ(k)k is the total value of loans.
(6) The total demand for CBDC is given by
c̄ = (1 ≠ “)(1 ≠ ‘)(qh + ·̃). (2.67)
(7) The total demand for cash is given by
m̄ = (– ≠ 1 + “)C
flm
. (2.68)
(8) The fraction of sellers who report truthfully and accept deposits, ‘, is such that
m̄ + b̄ + c̄ = D.
In equilibrium, Rb and Rd satisfy
1 + µ
1 + Rb = —◊ +
(1 ≠ ◊)(1 + µ)
1 + Rd . (2.69)
Hence, Rb > Rd = Rc. This means that the interest rate on CBDC is lower than the
interest rate on government bonds, so bankers will not hold CBDC.
In a type-4 equilibrium, CBDC is not accepted by sellers who evade taxes. This means
that how much anonymity CBDC o ers will not have any impact on the equilibrium.
Now, consider the e ects of Rc on equilibrium outcomes.
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Proposition 2.8 Increasing Rc while holding µ constant increases qh and q0. In addi-
tion, “, ‘, and k will decrease.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Increasing Rc has similar e ects in type-3 and type-4 equilibria. Specifically, a higher Rc
increases the income and output of sellers who report truthfully and lowers the incen-
tive for sellers to evade taxes. The decrease in tax evasion lowers the fiscal authority’s
incentive to audit, which allows sellers who evade taxes to also produce more for buyers.
The decrease in tax evasion also increases the demand for bank deposits and CBDC. To
increase the supply of CBDC, the central bank purchases more government bonds from
the bond market. Recall that because the central bank is immune from the limited com-
mitment issue, for the same quantity of government bonds the central bank can create
more payment assets compared to bankers. Since the total supply of government bonds
is fixed, the competition between the central bank and bankers drives out deposits. As
a result, ‘ decreases in equilibrium.
I summarize the four equilibrium types discussed in the following table.
Equilibrium Types Payment instrument(s)
accepted by honest sellers
Payment instrument(s)
accepted by dishonest sellers
Type-1 (benchmark) Bank deposits Cash
Type-2 Bank deposits CBDC
Type-3 CBDC and bank deposits CBDC
Type-4 CBDC and bank deposits Cash
Table 2.3: Equilibrium Types
flc





Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Types
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In Figure 2.4, I show how equilibrium types depend on Rc (the horizontal axis) and flc
(the vertical axis). The origin represents (Rc, flc) = (0, flm). In general, CBDC replaces
only cash if it o ers high anonymity but low interest rate (a type-2 equilibrium). CBDC
replaces (some) bank deposits if it o ers low anonymity but high interest rate (a type-4
equilibrium). If CBDC o ers a combination of high interest rate and higher anonymity
than deposits, then it replaces cash and (some) bank deposits (a type-3 equilibrium).
2.5 Aggregate Welfare and Central Bank Net Rev-
enue
In the first part of this section, I discuss the welfare e ects of introducing a central
bank digital currency (CBDC). Aggregate welfare is measured using an equal-weighted
sum of all agents’ utility. Specifically, let xb denote the net consumption of bankers
in the DM (recall that bankers may both produce and consume in the CM). Let xe
denote the consumption of entrepreneurs born in the previous period. Recall that l is
the labor supplied by buyers in the CM, and x is the consumption of sellers in the CM.
Furthermore, qh and q0 are the output from sellers who report their income truthfully
and the output from sellers who evade taxes, respectively. Finally, “ is the proportion of
sellers who evade taxes. Then, aggregate welfare is given by
W = (1 ≠ “)[u(qh) ≠ qh] + “[u(q0) ≠ q0] + xb + xe + x ≠ l. (2.70)
In the second part of this section, I discuss the e ect of introducing CBDC on the central
bank’s net revenue. The central bank in the model, similar to its counterparts in reality
(e.g., the Federal Reserve), earns revenue through the interest payments on its assets
(government bonds). The interest expenses of the central bank are the interest payments
on its liabilities (CBDC and/or cash). Since the central bank does not pay interest on
cash, the interest expense of the central bank is zero in the benchmark. In practice,
the expenses of central banks may also include costs of producing and replacing physical
cash, and the costs of operating the central bank (e.g., personnel costs).11 To ensure a
central bank’s independence of the fiscal authority, it may be necessary for the central
bank to cover its own expenses rather than rely on transfers from the fiscal authority.
For example, when discussing its independence, the Federal Reserve emphasizes that it
11The interest expense of the Federal Reserve in 2019 is $41B, and the operating expense is $7B.
Together, they account for 85% of the Federal Reserve’s total expenses. In comparison, the interest
expense and the operating expense of the Bank of Canada in 2019 are $406M and $519M, respectively,
and they account for 94% of the Bank of Canada’s total expenses.
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“does not receive funding through the congressional budgetary process”.12 It is therefore
of interest to understand how introducing CBDC, especially interest-bearing CBDC,
a ects the central bank’s net revenue.
2.5.1 Aggregate Welfare
Recall that ÷0 is the audit probability and C is the cost per audit. In equilibrium, the
fiscal authority only audits sellers who report zero income, which include measure –≠1 of
sellers who did not meet buyers in the DM, and measure “ of sellers who choose to evade
taxes. Hence, the total audit costs are equal to (– ≠ 1 + “)÷0C. Recall also that k is the
amount of CM good invested in each entrepreneur’s project. Then, f(k) ≠ k represents
the net output from entrepreneurs’ projects. Since the CM good cannot be carried into
the next period, the resource constraint in the CM implies that net CM consumption
xb + xe + x ≠ l must satisfy
xb + xe + x ≠ l = f(k) ≠ k ≠ (– ≠ 1 + “)÷0C. (2.71)
Aggregate welfare can then be divided into three components.
W = (1 ≠ “)[u(qh) ≠ qh] + “[u(q0) ≠ q0]
¸                                             ˚˙                                             ˝
Total surplus in the DM
+ f(k) ≠ k
 ̧       ̊  ̇       ̋
Net output from entrepreneurs
≠ (– ≠ 1 + “)÷0C




In what follows, to study the e ect of introducing CBDC on aggregate welfare, I compare
the three components with their counterparts in the benchmark equilibrium.
I. Total surplus in the DM
Recall that Rc denotes the interest rate on CBDC, and flc denotes the probability
of the income received in CBDC being observed by the fiscal authority after an audit.
Depending on the central bank’s choices of Rc and flc, there are four types of equilibria
(see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.4). Let Rbench denote the deposit rate in the benchmark
equilibrium.
First, consider the e ect of introducing CBDC on “.
12See https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm. Currently, both the Federal Re-
serve and the Bank of Canada earn more than enough to cover their expenses, and they transfer the
remaining revenue to the fiscal authorities at the end of each year. In 2019, the Federal Reserve and
the Bank of Canada transferred $54.8B and $1.2B to the federal governments of the US and Canada,
respectively.
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Proposition 2.9 Compared to the benchmark, “ is smaller in type-2, type-3, and type-4
equilibria. Given flc, “ is smaller in type-3 equilibria than in type-2 equilibria. Given Rc,
“ is also smaller in type-3 equilibria than in type-4 equilibria.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
In a type-2 equilibrium, CBDC is only accepted by sellers who evade taxes. Recall
that flm is the probability of cash being observed by the fiscal authority after an audit.
Because flc > flm, introducing CBDC increases the visibility of sellers’ income. This gives
the fiscal authority more incentive to audit sellers, which decreases tax evasion. In a
type-4 equilibrium, CBDC is only accepted by sellers who report their income truthfully,
so the anonymity of CBDC is irrelevant to tax evasion. However, in this case, CBDC
competes with bank deposits and increases the deposit rate, which attracts more sellers
to report their income truthfully. Finally, in a type-3 equilibrium, CBDC is accepted by
both sellers who report their income truthfully and sellers who evade taxes. Therefore,
CBDC not only competes with bank deposits but also makes tax audits more e ective.
The result is that the reduction in tax evasion is larger compared to any type-4 equilibria
given Rc and any type-2 equilibria given flc.
Next, consider the e ects of introducing CBDC on q0 and qh.
Proposition 2.10 Compared to the benchmark, (1) q0 and qh are smaller in type-2
equilibria, and larger in type-4 equilibria; and (2) q0 and qh are smaller in type-3 equilibria
if Rc < Rbench but larger if Rc > Rbench.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
In equilibrium, q0 and qh only depend on the deposit rate in the economy. To see this,
note that qh solves
uÕ(qh) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) . (2.73)
Recall that sellers who evade taxes and sellers who report truthfully o er the same surplus
S to buyers. By following (2.20)-(2.24), it is easy to derive that
S = —u(qh) ≠ —uÕ(qh)(qh + ·̃) = —u(q0) ≠ —uÕ(q0)q0. (2.74)
In type-3 and type-4 equilibria, because sellers who report truthfully are indi erent be-
tween CBDC and bank deposits, Rc = Rd. Hence, q0 and qh are larger than their
counterparts in the benchmark equilibrium if and only if Rc Ø Rbench. In type-2 equi-
libria, the decrease in tax evasion causes a shortage of bank deposits, which lowers the
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deposit rate. Hence, in any type-2 equilibrium, Rd < Rbench, and q0 and qh are smaller
compared to the benchmark.
The intuition for the relationship between q0 and qh (i.e., equation (2.74)) is as follows.
First, qh does not depend on the fiscal authority’s audit strategy because it is the output
from sellers who report truthfully. Second, if qh changes, the fiscal authority must change
the audit probability so that sellers who evade taxes produce exactly the q0 that satisfies
(2.74). This ensures that sellers who evade taxes have no disadvantage nor advantage
when competing with sellers who report truthfully, because in equilibium sellers must be
indi erent between evading taxes and not evading taxes.
Finally, consider how introducing CBDC a ects the total surplus in the DM.
Proposition 2.11 For any flc, there exists RcÕ < Rbench such that for any Rc Ø RcÕ,
the total surplus in DM is higher in type-3 equilibria than in the benchmark equilibrium.
There also exists Rc† such that for any Rc Ø Rc†, the total surplus in DM is higher in
type-3 equilibria than in any type-2 equilibria. Finally, given Rc, the total surplus in DM
is higher in type-3 equilibria than in any type-4 equilibria.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2.11 follows from Proposition 2.9 and 2.10. In particular, it says that even
if RcÕ Æ Rc < Rbench, as long as Rc and flc are such that the equilibrium is type-3,
introducing CBDC will increase DM surplus compared to the benchmark. In such case,
although q0 and qh are lower than their counterparts in the benchmark equilibrium, “ is
also smaller. Recall that q0 < qh because the risk of being audited and punished by the
fiscal authority acts as a proportional tax on sellers who evade taxes. Hence, the total
surplus in the DM increases even though the deposit rate is lower than the benchmark.
Note that increasing Rc in a type-3 equilibrium will increase q0 and qh and decrease
“ (see Proposition 2.7). Hence, the total surplus in the DM will be higher. However, it
will also increase the funding costs of bankers, which will in turn raise the loan rate and
lower the investment in entrepreneurs’ projects. I discuss this e ect in Part II.
II. Net output from entrepreneurs’ projects
The investment in an entrepreneur’s project, k, is given by
f Õ(k) = 1 + R
k
1 + µ , (2.75)
where Rk is the nominal loan rate. From bankers’ problem in Section 2.3.2, we know
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that the relationship between Rk and the deposit rate Rd is given by
1 + µ
1 + Rk = —◊ +
(1 ≠ ◊)(1 + µ)
1 + Rd . (2.76)
In a type-2 equilibrium, the deposit rate is lower than the benchmark because the decrease
in tax evasion causes a shortage in bank deposits. Hence, k is larger than the benchmark.
In a type-3 equilibrium, the deposit rate is equal to the interest rate on CBDC, so the
deposit rate is larger than the benchmark if Rc < Rbench and smaller if Rc > Rbench. In a
type-4 equilibrium, CBDC competes with bank deposits and increases the deposit rate.
Hence, k is smaller than the benchmark.
However, a higher k does not necessarily mean higher net output from entrepreneurs’
projects (f(k) ≠ k). When the total supply of assets in the economy (government bonds
plus loans to entrepreneurs) is low, the deposit rate carries a large liquidity premium
(i.e., Rd is low). This means the loan rate is low and investment k is ine ciently high.
Specifically, if Rbench < µ, then an increase in k compared to the benchmark will decrease
the net output from entrepreneurs’ projects. The next proposition follows directly from
the above arguments.
Proposition 2.12 Assume Rbench < µ. Compared to the benchmark, f(k) ≠ k is lower
in type-2 equilibria. In addition, there exists RcÕÕ such that if Rbench < Rc Æ RcÕÕ, f(k)≠k
is higher in both type-3 and type-4 equilibria. If Rbench > Rc, f(k) ≠ k is lower in type-3
equilibria.
If Rbench > µ and Rc > Rbench, then compared to benchmark, f(k) ≠ k is lower in both
type-3 and type-4 equilibria. Recall that under the same conditions, the total surplus
in the DM surplus is higher compared to the benchmark. Hence, a trade-o  exists in
such cases: introducing CBDC promotes the trade in the DM, but it also increases the
funding costs of bankers and decreases the output from entrepreneurs.
III. Total audit costs
The number of audits that the fiscal authority conducts depends on the measure of
sellers who report zero income (–≠1+“) and the audit probability (÷0). Proposition 2.9
shows that introducing CBDC decreases tax evasion and reduces the measure of sellers
who report zero income. However, the audit probability may be higher or lower compared
to the benchmark depending on Rc and flc.
Proposition 2.13 Compared to the benchmark, ÷0 is lower in type-4 equilibria but higher
in type-2 and type-3 equilibria.
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Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Hence, compared to the benchmark, the total audit costs are lower in type-4 equilibria.
For type-2 and type-3 equilibria, the total audit costs may be higher or lower depending
on Rc and flc.
Because all three components of aggregate welfare can in principle move in di erent
directions, in order to derive clear welfare implications, I restrict my attention to some
subsets of CBDC configurations. First, assume Rc > Rbench. Recall that in this case,
only type-3 and type-4 equilibria exist (see Figure 2.4). Now, define flc(Rc) to be the
highest flc such that given (Rc, flc), the equilibrium is type-3. Specifically, flc(Rc) solves
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷0)(1 + Rc) =
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷0 , (2.77)
where ÷0 is given by the solution to a type-3 equilibrium in Section 2.4.3.
Proposition 2.14 For any Rc > Rbench, (Rc, flc(Rc)) o ers the highest aggregate welfare.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
First, in type-3 and type-4 equilibria, Rc = Rd. From Part I and II, we know that q0,
qh, and k only depend on Rd. This means that for any given Rc > Rbench, aggregate
welfare varies only because of “ and ÷0. By following Proposition 2.7, it is easy to plot








Figure 2.6: Relationship Between ÷0 and flc when Rc > Rbench
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That is, for any given Rc > Rbench, “ and ÷0 reach minima when flc = flc(Rc). Hence, for
any given Rc > Rbench, aggregate welfare reaches a unique maximum when flc = flc(Rc).
Note that in type-4 equilibria, equilibrium outcomes do not depend on flc since CBDC is




Figure 2.7: Relationship Between W and flc when Rc > Rbench
When Rc Æ Rbench, how introducing CBDC a ects aggregate welfare is in general
ambiguous. The reason is that changes in net output from entrepreneurs are often in the
opposite directions of changes in DM surplus. Nevertheless, if the question one wishes
to answer is whether introducing CBDC can increase aggregate welfare, then we may
restrict our attention to Rc’s that are close to Rbench. In such cases, k is similar to its
counterpart in the benchmark equilibrium. I refer to this type of CBDC as “deposit-
like” CBDC. Formally, a CBDC is deposit-like if
(1) (Rc, flc) is in the neighborhood of B © (Rbench, flc(Rbench)), and
(2) the equilibrium given (Rc, flc) is type-3.
I consider “cash-like” CBDC. Formally, a CBDC is cash-like if
(1) (Rc, flc) is in the neighborhood of A © (0, flm), and
(2) the equilibrium given (Rc, flc) is type-2.
The following figure shows the locations of A and B in the Rc-flc space.
flc






Figure 2.8: Locations of A and B
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Proposition 2.15 Introducing deposit-like CBDC increases aggregate welfare. Further-
more, aggregate welfare is higher with deposit-like CBDC than with cash-like CBDC.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
By following Proposition 2.11, it is easy to show that compared to the benchmark equi-
librium and any type-2 equilibria with cash-like CBDC, the total surplus in the DM is
higher. Furthermore, the total audit costs is also lower with deposit-like CBDC because
the reduction in tax evasion is larger in type-3 equilibria than in type-2 equilibria.
I conclude this subsection by providing some intuition for why deposit-like CBDC
provides higher aggregate welfare compared to cash-like CBDC. First, because tax evasion
is distortionary, ceteris paribus, a decrease in tax evasion always increases aggregate
welfare. However, if CBDC is cash-like, sellers who report their income truthfully accept
only bank deposits, so a decrease in tax evasion will increase the demand for deposits. The
resulted shortage of bank deposits will lower the deposit rate and hinder the transactions
between buyers and sellers. To solve this problem, the design of CBDC must achieve two
objectives. First, introducing CBDC must increase the supply of payment assets in the
economy. Second, the interest rate on CBDC must be su ciently high for sellers who
report truthfully to accept CBDC. Note that achieving only one of the two objectives is
not su cient to avoid the shortage of bank deposits: the shortage will remain if either
CBDC is not accepted by sellers who report truthfully, or introducing CBDC does not
increase the total supply of payment assets.
Achieving the second objective requires the interest rate on CBDC to be su ciently
high, but how does introducing CBDC increase the supply of payment assets? Recall that
bankers have limited commitment so they can abscond with a portion ◊ of their assets.
By assumption, the central bank is immune from the limited commitment problem. This
means that bankers must hold more assets than their liabilities so that they do not have
the incentive to default. The di erence between bankers’ assets and liabilities is bank
capital, which bankers accumulate through working in the CM. In comparison, the central
bank holds the same quantity of assets (government bonds) and liabilities (cash and/or
CBDC). See Figure 2.9(a) for an illustration. Recall that the central bank introduces
CBDC by purchasing government bonds from the bond market with CBDC (and it
introduces cash in the same way). Since there are fewer government bonds available,
bankers issue fewer deposits. See Figure 2.9(b) for an illustration.
Next, note that with each unit of government bonds, the central bank can create one
unit of CBDC, while bankers can only create 1≠◊ units of deposits. As a result, after the
introduction of CBDC, the total supply of bank deposits and deposit-like CBDC is larger
compared to the supply of deposits in the benchmark. In other words, the introduction
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(b) After Deposit-like CBDC








Figure 2.10: Supply of Bank Deposits and Deposit-like CBDC
Regardless of whether CBDC is cash-like or deposit-like, introducing CBDC will decrease
tax evasion and increase the demand for payment assets. However, with deposit-like
CBDC, the increase in the demand for payment assets is satisfied by the increase in the
supply of payment assets (see Figure 2.12). This e ect is what allows the total output
and surplus in the DM to increase after the introduction of CBDC. Without this e ect,
the increase in demand for deposits will drive down the deposit rate, which will then










Figure 2.11: E ects of Introducing Cash-like CBDC
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It should be noted that the above results do not imply that the central bank should
replace private banking because bankers also make loans to entrepreneurs. In practice,
central banks may lack the expertise to make such loans. It should also be noted that if
Rc = Rbench, the supply of loans is not a ected by the introduction of CBDC. Although
bank deposits are crowded out by CBDC, they are (a portion of) the deposits that are











is equal to Rc
Does not happen with cash-like CBDC
Figure 2.12: E ects of Introducing Deposit-like CBDC
2.5.2 Central Bank Net Revenue
Although aggregate welfare is higher with deposit-like CBDC, the central bank also has
to pay higher interest. The goal of this section is to understand the impact of an interest-
bearing CBDC on the central bank’s net revenue. The central bank’s budget constraint
is given by the following.
Mt+1 ≠ Mt
pt
+ Ct+1 ≠ Ct
pt










+ Et + T ct . (2.78)
Recall that Et is the central bank’s operating expenses. In practice, the operating ex-
penses of a central bank can be large. For example, the operating expenses of the Bank
of Canada is equal to 28% of its net interest income. Since the central bank uses the
cash and CBDC it creates to purchase government bonds, we have Mt + Ct = Bct for all
t. Now, define c̃ = Ctpt and m̃ =
Mt
pt
. The central bank’s net revenue can be written as
  = (Rb ≠ Rc)c̃ + Rbm̃ ≠ E . (2.79)
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Note that m̃ = 0 in type-2 and type-3 equilibria, but m̃ > 0 in type-4 equilibria. Note
also that   is equal to the transfer to the fiscal authority, T c. In principle,   can be
negative, in which case the central bank receives transfers from the fiscal authority.
The e ect of introducing CBDC on central bank net revenue depends on the interest
rate spread Rb ≠ Rc and the demand for central bank liabilities, c̃ and m̃. In a type-
2 equilibrium, Rb is smaller compared to the benchmark (see Proposition 2.10). The
demand for CBDC is also lower compared to the demand for cash in the benchmark,
because CBDC is accepted by sellers who evade taxes, and there is less tax evasion.
Hence, the central bank’s net revenue is lower. In a type-3 equilibrium, the interest rate
spread Rb ≠Rc is smaller than in a type-2 equilibrium because Rc is higher. However, the
demand for CBDC is also higher because CBDC is accepted by both sellers who evade
taxes and (some) sellers who report truthfully.
Now, denote the deposit rate and government bond rate in the benchmark equilibrium
as Rbench and RbÕ, respectively. They satisfy the following relationship
1 + µ
1 + Rb = —◊ +
(1 ≠ ◊)(1 + µ)
1 + Rbench . (2.80)
Let the level of tax evasion in the benchmark equilibrium be “bench. Recall that D =
(1+Rb)Bt
pt
is the total supply of government debt. I show that if the following assumption
about the benchmark equilibrium holds, the central bank’s net revenue is lower with






The assumption is satisfied as long as ◊ is su ciently small. Recall that the central bank
creates CBDC by purchasing government bonds with CBDC. In the extreme case where
the central purchases all government bonds from the market, the supply of CBDC is equal
to the total supply of government bonds, D/(1 + Rb). Then, the left-hand side of the
inequality represents the highest possible central bank net revenue when Rc = Rbench. The
right-hand side represents the central bank’s net revenue in the benchmark. Intuitively,
Assumption 2.5.1 ensures that in a type-3 equilibrium, the increase in demand for CBDC
does not o set the decrease in the interest rate spread Rb ≠ Rc.
Proposition 2.16 Suppose Assumption 2.5.1 holds. Then, introducing either deposit-
like CBDC or cash-like CBDC will decrease central bank net revenue. Furthermore,
central bank net revenue will be lower with deposit-like CBDC than with cash-like CBDC.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
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If the decrease in net revenue is significant, the central bank may not be able to cover its
own expense and may require transfers from the fiscal authority. Such transfers may be
feasible because the reduction in tax evasion increases the fiscal authority’s tax revenue.
However, relying on the fiscal authority’s transfers may undermine the independence of
the central bank.
2.6 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter is to study the implications of tax evasion for the optimal design
of central bank digital currencies (CBDC). To accomplish this goal, I incorporate an
audit game between taxpayers and the fiscal authority into a general equilibrium model.
As a benchmark, I consider a scenario where only cash and bank deposits are available
as payment. Bank deposits have a higher return than cash, but it is easier to conceal
cash from the fiscal authority. I find that under the optimal tax schedule, an increase
in inflation prompts agents to substitute away from cash, but this also lowers the fiscal
authority’s incentive to audit agents. In equilibrium, the decrease in tax enforcement
leads to more agents evading taxes and hence a higher demand for cash.
When CBDC is introduced as a new payment instrument, the e ect on tax evasion
depends crucially on the degree of anonymity of CBDC, which determines the probability
of the income received in CBDC being observed by the government. I find that as long
as CBDC o ers less anonymity than cash, introducing CBDC will decrease tax evasion.
However, if CBDC is cash-like in the sense that it still o ers relatively high anonymity
but low interest rate, then introducing CBDC will decrease the output from not only
agents who evade taxes but also agents who report their income truthfully. If CBDC is
instead deposit-like in the sense that it o ers low anonymity but high interest rate, then
introducing CBDC will increase output and aggregate welfare. Furthermore, introducing
deposit-like CBDC needs not increase the funding costs of private banks or decrease
bank lending and investment. However, paying the high interest rate on CBDC will
decrease the central bank’s net interest revenue, which may jeopardize the central bank’s
independence.
To emphasize the mechanisms through which tax evasion a ects payment choice and
CBDC design, I abstract from several important issues that could be addressed in future
research. First, in this paper, all agents are assumed to be ex ante homogeneous. The only
uncertainty in the economy comes from search friction, and it only a ects agents who are
risk-neutral. These simplifying assumptions remove the income redistribution concerns
when I design the tax schedule. Income redistribution is certainly an important issue,
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and CBDC may be a useful tool in this regard as well (Davoodalhosseini, 2018). Second,
in this paper, there are no concerns of privacy other than tax evaders trying to conceal
their income from the government. In practice, there are many reasons why individuals
may want to hide their transactions from other individuals and the government (Kahn
et al., 2020). The origins of such privacy concerns will likely determine the type(s) of
transactions where CBDC will be accepted. This in turn can have important implications
for tax compliance and the central bank’s revenue. Finally, it has been argued that CBDC
may help promote financial inclusion (Lagarde, 2018). Specifically, individuals may prefer
cash not because they want to evade taxes, but because the transaction costs are lower
compared to bank deposits and bank credit (Aı̈t Lahcen and Gomis-Porqueras, 2019). If
CBDC can be easy and cheap to use, it may promote both transaction e ciency and tax
compliance.
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Chapter 3
Liquidity and Private Information in
Asset Markets
3.1 Introduction
In asset markets, liquid assets that sellers possess before trading play an important role in
determining market outcomes. For example, a firm issuing equity to fund a new project
may choose to o er investors fewer shares at a (potentially) higher price if it already has
some liquid assets on hand. Conversely, a hedge fund facing sudden redemptions during
a financial crisis may deplete its liquidity reserves and be forced to sell large quantities of
assets at a loss. However, it is not well understood how the liquidity possessed by sellers
interacts with information friction in equilibrium. Specifically, how does the seller’s
liquidity a ect market equilibrium when asset quality is the seller’s private information?
How will the equilibrium change if sellers’ valuations of liquid assets are also private
information? What implications can be derived concerning government interventions
during crises, such as central bank lending and government asset purchases?
To answer these questions, I build a model where agents can choose to hold a portfolio
of fiat money and other assets, which I assume to be one-period lived Lucas trees. After
choosing their portfolios, some agents receive an opportunity to consume a good that
can only be purchased with money. These agents have the incentive to sell their assets
for money. Because agents’ preferences over the consumption good are assumed to be
concave, there exists an optimal amount of after-trading money holdings. This means
that the more money asset sellers have before trading, the fewer assets they need to sell
in the asset market. Asset quality can be either low or high, and this information is
privately held by asset owners. Asset sellers’ demand for money may also be private
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information: specifically, some sellers may have a greater demand for the consumption
good and hence a greater need for money, but this cannot be directly observed by asset
buyers.
There are two main findings. First, as a benchmark, I assume that all sellers have the
same demand for the consumption good, and asset quality is the only source of private
information. I find that the equilibrium depends on sellers’ money holdings. When
sellers’ money holdings are large, sellers with high-quality assets lower the quantity they
sell in order to signal asset quality. Although these sellers obtain less money, they sell at
a higher price. When sellers’ money holdings are small, the opportunity cost of signaling
by lowering sale quantity is large. Sellers with high-quality assets choose to pool with
other sellers and make the same o er to buyers. Although the asset price is lower for
sellers with high-quality assets, they sell more assets and obtain more money.
Second, I assume that some sellers have a greater demand for money and it is their
private information. I interpret this scenario as a flight-to-safety episode when some
sellers become distressed and are pressured to liquidate their assets. I find that the
equilibrium can be separating, pooling, or “semi-pooling” depending on sellers’ money
holdings and the number of distressed sellers. A semi-pooling equilibrium emerges when
many sellers are distressed. In such an equilibrium, distressed sellers and undistressed
sellers with low-quality assets pool and make the same o er to buyers. Undistressed
sellers with high-quality assets separate from other sellers by charging a higher price and
selling a smaller quantity. In contrast to the benchmark, under certain conditions, the
semi-pooling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium even if sellers’ money holdings are
small. This finding shows that the e ect of sellers’ money holdings on the equilibrium
depends crucially on the private information present in the asset market.
In related papers, Chang (2018), Guerrieri and Shimer (2018), and Williams (2016)
also study two-dimensional private information in asset markets. Chang (2018) assumes
indivisible assets and constructs a semi-pooling equilibrium to study the fire sale phe-
nomenon, while Williams (2016) solves on a fully separating equilibrium with divisible
assets. Guerrieri and Shimer (2018) focus on the welfare implications of multiple equilib-
ria. In these papers, sellers’ preferences over liquid assets are assumed to be heterogeneous
but linear. As a result, if there are no market frictions, sellers will sell their entire stock
of assets regardless of the liquidity they already have in their possession. In this chapter,
the marginal value of liquidity decreases to zero as a seller obtains more liquidity. This
setup allows me to show how sellers’ liquidity holdings before trading and the private
information in asset markets together determine the equilibrium.
To explore policy implications, I extend the model to include discount window lending
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and government asset purchases. In the case of discount window lending, I assume sellers
can use their assets as collateral to borrow from the discount window before trading
in the asset market. I show that there exists an equilibrium where only sellers with
high-quality assets borrow from the discount window. This result is in contrast with the
existing theoretical literature on discount window lending, which finds that the discount
window lends mostly, if not entirely, to borrowers with low-quality assets.1 In another
related paper, Madison (2017) also allows sellers to choose between collateralized loans
and asset sales, and finds that they are equivalent in separating equilibria. I find that
as long as the discount rate is not too high, discount window loans benefit sellers with
high-quality assets regardless of whether the equilibrium is separating or pooling.
The model in this chapter is based on Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016), who
extend the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework by introducing an over-the-counter asset
market to allow agents to rebalance their portfolios.2 The closest work that studies
private information in asset markets is Madison (2019), who also builds on Geromichalos
and Herrenbrueck (2016). The main di erence is that Madison (2019) focuses on the
e ects of the distribution of asset quality on the market equilibrium, while this chapter
focuses on the e ects of sellers’ holdings of liquid assets. In another closely related paper,
Rocheteau (2011) shows that as long as the supply of bonds (akin to fiat money in this
chapter) is not too small, the market equilibrium is separating. This echoes the finding
in this chapter that the equilibrium in the asset market is separating when sellers’ money
holdings are large. However, Rocheteau (2011) only provides su cient conditions for
separating equilibria to exist, while this chapter derives su cient and necessary conditions
for the equilibrium to be separating or pooling. Papers that also study the endogenous
selection between pooling and separating equilibria include Rocheteau (2008), Madison
(2017), and Bajaj (2018). Similar to Madison (2019), they focus solely on the e ects of
the distribution of asset quality.
Finally, the chapter belongs to the vast literature on private information and signaling
spurred by Akerlof (1970) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Some recent work that also studies
private information in asset markets includes Eisfeldt (2004), Kurlat (2013), Guerrieri
and Shimer (2014), Chiu and Koeppl (2016), and Choi (2018). Eisfeldt (2004), Kurlat
(2013), and Chiu and Koeppl (2016) restrict their attention to pooling equilibria by
1See for example Ennis and Weinberg (2013), Ennis (2019), Gauthier et al. (2015), Li et al. (2016)
and Gorton and Ordoñez (2016).
2See also Geromichalos et al. (2016), Herrenbrueck and Geromichalos (2017), Geromichalos and
Herrenbrueck (2017), and Herrenbrueck (2019). Other papers that explore the idea of rebalancing asset
portfolios before consumption include Kocherlakota (2003), Boel and Camera (2006), Berentsen et al.
(2007), Berentsen and Waller (2011), Li and Li (2013), and Jacquet (2018). None of these papers study
the private information problem.
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requiring agents to trade at one price or not trade at all. Guerrieri and Shimer (2014)
focus on separating equilibria and show that asset markets shut down when there are
worthless assets in the market. I show that this needs not be the case if sellers are
allowed to pool. Lastly, Choi (2018) assumes that asset buyers do not inherit sellers’
private information and have to learn it themselves. Instantaneous learning is found to
be welfare-maximizing, and public disclosure of private information is not always welfare-
improving.3
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model environment.
Section 3.3 solves the equilibrium. Section 3.4 studies policy implications. Section 3.5
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period is divided into three subperiods: the
asset market (AM), the goods market (GM), and the centralized market (CM). There
is measure one of consumers and producers. In the GM, there is a GM good that is
consumed by consumers, but it can only be produced by producers. In the CM, there is
a CM good that can be produced and consumed by all agents. The CM good also serves
as the numeraire. A consumer’s instantaneous utility is given by
÷tu(gt) + ct, (3.1)
where gt and ct are the consumption of the GM good and the CM good, respectively. I















0, with probability 1 ≠ –;
1, with probability –(1 ≠ fi);
÷d Ø 1, with probability –fi.
(3.2)
If ÷t = 0, a consumer does not derive utility from the DM good and is referred to as a
“non-shopper”. If ÷t > 0, a consumer derives utility from the DM good and is referred to
as a “shopper”. In particular, if ÷d > 1, then some shoppers have a greater demand for
3Other work that also studies private information in asset markets includes Williamson and Wright
(1994), Li et al. (2012), Golosov et al. (2014), Camargo and Lester (2014), Chari et al. (2014), Carapella
and Williamson (2015), Lauermann and Wolinsky (2016), and Ozdenoren et al. (2019). A recent paper
by Cai and Dong (2020) studies the e ects of adverse selection on the secular migration of asset trading
from centralized markets to decentralized markets.
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the DM good than other shoppers. The realization of ÷t is i.i.d. across consumers and
time. I assume that uÕ(.) > 0, uÕÕ(.) < 0, uÕ(0) > 1, and uÕ(gú) = 1 for some gú < Œ. I
also assume gt Ø 0, but ct can be negative, in which case it is interpreted as production
in the CM: one unit of labor in the CM can be turned into one unit of CM good. Next,
the instantaneous utility of a producer is given by
≠ht + Xt, (3.3)
where ht is the amount of labor supplied in the GM, and Xt is the consumption of the
CM good. I assume one unit of labor in the GM can be turned into one unit of the GM
good. Neither goods can be carried across periods. All agents discount future utility
using — œ (0, 1).
There are two types of assets in the economy: (fiat) money and perfectly divisible real
assets. Money is issued by a government, and the real assets are endowed to consumers
in each CM. In the CM of the next period, each unit of assets produces a dividend of ”
units of CM good before depreciating by 100%. I assume ” is stochastic. I also follow
Plantin (2009)’s approach and assume that by holding the real assets, consumers learn
their quality.4 Specifically, at the beginning of the AM, with probability  , a consumer
learns that her real assets have low quality, and each unit of the assets will produce
”l > 0 units of the CM good. With probability 1 ≠  , a consumer learns that her real
assets have high quality, and each unit will produce ”h > ”l units of the CM good. ” is a
consumer’s private information and cannot be observed by other agents. The realization
of ” is independent across consumers and is independent of the realization of ÷t.
I assume agents are anonymous in all three subperiods. Therefore, a medium of
exchange is necessary for the trade between shoppers and producers in the GM. I assume
producers only accept money for payments. Hence, shoppers may want to sell their real
assets to non-shoppers for money. In the AM, after consumers learn ÷t and the quality of
their assets, a market opens for asset trade. A seller is randomly matched with a buyer.
Once matched, the seller makes take-it-or-leave-it o er to the buyer. The o er consists
of a unit price, Â, and a quantity for sale, s. If an o er is accepted, the seller receives
Âs units of money, and the buyer receives s units of assets. To simplify the analysis, I
assume an asset seller is matched with a buyer with probability one.5
4Plantin (2009) shows that this assumption is of particular relevance to assets like collateralized debt
obligations and privately placed debt, which are securities sold to selected investors and are bundled
with future access to privileged information about the assets. Investors may not be able to fully diversify
their portfolios because these assets are not sold publicly, and the access to privileged information creates
private information. Similar assumptions can be found in Rocheteau (2011) and Madison (2017, 2019).
5This assumption requires –, the proportion of shoppers, to be less than 1/2.
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In the GM, a shopper is matched with a producer with probability one, and shoppers
make take-it-or-leave-it o ers to producers. Next, in the CM, agents produce, trade, and
consume the CM good. The real assets are also traded in the CM. Lastly, let Mt denote
the supply of money.
Mt+1 = (1 + µ)Mt, (3.4)
where µ is the money growth rate. I assume µ > — ≠ 1. Money is injected to (or
withdrawn from) the economy by the government via a lump-sum transfer (or tax) in
each CM.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section, I first study the case where ÷d = 1 and all shoppers have the same demand
for the GM good. Next, I solve the case where ÷d > 1 and some shoppers have a greater
demand for the GM good. I consider in particular the possibility that ÷t is shoppers’
private information and focus on a two-dimensional private information problem in the
AM. Throughout this section, I restrict my attention to stationary equilibria where all
real variables stay constant.
3.3.1 Equilibrium with One-dimensional Private Information
It is convenient to start with the goods market (GM). Since shoppers make take-it-or-
leave-it o ers to producers, the price of the GM good (in terms of the CM good) is one.
Denote the amount of real balances carried by a shopper as z̃. As is standard in the Lagos
and Wright (2005) models, shoppers’ value function in the CM is linear in z̃. Hence, the
cost of purchasing g units of GM good is g. The shoppers solve the following problem
max
g
u(g) ≠ g s.t. g Æ z̃, (3.5)
where g represents the GM good consumed. Let g(z̃) be the solution to the above
problem. It is easy to see that g(z̃) = min{z̃, gú} where uÕ(gú) = 1. That is, shoppers
either spend all money if it is not enough to purchase the e cient amount of consumption
(gú), or consume gú if z̃ Ø gú.
Next, let zb denote the real balances a non-shopper has at the beginning of the AM.
Let zs and a denote the real balances and the real assets held by a shopper at the
beginning of the AM, respectively. If zs Ø gú, shoppers have enough real balances to
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consume e ciently in the GM. If zs < gú, shoppers may want to sell their real assets for
money. Non-shoppers are willing to purchase assets because they have no use for money.
In what follows, I assume zs < gú.
Now, consider a seller with asset quality ”j o ering (Âj, sj) where j œ {l, h} to her
matched buyer. Recall that Â is the unit price of the real assets (in real term), and s is
the quantity for sale. If the o er is accepted by the buyer, the seller’s surplus is given by
u(zs + Âjsj) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”jsj s.t. sj Æ a and Âjsj Æ zb. (3.6)
In words, (3.6) says that the seller obtains Âjsj units of money, which allows her to
consume Âjsj units more GM goods in the following GM.6 In exchange, she gives up sj
units of assets, which will produce ”jsj units of dividends in the CM. The o er (Âj, sj)






“(j|Â, s)”j ≠ Âs
T
V1(Â, s). (3.7)
In words, (3.7) says that if the buyer accepts the o er, she receives s units of assets, which
she expects to produce s qj=l,h “(j|Â, s)”j units of dividends in the CM. In exchange, she
hands over Âs units of money to the seller. “(j|Â, s) is the buyer’s belief about the
probability of the quality being ”j given the o er (Â, s). 1(Â, s) is the buyer’s acceptance
rule. 1(Â, s) = 1 if the buyer accepts the o er (Â, s), and 1(Â, s) = 0 if she does not.
Now, I define the equilibrium in the AM.
Definition 3.1 The equilibrium in the AM is a set of o ers {(Âl, sl), (Âh, sh)}, an ac-
ceptance rule 1(Â, s), and a belief function “(j|Â, s) such that
(1) Conditional on “(j|Â, s), the strategies (Âl, sl), (Âh, sh), and 1(Â, s) are sequentially
rational;
(2) “(j|Â, s) is derived from Bayes’ rule whenever it is possible; and
(3) The equilibrium is undefeated.
Conditions (1) and (2) define a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), but they put
no restrictions on beliefs about out-of-equilibrium actions. As a result, conditions (1)
and (2) are satisfied by a continuum of PBE. To obtain meaningful results, in condition
(3), I apply the undefeated equilibrium refinement by Mailath et al. (1993). A formal
definition of the undefeated equilibrium can be found in Appendix B.1. Informally, a
6I show in Appendix B.2 that in equilibrium, zs + Âjsj Æ gú for all zs < gú.
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PBE (“PBE-1”) is defeated by another PBE (“PBE-2”) if (1) there exists an o er that
is not made by any sellers in PBE-1 but is made by a set of sellers (denoted as K) in
PBE-2; and (2) all sellers in K must be weakly better o  in PBE-2 while some sellers
in K are strictly better o . In Appendix B.2, I show that to find undefeated equilibria,
one needs only check if high-quality sellers have the incentive to deviate unilaterally
(K = {h}) or if both types of seller have the incentive to deviate (K = {l, h}). This
is because low-quality sellers do not benefit from deviating unilaterally. The undefeated
equilibrium refinement is therefore equivalent to selecting the PBE that maximizes the
surplus of high-quality sellers.
In similar models of asset markets, the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987)
is sometimes used as a refinement method (see Rocheteau (2011) and Madison (2019)).
However, the undefeated equilibrium refinement has several advantages in this environ-
ment. First, both refinement methods select the least ine cient separating equilibria
among all separating equilibria (Riley, 1979). However, the undefeated equilibrium re-
finement also allows pooling equilibria if they are Pareto-superior. For example, if ”l = 0,
the Intuitive Criterion predicts a complete shutdown of trading. However, both types
of sellers may prefer a pooling equilibrium if the proportion of low-quality assets ( ) is
small. Second, as mentioned above, the undefeated equilibrium refinement is equivalent
to selecting the PBE that maximizes the surplus of high-quality sellers. This greatly
simplifies the implementation of the refinement.
The equilibrium is solved in Appendix B.2. The next proposition characterizes the
equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a cuto  value zÕs œ [0, gú) such that
(1) For all zs < zÕs, the equilibrium is pooling and (Âl, sl) = (Âh, sh) = (Âp, sp);
(2) For all zs Ø zÕs, the equilibrium is separating and (Âl, sl) , (Âh, sh);
(3) Âl < Âp < Âh, sl > sp > sh and Âlsl Ø Âpsp > Âhsh. And zÕs is decreasing in zb and
a.
Proof: see Appendix B.2.
The proposition says that there exists a threshold zÕs such that, if zs is smaller than zÕs,
low-quality sellers and high-quality sellers o er the same price and sell the same quantity.
If zs is larger than zÕs, high-quality sellers signal their quality to buyers by charging a
higher price and selling a smaller quantity. The equilibrium depends on sellers’ liquidity
needs because high-quality sellers face di erent costs in pooling and separating equilibria.
In a pooling equilibrium, the sale price is discounted for high-quality sellers because
buyers are only willing to pay for the average quality in the market. In a separating
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equilibrium, the sale quantity is low for high-quality sellers in order to prevent low-quality
sellers from mimicking high-quality sellers’ o ers. When sellers’ liquidity needs are large
(i.e., zs is small), high-quality sellers prioritize obtaining more liquidity and accept the
price discount. When sellers’ liquidity needs are small (i.e., zs is large), high-quality
sellers can a ord to lower the quantity they sell in order to charge a higher price.
Another finding is that the threshold zÕs depends on zb and a. The reason is that the
asset trade in the AM may be constrained by either buyer’s real balances or seller’s real
assets. Then, a larger zb or a can increase the trading volume for both types of assets in
a separating equilibrium. This is because to signal quality, high-quality sellers only have
to sell less relative to the quantities low-quality sellers sell. Hence, high-quality sellers
can sell more if low-quality sellers sell more. In other words, for high-quality sellers, the
signaling cost is decreasing in zb and a.
Next, I turn to consumers’ choices of z and a in the CM to bring to the next period.
I restrict my attention to symmetric solutions where all consumers choose to carry the
same z and a. Let V (ẑ, â) be the expected utility for a consumer choosing portfolio (ẑ, â).
V (ẑ, â) = –[ (u(gl) ≠ gl) + (1 ≠  )(u(gh) ≠ gh)] + ẑ + ”̄â (3.8)
First, (gl, gh) = (ẑ +Âlsl, ẑ +Âhsh) represents the GM consumption of shoppers with low-
quality and high-quality assets, respectively. In words, (3.8) says that with probability
–, a consumer is a shopper, and her surplus from consuming in the GM is equal to
 (u(gl) ≠ gl) + (1 ≠  )(u(gh) ≠ gh). If the consumer is a non-shopper, the expected value
of the portfolio (ẑ, â) is ẑ + ”̄â.
Now, denote the price of money and the real assets as „t and Ÿt, respectively. In a
stationary equilibrium, Ÿt = Ÿ, and the (gross) inflation rate „t„t+1 is equal to 1 + µ where
µ is the money growth rate. Consumers in CM solve the following problem
max
ẑ,â
≠(µ + 1)ẑ ≠ Ÿâ + —V (ẑ, â). (3.9)
In Appendix B.2 (Proposition B.5), I show that there exist µ1 < µ2 such that the AM
equilibrium is separating if µ Æ µ1 and pooling if µ Ø µ2. If µ1 < µ < µ2, then under
certain conditions, no symmetric solutions exist. The reason is that when µ1 < µ < µ2,
asset trade in the AM is constrained by buyer’s money, and the optimal choices of ẑ and
â depend on other consumers’ choices of ẑ. Conditional on other consumers expecting
the AM equilibrium to be pooling (or separating), a consumer may deviate to choose
a di erent portfolio and make a separating (or pooling) o er in the AM. When such
deviations are profitable, there are no symmetric solutions.
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3.3.2 Equilibrium with Two-dimensional Private Information
In this section, I assume ÷d > 1 so some asset sellers have a greater demand for the GM
good. I interpret ÷t = ÷d as an unforeseen liquidity shock that happens with probability
fi and increases a seller’s demand for money. The liquidity shock is akin to a flight-to-
safety episode that often happens during runs on financial institutions or crises in repo
markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011; Martin et al., 2014). In this context, I refer to sellers
with ÷t = ÷d as distressed sellers and sellers with ÷t = 1 as undistressed sellers. I denote
fi as the market distress level.
The sellers’ and buyers’ problems are similar to the benchmark case in Section 3.3.1.
There are now four types of sellers: undistressed (and distressed) low-quality sellers and
undistressed (and distressed) high-quality sellers. Denote the o er of a seller as (Âij, sij)
where the subscript j œ {l, h} denotes the quality of her assets and the superscript
i œ {u, d} denotes the seller’s distress status. Let ÷u = 1. If the o er is accepted by a
buyer, the seller’s surplus is
÷iu(zs + Âijsij) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”jsij s.t. sij Æ a and Âijsij Æ zb. (3.10)





“(i, j|Â, s)”j ≠ Âs
T
V1(Â, s), (3.11)
Similar to the benchmark case, “(i, j|Â, s) represents the buyer’s belief about the prob-
ability of the seller being type (i, j) given the o er (Â, s). And 1(Â, s) represents the
buyer’s acceptance rule. 1(Â, s) = 1 if the buyer accepts the o er (Â, s), and 1(Â, s) = 0
if she does not. Now, I define the equilibrium in the AM.
Definition 3.2 The equilibrium in the AM is a set of o ers {(Âul , sul ), (Âuh, suh), (Âdl , sdl ), (Âdh, sdh)},
an acceptance rule 1(Â, s), and a belief function “(i, j|Â, s) such that
(1) Conditional on “(i, j|Â, s), the strategies (Âul , sul ), (Âuh, suh), (Âdl , sdl ), (Âdh, sdh), and
1(Â, s) are sequentially rational;
(2) “(i, j|Â, s) is derived from Bayes’ rule whenever it is possible; and
(3) The equilibrium is undefeated.
The liquidity shock brings two changes to the AM equilibrium. First, since there are now
four types of sellers, the equilibrium is not restricted to be either pooling or separating.
In particular, there may exist equilibria where some sellers pool while others separate.
Second, the AM equilibrium depends crucially on whether a seller’s distress status can
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be observed by other agents in the AM or not, and in what follows, I discuss these two
cases separately.
I. Distress Status Revealed
First, suppose that sellers’ distress statuses are revealed to all agents. Recall that Propo-
sition 3.1 shows that if zs < zÕs, sellers would pool in the AM without the liquidity shock,
and if zs Ø zÕs, sellers would separate. The next proposition shows how the liquidity
shock a ects the AM equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 Assume ÷d is large and ”h/”̄ < 2 ≠ ”l/”h.
(1) Suppose zs < zÕs. All sellers pool in equilibrium.
(2) Suppose zs Ø zÕs. Distressed sellers pool while undistressed sellers separate in equilib-
rium.
Proof: see Appendix B.3.
First, I explain the assumptions in Proposition 3.2. If ÷d is large, a su cient condition
for distressed sellers to pool is ”h/”̄ < 2 ≠ ”l/”h. To see why, first note that when ÷d
is large, compared to a separating equilibrium, the extra amount of liquidity distressed
high-quality sellers can obtain from pooling is small. This is because, first, asset trade
in a pooling equilibrium can be constrained by sellers’ assets or buyers’ money. Second,
in a separating equilibrium, the increase in liquidity needs makes it less attractive for
distressed low-quality sellers to mimic high-quality sellers’ o er. This allows distressed
high-quality sellers to sell more in a separating equilibrium. Now, if ”h/”̄ is large, so is
the price discount in a pooling equilibrium. In such case, the extra amount of liquidity
sellers obtain from pooling may not be large enough to justify the price discount. As a
result, distressed sellers may separate after a large liquidity shock even if their money
holdings are small.
Next, in case (1), if sellers pool without the liquidity shock (i.e., zs < zÕs), they
continue to pool after receiving the shock. In addition, although distressed sellers demand
more liquidity than undistressed sellers, they make the same pooling o er because asset
trade is constrained either by buyers’ money or by sellers’ assets. In fact, when the AM
equilibrium is pooling, asset trade is constrained with or without the liquidity shock.
If asset trade was not constrained, consumers could increase their expected utility by
carrying less money from the CM. Hence, the liquidity shock does not a ect the AM
equilibrium if zs < zÕs.
Now, suppose sellers separate without the liquidity shock (i.e., zs Ø zÕs). Then dis-
tressed sellers choose to pool, while undistressed sellers remain separated in equilibrium.
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In this case, distressed sellers do not need to prevent undistressed low-quality sellers from
mimicking their o ers. This is because if undistressed low-quality sellers chose to deviate,
they would be identified by buyers as low-quality sellers, since undistressed high-quality
sellers do not have the incentive to deviate. Therefore, when sellers’ distress statuses are
revealed, the equilibrium price and sale quantity for undistressed sellers are una ected
by either the distressed level of other sellers (÷d) or the distress level of the market (fi).
However, this is not the case if sellers’ distress statuses are not revealed.
II. Distress Status not Revealed
Suppose buyers cannot tell if a seller is distressed or not. Now there exist two dimensions
of private information: sellers’ distress statuses and the quality of their assets. In Section
3.3.1, I show that a PBE is undefeated if there does not exist another PBE where high-
quality sellers are strictly better o . This result can be generalized to the two-dimensional
case. Specifically, a PBE is undefeated if there does not exist another PBE that satisfies
one of the following three conditions.
(1) All high-quality sellers are weakly better o  while some high-quality sellers
(distressed and/or undistressed) are strictly better o .
(2) Distressed and undistressed high-quality sellers do not pool. Undistressed high-
quality sellers are strictly better o  while distressed high-quality sellers are strictly
worse o .
(3) Distressed and undistressed high-quality sellers do not pool. Distressed high-
quality sellers are strictly better o  while undistressed high-quality sellers are
strictly worse o .
Similar to the one-dimensional case, a PBE is defeated if all high-quality sellers are
better o  in an alternative PBE. However, unlike the one-dimensional case, a PBE can
be defeated by another PBE where some high-quality sellers are strictly worse o . For
example, suppose that for some PBE, condition (2) is satisfied. Then, undistressed high-
quality sellers have the incentive to deviate even though distressed high-quality sellers
are strictly worse o  in the alternative PBE. Now, suppose instead that in some PBE,
distressed high-quality sellers are strictly better o  while undistressed high-quality sellers
are strictly worse o , and all high-quality sellers pool (and potentially they pool with
other low-quality sellers as well). This means that distressed high-quality sellers can only
profit from a deviation if undistressed high-quality sellers also deviate. Because the latter
do not have incentive to deviate, the alternative PBE does not defeat the original PBE.
Now, I describe the AM equilibrium. First, I define a “semi-pooling” equilibrium.
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Definition 3.3 A semi-pooling equilibrium is such that distressed sellers pool with undis-
tressed low-quality sellers while undistressed high-quality sellers separate from other sell-
ers.
The next proposition shows that the equilibrium now depends on market distress level,
fi, which is equal to the proportion of distressed sellers. In addition, unlike when the
distress statuses are revealed, undistressed sellers may also be a ected by the liquidity
shock in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3 Assume ÷d is large and ”h/”̄ < 2 ≠ ”l/”h < ”̄/”l.
(1) Suppose zs < zÕs. If fi is small, all sellers pool in equilibrium. If fi is large and a is
small, the equilibrium is semi-pooling.
(2) Suppose zs Ø zÕs. If fi is small and zb and a are large, distressed sellers pool while
undistressed sellers separate in equilibrium. If fi is large and a is small, the equilibrium
is semi-pooling.
Proof: see Appendix B.3.
When market distress level is low, the equilibrium is identical to when sellers’ distress
statuses are revealed. Specifically, if the amount of money sellers have is small (zs < zÕs),
all sellers pool, and the liquidity shock has no e ect on the equilibrium. If zs Ø zÕs and zb
and a are large, distressed sellers pool while undistressed sellers separate. In the latter
case, if either zb or a is small, undistressed low-quality sellers may have the incentive to
mimic distressed sellers’ pooling o er. Because sellers’ distress statuses are not revealed,
buyers cannot detect such deviation, and distressed sellers may be forced to pool with
undistressed low-quality sellers. I discuss this case in the proof of Proposition 3.3.
When market distress level is high, there exists a semi-pooling equilibrium where dis-
tressed sellers pool with undistressed low-quality sellers. To see why such an equilibrium
exists, first suppose that zs < zÕs. Without the liquidity shock, high-quality sellers prefer
to pool. However, when undistressed low-quality sellers pool with distressed sellers, the
former are better o  than they are in a separating equilibrium. This lowers undistressed
high-quality sellers’ signaling cost should they choose to separate from other sellers. Now,
in a semi-pooling equilibrium, undistressed low-quality sellers’ surplus increases with fi.
This means undistressed high-quality sellers will prefer to separate from other sellers
if fi is large. Second, suppose that zs Ø zÕs. In this case, distressed sellers pool with
undistressed low-quality sellers because when distress statuses are not revealed, the for-
mer cannot prevent the latter from mimicking the pooling o er. Lastly, if both fi and
a are large, there may be no undefeated equilibria. I discuss this case in the proof of
Proposition 3.3.
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III. Welfare
Part I and II show that the main implication of two dimensions of private information is
the existence of a semi-pooling equilibrium. In this part, I compare sellers’ surplus in the
semi-pooling equilibrium when sellers’ distress statuses are not revealed to their surplus
when the distressed statuses are revealed. Recall that buyers’ expected surplus is always
zero because sellers make take-it-or-leave-it o ers. Sellers’ surplus is given by (3.10).
Proposition 3.4 Assume that ÷d is large, ”h/”̄ < 2 ≠ ”l/”h < ”̄/”l, fi is large, and a is
small.
(1) If zs < zÕs, in the semi-pooling equilibrium, distressed sellers and undistressed low-
quality sellers are worse o  while undistressed high-quality sellers better o .
(2) If zs Ø zÕs, in the semi-pooling equilibrium, distressed sellers are worse o  while
undistressed sellers are better o .
Proof: see Appendix B.3.
When zs < zÕs, all sellers pool if the distress statuses are revealed. Distressed sellers are
worse o  in the semi-pooling equilibrium because the average asset quality of the pool of
sellers, which is equal to [ ”l +(1≠ )fi”h]/[ +(1≠ )fi], is lower than the average asset
quality of the market (i.e., the average quality when all sellers pool). This also means
that undistressed low-quality sellers are worse o . Undistressed high-quality sellers are
better o  because the pooling of the distressed sellers and undistressed low-quality sellers
lowers the signaling cost.
When zs Ø zÕs and the distress statuses are revealed, distressed sellers pool while undis-
tressed sellers separate. Distressed sellers are worse o  in the semi-pooling equilibrium
because they have to pool with undistressed low-quality sellers, who are simultaneously
better o  because they now pool with high-quality sellers. Similar to the case where
zs < zÕs, undistressed high-quality sellers are better o  because the signaling cost is lower
in the semi-pooling equilibrium.
3.4 Policy Implications
In this section, I extend the model to study two policy experiments: discount window
lending and government asset purchases.
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3.4.1 The Discount Window and Discount Window Stigma
The discount window is a facility where the Federal Reserve makes (collateralized) loans
to depository institutions. While there is a large literature that studies discount window
lending,7 much less attention has been paid to environments with private information.
This has inspired a developing literature that studies discount window lending when
the quality of the collateral is unobservable (Ennis and Weinberg, 2013; Gauthier et al.,
2015; Gorton and Ordoñez, 2016; Li et al., 2016; Ennis, 2019). The literature finds
that due to adverse selection, discount window borrowers are mostly, if not entirely,
borrowers with low-quality assets. By removing these borrowers from the market, the
discount window reduces information friction, but incurs a net loss. In this section, I
show that under certain conditions, fully collateralized discount window loans can attract
exclusively borrowers with high-quality assets, and the discount window can make a
positive profit.
I assume there exists a discount window that opens at the beginning of the AM, after
agents observe ÷t and asset quality but before they trade assets. The (gross) lending rate
of discount window loans is RD Ø 1, and repayments are due in the CM of the same
period. The loans must be fully collateralized so that borrowers with low-quality assets
do not have the incentive to default. That is, the highest amount an agent with a units
of real assets can borrow is ”la/RD. The assets pledged as collateral are held by the
discount window until loan repayments are received. I also assume that borrowing from
the discount window is not observable to other agents in the market. In practise, the
information on discount window loans is disclosed with a two-year lag.
It is clear that asset buyers do not have the incentive to borrow from the discount
window. Now, I set up sellers’ problems. For simplicity, I assume ÷d = 1 and asset trade
is not constrained by zb or a. Let mD denote the amount of discount window loan (in






u(zs + mD + ÂDj sDj ) ≠ RDmD ≠ ”jsDj (3.12)
subject to buyers’ beliefs about asset quality. Buyers’ problem is the same as (3.7)
and the equilibrium definition is similar to Definition 3.1. The next proposition shows
that when sellers’ money holdings are large (i.e.„ zs Ø zÕs), the discount window can
attract exclusively sellers with high-quality assets. I discuss the case where sellers’ money
holdings are small at the end of this section.
7See Ennis (2016) for a review of the discount window literature.
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Proposition 3.5 Suppose zs Ø zÕs. There exists an RDÕ > 1 such that
(1) If RD = 1, low-quality sellers and high-quality sellers only borrow from the discount
window.
(2) If RD œ (1, RDÕ), high-quality sellers borrow from the discount window and sell in the
asset market, while low-quality sellers only sell in the asset market.
(3) If RD Ø RDÕ, low-quality sellers and high quality only sell in the asset market.
Proof: see Appendix B.4.
I focus my attention on case (2), where the cost of discount window loans is strictly
positive but not too large. In this case, only high-quality sellers borrow from the discount
window. However, high-quality sellers do not borrow all the liquidity they need, as a
portion of their real assets is sold later in the asset market. The higher RD is, the
less they borrow from the discount window and the more they sell in the asset market.
Low-quality sellers do not mimic this strategy because, firstly, collateralized loans allow
sellers to obtain liquidity while keeping their assets. Low-quality sellers do not benefit
from keeping their assets because the market price is either equal to their assets’ value (in
a separating equilibrium) or above their assets’ value (in a pooling equilibrium). However,
for high-quality sellers, a combination of borrowing and selling allows them to retain the
dividends of some of their assets and to charge a high price on the assets they sell. In
equilibrium, the discount window increases high-quality sellers’ utility while earning a
net profit.8
These findings have novel implications on discount window stigma, which refers to
depository institutions’ reluctance to borrow from the discount window during financial
crises.9 Existing theoretical literature shows that for borrowers with low-quality assets,
the discount window o ers more favorable terms compared to the market.10 Conse-
quently, it is predicted that the discount window attracts mostly, if not entirely, borrow-
ers with low-quality assets. Borrowing from the discount window therefore becomes a
signal of low quality.
However, this mechanism is inconsistent with the Federal Reserve’s discount window
policies, because all discount window loans must be collateralized and the lending Reserve
8In a related paper, Ozdenoren et al. (2020) show that safe assets (akin to money in this chapter)
can help reduce information friction when they are pooled with information-sensitive assets. In contrast,
in this chapter, discount window loans reduce information friction by lowering high-quality sellers’ needs
to sell information-sensitive assets.
9For empirical evidence, see Furfine (2003), Armantier et al. (2015), Anbil (2018) and Vossmeyer
(2019).
10In Ennis and Weinberg (2013) and Li et al. (2016), the discount rate is lower than the market rate
for borrowers with low-quality assets. In Ennis (2019), the market rate contains a risk premium, but
the discount rate does not. In Gorton and Ordoñez (2016), the discount window may accept bad assets
as collateral.
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Banks apply haircuts based on asset types. Also, there has been no report of default in
discount window loans.11 In this chapter, discount window loans are fully collateralized,
and borrowers do not default. Discount window stigma does not appear in equilibrium:
rather than avoiding discount window loans, high-quality sellers use them to lower the
signaling cost.
Lastly, if sellers’ money holdings and asset holdings are small, discount window lend-
ing may hurt aggregate welfare, which is measured by the total consumption in the
GM.12 In this case, sellers may pool in the asset market after borrowing from the dis-
count window because their liquidity needs are still high. Since the discount window
treats all assets as low-quality assets, compared to the pooling equilibrium in the bench-
mark model, sellers obtain less liquidity when they borrow from the discount window.
Despite obtaining less liquidity, high-quality sellers are better o  because they can keep
the dividends of some of their assets. However, low-quality sellers are strictly worse o 
compared to when there is no discount window and the equilibrium is pooling. Because
sellers bring less liquidity to the GM, the total consumption is lower.
3.4.2 Market Freeze and Government Asset Purchase
In 2007, the collapse of the housing market surprised investors and led to widespread
market dysfunction (Gorton, 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). There was virtually no
trading in the market of mortgages-backed securities and other asset-backed securities
(Benmelech et al., 2019). Such market freezes happen frequently during financial crises
(Benmelech and Bergman, 2018). The goal of this section is to study an unforeseen
quality shock that makes the quality of low-quality assets, ”l, zero. First, I show that
depending on sellers’ liquidity needs, this shock may or may not cause a market freeze.
Second, because ”l = 0, collateralized lending is not feasible. I study how government
asset purchases may unfreeze the market and improve welfare.
I assume the unforeseen quality shock happens at the beginning of the AM. It is
common knowledge that the shock has happened, but asset quality is still private infor-
mation. For simplicity, I assume ÷d = 1 and asset trade is not constrained by zb or a. If
the AM equilibrium is separating, the trading volume of all assets (i.e., asset price times
sale quantity) approaches zero as ”l approaches zero. This is because the opportunity
cost of selling assets is zero for low-quality sellers, who will then mimic any o ers from
high-quality sellers. However, this does not mean the market will freeze because sellers
11Data on discount window loans: https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-
window.htm.
12A formal analysis can be found in the proof of Proposition 3.5 in Appendix B.4.
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can choose to pool. The following proposition shows that as long as sellers’ liquidity
needs are su ciently high, high-quality sellers prefer pooling to not selling at all.
Proposition 3.6 There exists a zùs such that
(1) For all zs Æ zùs , there exists a ”ùl such that if ”l œ [0, ”ùl ), the equilibrium is pooling;
(2) For all zs > zùs , there exists a ”ùùl such that if ”l œ (0, ”ùùl ), the equilibrium is separating.
If ”l = 0, a market freeze happens.
Proof: see Appendix B.4.
The proposition shows that when sellers’ liquidity needs are low, a market freeze happens
when ”l = 0. This is because for high-quality sellers, the price discount in a pooling
equilibrium is high relative to the benefit of obtaining extra liquidity. Figure 3.1 provides
an illustration of the results.





































Figure 3.1: Market Freezes
The findings in Proposition 3.6 indicate that if a government can remove (purchase)
the bad assets from the market and improve the market price, it may be able to unfreeze
the market. Now, suppose a market freeze happens and the government implements an
asset purchase program. The program is financed by a lumpsum tax in the CM. The
government makes two announcements: (1) the price at which it will purchase the real
assets; and (2) the total quantity of real assets it will purchase. All sellers have an equal
chance to contact the government and the contact is frictionless. If a seller chooses to
sell to the government, she is required to sell all of her real assets so that sellers with bad
assets are removed from the market. This increases the pooling price and may unfreeze
the market. Sellers who choose not to sell to the government proceed to trade in the
asset market.
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In equilibrium, only bad assets are sold to the government. This is consistent with the
findings in Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012). Hence, the government can
unfreeze the market if it purchases enough bad assets. The government asset purchase
has the following two properties.
Proposition 3.7 (1) It is not optimal to purchase all bad assets from the market.
(2) The government can purchase assets at a price below the market price.
Proof: see Appendix B.4.
I explain the first result with an example in the panel (a) of Figure 3.2. First, if not
enough bad assets are removed from the market, the market stays frozen so the curves are
flat. Once the government unfreezes the market, the cost of the program increases rapidly
because removing bad assets increases the market price, and hence the government has
to pay more to compete with the market. However, the marginal benefit of the program
(the slope of the solid line) decreases as the trading in the asset market improves. As a
result, there exists an optimal purchase quantity, and it is less than the quantity of bad
assets in the economy.
Second, the government price is below the market price because sellers with bad assets
sell more to the government than in the market. Due to the price discount in the pooling
equilibrium, high-quality sellers in general do not sell all of their assets. However, sellers
with bad assets sell all of their assets to the government. In equilibrium, these sellers are
indi erent between selling less in the market for a higher price and selling more to the
government for a lower price.
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Figure 3.2: Welfare and Asset Prices
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines how asset sellers’ private information and the liquid assets they
possess before trading together a ect asset market outcomes. In equilibrium, sellers’
liquidity interacts with private information in the asset market and generates various
types of equilibria. Specifically, when asset quality is the source of private information,
the equilibrium is separating if sellers’ liquidity holdings are large, and pooling if sellers’
liquidity holdings are small. This is no longer true when another dimension of private
information, i.e., sellers’ valuations of liquid assets, is introduced to the environment. The
equilibrium can be semi-pooling and feature sellers with high-quality assets separating
from other sellers even when sellers liquidity holdings are small.
I also extend the model to study government interventions in the forms of discount
window lending and asset purchases. I find that it is possible that only sellers with
high-quality assets borrow from the discount window even though the discount window
does not attempt to screen the borrowers. This shows that discount window stigma
may not be the result of private information about quality in the asset market. I also
find that after a negative quality shock causes the asset market to freeze, a government
can unfreeze the market by purchasing bad assets. However, it is not optimal for the
government purchase all bad assets from the market.
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Chapter 4
Signaling in Competitive Search
Equilibrium
4.1 Introduction
Consider an asset seller with private knowledge that her assets have high quality. How
does the seller signal this information to buyers? A large literature spurred by Leland and
Pyle (1977) has studied partial retention of assets as a signal. Specifically, compared to
sellers with low-quality assets, sellers with high-quality assets may sell a smaller quantity
because their assets have a higher continuation value. Alternatively, sellers with high-
quality assets may charge a higher price if it means to sell with a lower probability
(e.g., illiquidity) (Guerrieri and Shimer, 2014). Illiquidity can also be a credible signal
of quality because sellers with high-quality assets benefit more from keeping their assets
compared to sellers with low-quality assets. Although both types of signals have been
studied in the literature, how they di er from each other is not well understood. To asset
sellers, what are the relative costs of signaling via illiquidity and partial retention? How
does the use of illiquidity and partial retention as signals depend on the quality of assets?
How is signaling a ected by shocks to seller’s liquidity demand or asset quality?
To answer these questions, I build a model to study both signals in a general frame-
work. To allow illiquidity as a signal, I follow Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) to assume
agents trade assets via competitive search. To allow partial retention as a signal, I de-
viate from Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) by assuming that assets are perfectly divisible.
To sell assets, sellers post a price and a quantity for sale. The probability of a seller
meeting a buyer (and vice versa) is determined by the buyer-to-seller ratio associated
with each price and quantity. After paying an entry cost, buyers observe all o ers and
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the associated buyer-to-seller ratios before deciding where to buy.
There are two types of perfectly divisible assets: fruit and trees. Fruit can be con-
sumed at anytime, but trees cannot be consumed directly. Instead, trees will bear fruit
sometime in the future. Fruit is meant to represent liquid assets that can be used to
purchase consumption goods or fund investment, while trees cannot be used for those
purposes. All agents are endowed with some fruit and trees. I assume only the owners
of the trees can observe the quality, which is measured by the amount of fruit each unit
of trees will eventually produce. There are two types of agents, early consumers and late
consumers. Early consumers may want to sell their trees to late consumers for fruit so
that they can consume immediately.
There are two main findings. First, all assets sellers (i.e., early consumers) except
those with the lowest-quality trees use both types of signals in equilibrium. Specifically,
I find that both trading probability and trading volume (which is the amount of fruit
exchanged in trade) decrease with the quality of seller’s trees. In a related paper, Williams
(2016) also studies both signals in a similar framework. However, he shows that sellers
do not use partial retention as a signal unless other information frictions are introduced.
This is because in Williams (2016), sellers’ preferences over fruit are assumed to be
linear. If a seller is able to signal through illiquidity the quality of her trees, it is optimal
to sell all of her trees. In this paper, asset sellers’ preferences over fruit are strictly
concave. Compared to using only illiquidity as a signal, sellers benefit from lowering
trading volume in exchange for higher trading probability. In other words, there exists
a trade-o  between illiquidity and partial retention that is absent in models with linear
preferences.
Second, I find that how the two signals are used depends on the quality of sellers’
trees. Specifically, among sellers with high quality trees, those with relatively higher-
quality trees sell marginally fewer trees but with significantly lower probability. In com-
parison, among sellers with low quality trees, those with relatively higher-quality trees
sell significantly fewer trees but with only marginally lower probability. This is because
for sellers with low-quality trees, trading volume is high and the marginal value of fruit
is low, so they prefer lowering trading volume to lowering trading probability. For sell-
ers with high-quality trees, trading volume is low so the marginal value of fruit is high.
trading probability is then a less costly signal.
Building on these results, I study how the use of signals react to shocks to the econ-
omy. First, an aggregate liquidity shock that increases all sellers’ demand for fruit leads
to higher trading probability and trading volume for all sellers. However, for sellers with
high-quality trees, trading probability increases more than trading volume. This is be-
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cause for sellers with high-quality trees, a small increase in trading volume has a large
e ect on a seller’s utility since the marginal utility of fruit is large. Hence, for sellers
with high-quality trees, a large increase in trading volume would lead to sellers with
lower-quality trees mimicking their o ers. I also find that a quality shock that lowers the
quality of low-quality trees has similar e ects. The shock lowers trading probability and
trading volume for all sellers. However, for sellers with high-quality trees, the decrease
in trading probability is larger than the decrease in trading volume.
The relationship between illiquidity and partial retention as signals is also explored in
Williams (2016). After introducing sellers’ preferences as a second dimension of private
information, Williams (2016) shows that there exists a fully separating equilibrium where
both types of signals are used. Sellers with the same continuation value of assets charge
the same price. Among such sellers, those with higher-quality assets sell less but with a
higher probability. This also implies that buyers purchase assets with di erent quality at
the same price in equilibrium. In this chapter, sellers use both types of signals even though
there is only one dimension of private information. The trade-o  emerges as the relative
costs of illiquidity and partial retention changes with trading volume. Furthermore, in
an extension I show that the main findings of this chapter holds when there is a fixed
supply of buyers as opposed to free entry of buyers.
This chapter is related to literature that studies asset markets with private infor-
mation and search friction. Building on Guerrieri et al. (2010), Chang (2018) studies
a two-dimensional private information problem similar to Williams (2016). However,
Chang (2018) assumes the asset is indivisible and focuses instead on semi-pooling equi-
libria that can be used to explain the fire sale phenomena. The two-dimensional private
information problem is also studied by Guerrieri and Shimer (2018). Their focus is the
welfare implications of multiple equilibria. Both Chang (2018) and Guerrieri and Shimer
(2018) assume linear preferences. Therefore, the trade-o  between illiquidity and partial
retention does not emerge in their models.
This chapter belongs to the vast literature on private information spurred by Akerlof
(1970) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Some recent work that also studies private informa-
tion in asset markets includes Eisfeldt (2004), Kurlat (2013), Chiu and Koeppl (2016),
and Choi (2018). Eisfeldt (2004), Chiu and Koeppl (2016), and Kurlat (2013) restrict
their attention to pooling equilibria by requiring agents to trade at one price or not trade
at all. Choi (2018) assumes that asset buyers do not inherit sellers’ private information
after trade and have to learn it, and finds that public disclosure of private information
is not always welfare-improving. The notion that trade in asset markets is motivated by
agents’ di erent needs for liquidity is based on Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016a),
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who extend the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework by allowing agents to rebalance their
portfolios before consumption.1
In what follows, Section 4.2 describes the physical environment. Section 4.3 solves
the equilibrium. Section 4.4 analyzes liquidity and quality shocks. Section 4.5 extend
the model to allow a fixed supply of buyers. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Model Environment
There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and two types of agents, early consumers and late
consumers. In period 0, a unit measure of early consumers are born and endowed with a
units of trees and b units of fruit. Both fruit and trees are perfectly divisible. Fruit may
be consumed in period 1 or period 2, but trees cannot be directly consumed. Instead,
trees will bear fruit in period 2. An early consumer’s utility is given by
u(c1) + ce2, (4.1)
where c1 is the consumption in period 1 and ce2 is the consumption in period 2. I assume
uÕ(.) > 0, uÕÕ(.) < 0, uÕ(b) > 1, and uÕ(cú) = 1 for some cú < Œ. There is also a large
measure of late consumers who only consumes in period 2. Like early consumers, they
are also endowed with fruit and trees, and their preferences are linear in their period-2
consumption.
I assume early consumers di er in the quality of the trees they hold. Let ” denote
the quality of an early consumer’s trees. It means each unit of the early consumer’s trees
will produce ” units of fruit in period 2. A consumer’s trees belong to one of J di erent
quality types, i.e., ” œ J = {”j}Jj=1 where ”1 < ”2 < ... < ”J . The distribution of ” is
Pr(” = ”j) =  j, for all ”j œ J . (4.2)
I assume only owners’ of the trees observe the quality. However, whether an agent is an
early consumer or a late consumer is public information.2
In period 0, an asset market opens for agents to trade fruit and trees. An agent who
wants to sell trees posts an o er (z, s) where z is the amount of fruit asked by the agent,
1See also Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016b), Herrenbrueck and Geromichalos (2017),
Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2017), and Herrenbrueck (2019). None of these papers study the
private information problem.
2Wang (2019) studies the case where agents’ preferences are also private information. In such case,
sellers may have di erent trading motives, and agents’ welfare depends on whether trading motives are
revealed.
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and s is the quantity of trees o ered by the agent. An agent who wants to buy trees
must pay an entry cost k. Following the competitive search literature, I refer to (z, s)
as a “location”. Denote the buyer-seller ratio in each location as ◊(z, s). I assume a
buyer meets a seller with probability q(◊), while a seller meets a buyer with probability
p(◊) = ◊q(◊). I assume qÕ(◊) < 0, pÕ(◊) > 0 and pÕÕ(◊) < 0. Buyers observe all (z, s)
pairs and the associated buyer-seller ratios before they decide which location to visit.
After the asset market, early consumers decide how much to consume in period 1 and 2.
For simplicity, I assume that a Ø (cú ≠ b)/”1 where cú solves uÕ(cú) = 1, and that late
consumers have deep pockets. This to guarantee that trade in the asset market is not
constrained by sellers’ or buyers’ assets, but they are not crucial to the results of this
chapter. Lastly, in period 2, trees bear fruit and the agents consume fruit.
4.3 Equilibrium
4.3.1 Agents’ Problems
To characterize the equilibrium, it is convenient to start with early consumers’ problem
after asset trade. Let b + z̃ be the amount of fruit an early consumer has after selling
their assets. z̃ is the amount of fruit obtained from the asset market. Let ã denote the
trees the early consumer has. Then the early consumer solves
max
c1,c2
u(c1) + ce2 (4.3)
s.t. c1 Æ b + z̃, (4.4)
ce
2
Æ b + z̃ ≠ c1 + ”ã. (4.5)
Let c1(b + z̃) denote the optimal c1. Then it is easy to see that c1(b + z̃) = min{b + z̃, cú}
where uÕ(cú) = 1. Recall that I assume uÕ(b) > 1. That is, the fruit endowment is not
large enough for early consumers to consume cú. Since all agents’ preferences in fruit are
linear in period 2 but fruit has a higher marginal value to early consumers in period 1,
they will want to sell trees in exchange for fruit. Now recall that to sell trees, sellers has
to post an o er (z, s). If buyers accept this o er, she must give the seller z units of fruit.
In return, she receives s units of trees. I assume and later verify that in equilibrium,
z Æ cú ≠ b so c1(b + z) = b + z. The expected utility of a seller who has quality ” trees
and posts (z, s) is given by
p(◊(z, s))[u(b + z) ≠ ”s] + (1 ≠ p(◊(z, s)))u(b) + ”a, (4.6)
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where ◊(z, s) is the market tightness at location (z, s). In words, (4.6) says that with
probability p(◊(z, s)), a seller meets a buyer and obtains z units of fruit, which allows
her to consume in total b + z units of fruit in period 1. In exchange, the seller transfers
s units of trees to the buyer. With probability 1 ≠ p(◊(z, s)), the seller does not meet
a buyer and consumes b in period 1. Next, the expected utility of a buyer who chooses







“(z, s; ”jÕ)”jÕ ≠ z
T
V , (4.7)
where “(z, s; ”jÕ) is the buyer’s belief about the probability of tree quality in location
(z, s) being ”jÕ . Note that
qJ
jÕ=1 “(z, s; ”jÕ) = 1. In words, (4.7) says that if a buyer meets
a seller at location (z, s), the buyer expects each unit of trees to produce on average
qJ
jÕ=1 “(z, s; ”jÕ)”jÕ units of fruit in period 2. In exchange for s units of trees, the buyer
gives the seller z units of fruit.
Sellers and buyers can choose not to participate in the asset market. Denote not
participating as ÿ. I define the competitive equilibrium in the asset market.
Definition 4.1 A competitive equilibrium is a set   of seller o ers, a vector {vús,j}Jj=1,
a market tightness functions ◊ :   æ [0, Œ], and a belief function “ :   ◊ J æ [0, 1] that
satisfy
(1) Given “(z, s; ”j), vús,j is given by
vús,j = max
(z,s)œ fiÿ
p(◊(z, s))[u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”js], (4.8)









“(z, s; ”jÕ)”jÕ ≠ z
T
V = k; (4.9)
(2) “(z, s; ”j) is given by Bayes’ Rule whenever possible;
(3) For all (z, s), (z, s) œ   only if it solves the maximization problem in (4.9); and
(4) There do not exist S µ J and (zÕ, sÕ, ◊Õ) œ R3
+
such that for any “Õ(zÕ, sÕ; ”j),
p(◊Õ)[u(b + zÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jsÕ] > vús,j for all ”j œ S, (4.10)





“Õ(zÕ, sÕ; ”jÕ)”jÕ ≠ zÕ Ø k for all “Õ(zÕ, sÕ; ”j) with support S. (4.12)
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Conditions (1)-(3) define a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), but they put no restric-
tions on beliefs about out-of-equilibrium actions. As a result, there exist a plethora of
PBE that satisfy conditions (1)-(3). To obtain meaningful results, condition (4) requires
the equilibrium to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). It says that for
any PBE to be an equilibrium, there must not exist an o -equilibrium o er (zÕ, sÕ) such
that (i) it only makes sellers in set S strictly better o , and (ii) it is accepted by buyers
as long as buyers’ beliefs about ” conditional on (zÕ, sÕ) put no weights on sellers in J \S.
Condition (i) means that sellers in J \S do not have the incentive to deviate. Condition
(ii) means that buyers will accept this o -equilibrium o er as long as their beliefs are
consistent with sellers’ strategies. If such o er exists, sellers in S will always deviate and
the original equilibrium will cease to exist.
The equilibrium is solved in Appendix C.1. Now let (zj, sj) denote the o er posted
by sellers with quality ”j trees. Let ◊j = ◊(zj, sj).
Proposition 4.1 Assume k < u(cú)≠u(b)≠(cú ≠b). Then there exists a unique compet-
itive equilibrium. In addition, for all 1 Æ jÕ < jÕÕ Æ J , ◊jÕ > ◊jÕÕ, sjÕ > sjÕÕ and zjÕ > zjÕÕ.
Proof: see Appendix C.1.
There are two important characteristics of the equilibrium. First, it is fully separating
in the sense that sellers with di erent quality trees sell with di erent probabilities and
receive di erent amounts of money. Second, in equilibrium, both illiquidity and partial
retention are used by sellers. Sellers with higher-quality trees sell with lower probability,
and they also sell smaller quantities. This is in stark contrast with the findings in Williams
(2016), who shows that when there is only one dimension of private information (i.e., asset
quality), sellers do not use partial retention as a signal. Williams (2016) assumes sellers’
preferences over fruit are linear, while in this chapter sellers’ preferences over fruit in
period 1 are strictly concave. To see why sellers use both signals, suppose for a moment
that sellers do not use partial retention. Then, for all sellers, c1 = cú and the marginal
utility of fruit would be equal to one. Since the opportunity cost of consuming in period
1 is also one, lowering trading volume only has second-order e ects on early consumers’
utility. However, a lower trading volume allows high-quality sellers to increase trading
probability, which has a first order e ect on their utility. Hence, there exists a trade-o 
between illiquidity and partial retention.
4.3.2 Illiquidity vs. Partial Retention
To demonstrate the trade-o  between illiquidity and partial retention as signals of asset
quality, I calculate the elasticities of trading probability (p(◊j)) and trading volume (zj)
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with respect to tree quality (”j). From Proposition 4.1, we know that dp(◊j)/ d”j < 0














U(z) = u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ zuÕ(b + z). (4.15)
The next proposition shows how the trade-o  changes with the quality of sellers’ trees.
Proposition 4.2 Assume p
Õ
(◊)
p(◊)pÕÕ(◊) is increasing in ◊ and
≠zU Õ(z)
U(z) is increasing in z. Then
D(jÕ) < D(jÕÕ) for all 1 < jÕ < jÕÕ Æ J .
Proof: see Appendix C.1.
The assumption on p(◊) is satisfied by the Cobb-Douglas matching function (i.e., p(◊) =
◊(1/◊)‘ where ‘ œ (0, 1)). If ◊ is not too large, the assumption is also satisfied by the
urn-ball matching function (i.e., p(◊) = ◊(1 ≠ e≠1/◊)) and the telephone-line matching
function (i.e., p(◊) = ◊[–/(– + ◊“)]1/“ where – œ (0, 1] and “ Ø 1). The assumption on
U(z) is satisfied by CRRA utility function (i.e., u(c) = (c1≠‡ ≠ 1)/(1 ≠ ‡)) for all ‡ > 0.
It should be noted that these two assumptions are su cient but not necessary for the
proposition to hold.
Now, to understand Proposition 4.2, consider sellers with ”j and ”j+1 trees as well
as sellers with ”jÕ and ”jÕ+1 trees, where j < jÕ. From Proposition 4.1, we know that to
prevent ”j sellers from deviating, it must be that p(◊j+1) < p(◊j) and zj < zj+1. Similarly,
to prevent ”jÕ sellers from deviating, it must be that p(◊jÕ+1) < p(◊jÕ) and zjÕ+1 < zjÕ .
Proposition 4.2 says that compared to ”j+1 sellers, ”jÕ+1 sellers reduce trading probability
more than they reduce trading volume. In other words, sellers with higher-quality trees
prefer illiquidity to partial retention. The intuition is that when the tree quality is
relatively low, trading volume is high so the marginal value of fruit is low. To signal their
quality, sellers prefer lowering trading volume to lowering trading probability. When the
tree quality is relatively high, trading volume is low so the marginal value of fruit is high.
Lowering trading volume becomes too costly compared to lowering trading probability.
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(b) Trading volume (z)
Figure 4.1: Equilibrium Trading Probability and Trading Volume
In panel (a) and (b), trading probability (p(◊)) and trading volume (z) are plotted
against ”, respectively. Panel (a) shows that p(◊) decreases slowly at first but accelerates
when ” is larger. Panel (b) shows that z decreases quickly at first but decelerates when
” is larger. This means that compared to sellers with low-quality trees, sellers with
high-quality trees are more willing to sacrifice trading probability than trading volume.
4.4 Liquidity and Quality Shocks
In this section, first I study a liquidity shocks that increases early consumers’ demand
for fruit. Second, I discuss a shock to the quality distribution that disproportionately
a ects low-quality trees. Such a scenario is similar to the subprime mortgages crisis in
2007-08 when the subprime mortgages have a much higher delinquency rate.
4.4.1 Liquidity Shock
Assume that before the asset market opens, an aggregate liquidity shock happens and
it increases early consumers’ marginal utility for Period 1 consumption. Specifically, let
the utility of early consumers in Period 1 be given by
u(.) = ÷û(.),
where ûÕ(.) > 0, ûÕÕ(.) < 0, ûÕ(b) > 1, and ûÕ(cú) = 1 for some cú < Œ. Note that
3The utility function used is
Ô
c.
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÷ = 1 in the benchmark model, and I assume ÷ > 1 when the liquidity shock happens.
A straightforward interpretation of such liquidity shock is a surprise consumption need.
Alternatively, the shock can be interpreted as a flight-to-safety episode that often happens
during runs on financial institutions or crises in repo markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011;
Martin et al., 2014).4
The next proposition shows how the equilibrium responds to the shock.
Proposition 4.3 After the liquidity shock, p(◊j) and zj increase for all j.
Proof: see Appendix C.2.
The liquidity shock increases trading probability and trading volume for all quality types.
In particular, for low-quality sellers, the increase in the marginal utility of fruit increases
the quantity they sell. This makes mimicking high-quality sellers’ o ers less attractive
because high-quality sellers sell less than low-quality sellers. As a result, high-quality




















(b) Trading volume (z)
Figure 4.2: Liquidity Shock and Equilibrium
Another interesting result is that as j increases, the increase in p(◊j) becomes larger
and larger compared to the increase in zj, as shown in Figure 4.2. This is the result of the
trade-o  between illiquidity and partial retention (see Proposition 4.2). When ”j is large,
zj is small and the marginal utility of fruit is large. As a result, a small increase in z has
a large e ect on a seller’s utility. This means zj cannot increase much without triggering
the deviation from sellers with lower-quality trees. On the other hand, the marginal e ect
of increasing p(◊j) is much smaller. Therefore, for sellers with high-quality trees, after a
4Wang (2020) studies an idiosyncratic liquidity shock and shows that the equilibrium depends cru-
cially on whether or not asset buyers can observe which sellers have received the shock.
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liquidity shock, the increase in trading probability is larger compared to the increase in
trading volume.
4.4.2 Quality Shock
Now assume that before the asset market opens, a quality shock happens and it decreases
the quality of sellers’ trees. Specifically, let {”†j}Jj=1 denote the tree quality after the shock.
I assume ”†j = h(”j)”j where h(”j) œ (0, 1] and h(”j) Æ h(”jÕ) for all j < jÕ. This means
that the shock disproportionately a ects low-quality trees.
The next proposition shows how the equilibrium responds to the shock.
Proposition 4.4 Equilibrium trading probability p(◊j) and equilibrium trading volume
zj decrease for all j > 1 after the quality shock.
Proof: see Appendix C.2.
The quality shock decreases trading probability and trading volume for all quality types
even if it only a ects the trees with the lowest quality (i.e., if h(”1) < 1 while h(”j) = 1
for all j > 1). The reason is that to prevent sellers with ”1 trees from deviating, all sellers
must lower trading probability and trading volume. Hence, sellers with high-quality trees

















(b) Trading volume (z)
Figure 4.3: Quality Shock and Equilibrium
Figure 4.3 shows that sellers with high-quality trees face larger decreases in trading
probability than sellers with low-quality trees, even though the shock a ects low-quality
trees more than high-quality trees.
Similar to the equilibrium under the liquidity shock, for sellers with high-quality
trees, the decreases in trading volume are small compared to the decreases in trading
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probability. This is because sellers with high-quality trees substitute trading probability
for trading volume, since it is expensive to decrease trading volume when it is already
small. It can therefore be concluded that after a liquidity shock or a quality shock, for
sellers with high-quality trees, the changes in trading probability are always larger than
the changes in trading volume.
4.5 Extension: Fixed Supply of Buyers
In this section, I assume there is a fixed supply of late consumers as a robustness check
of the results in this chapter. This modification o ers two new insights. First, buyer’s
surplus is no longer pinned down by the entry cost. Instead, it is endogenously determined
by the number of buyer relative to sellers in the asset market. Second, the fruit available
for asset trade is limited to the fruit held by the fixed supply of buyers. Recall that
fruit is meant to represent liquid assets. Then, buyers having limited amount fruit in
possession is akin to the situation where there is insu cient liquidity in asset markets.
In what follows, I solve the equilibrium in the new environment.
Let the total measure of early and late consumers be normalized to one. Let – denote
the measure of early consumers so 1 ≠ – is the measure of late consumers. Also, let be
and bl denote the amount of fruit held by early and late consumers before trading. The
problems of the late and early consumers are identical to those in Section 4.3 except now
the trade may be constrained by bl.
Definition 4.2 A competitive equilibrium is a set   of seller o ers, a vector {vús,j}Jj=1, a
scalar vúb , a market tightness functions ◊ :   æ [0, Œ], a belief function “ :  ◊J æ [0, 1],
and an accumulative price distribution function F :   æ [0, 1] that satisfy
(1) Given “(z, s; ”j), vús,j is given by
vús,j = max
(z,s)œ fiÿ
p(◊(z, s))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be) ≠ ”s], (4.16)









“(z, s; ”jÕ)”jÕ ≠ z
T
V ; (4.17)
(2) “(z, s; ”j) is given by Bayes’ Rule whenever possible;
(3) For all (z, s), (z, s) œ   only if it solves the maximization problem in (4.17), and it
is feasible: z Æ bl;
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“(z, s; ”j)dF (z, s) and
–




◊(z, s)dF (z, s) ;
and
(5) There do not exist S µ J and (zÕ, sÕ, ◊Õ) œ R3
+
such that zÕ Æ bl and
p(◊Õ)[u(be + zÕ) ≠ u(be) ≠ ”jsÕ] > vús,j for all j œ S, (4.18)




“Õ(zÕ, sÕ; ”jÕ)”jÕ ≠ zÕ Ø vúb for all “Õ(zÕ, sÕ; ”j) with support S. (4.20)
Conditions (1)-(3) are the same as conditions (1)-(3) in Definition 4.1 except that the
entry cost k is replaced with the endogenous buyer surplus vúb . Condition (4) is new and
it requires that the measure of buyers in each location adds up to the total measure of
buyers in the market. Lastly, condition (5) is the same as the condition (4) in Definition
4.1. It requires the equilibrium to satisfy the intuitive criterion.
The equilibrium is solved in two steps. The first step takes vb, the surplus of buyers,
as given. It solves the partial equilibrium by requiring sellers to o er at least vb to buyers.
This step is identical to how the equilibrium is solved in Section 4.3. The second step
is to find the equilibrium vúb that satisfies condition (4). The next proposition describes
the equilibrium.
Proposition 4.5 For all – œ (0, 1), there exists a unique competitive equilibrium. In
addition, for all 1 < jÕ < jÕÕ Æ J , ◊jÕ > ◊jÕÕ, sjÕ > sjÕÕ and zjÕ > zjÕÕ.
Proof: see Appendix C.3.
The equilibrium is very similar to the equilibrium found in Proposition 4.5: it is fully
separating, and sellers use both illiquidity and partial retention as signals. The main
finding of this chapter, i.e., the trade-o  between illiquidity and partial retention, also
holds in this equilibrium. Similar to Section 4.3.2, I compare the elasticities of ◊j and zj




and U(z) = u(be+z)≠u(be)≠zuÕ(be+z).
Proposition 4.6 Assume p
Õ
(◊)
p(◊)pÕÕ(◊) is increasing in ◊ and
≠zU Õ(z)
U(z) is increasing in z. Then
D(jÕ) < D(jÕÕ) for all 1 < jÕ < jÕÕ Æ J .
Proof: see Appendix C.3.
Now, I show how buyers’ surplus in equilibrium, vúb , depends on the share of sellers,
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seller’s demand for fruit, and the amount of fruit each buyer has. To discuss sellers’
demand for fruit, I reuse the utility function introduced in Section 4.4.1: u(.) = ÷û(.).
Proposition 4.7 vúb is increasing in –, ÷, and bl.
Proof: see Appendix C.3.
First, when the share of sellers or seller’s demand for fruit increases, sellers in each
location have the incentive to attract buyers by increasing the value they o er to buyers.
Hence, in equilibrium, vúb is higher. Second, if bl is larger, the total surplus of match
between buyers and sellers are larger. Since buyers are in fixed supply, sellers have the
incentive to attract buyers to their locations, and hence vúb is higher.
Since vúb is determined endogenously as opposed to being pinned down by the entry
cost, the equilibrium also responds to shocks di erently. For example, suppose a liquidity
shock happens and it increases ÷. Not only will trading probability p(◊) and trading
volume z react to the shock, but vúb will also change. Hence, there exists a general
equilibrium e ect that is not present in the model with free entry. Figure 4.4 provides
an example of how the responses di er in two environments. I reproduce panel (a) of
Figure 4.2 in the panel (a) of Figure 4.4 for comparison. In panel (b) where the supply
of buyers is fixed, trading probability is lower for low-quality sellers but higher for high-
quality sellers after the liquidity shock. In comparison, when there is free entry of buyers,


















(b) Fixed Supply of Buyers
Figure 4.4: Liquidity Shock and Trading probability (p(◊))
4.6 Conclusion
I develop a simple competitive search model to study illiquidity and partial retention
of assets as signals of asset quality in asset markets with private information. I show
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that both signals are used by sellers in equilibrium. However, for sellers with high-
quality assets, illiquidity is preferred over partial retention in the sense that among these
sellers, those with higher-quality assets sell with significantly lower probability but only
marginally less. I show the opposite is true for sellers with low-quality assets. Building
on these results, I study aggregate liquidity shocks that increase asset sellers’ need for
liquidity, and quality shocks that lower the quality of low-quality assets. The model
predicts that after the shocks, for sellers with high-quality assets, the changes in trading
probability are larger than the changes in trading volume, while the opposite happens
to sellers with low-quality assets. Lastly, as a robustness check, I show that the main
results in this chapter hold if instead of free entry of buyers, a fixed supply of buyers is
assumed. I provide an example of how the general equilibrium e ects in this modified
setup a ects equilibrium responses to shocks.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Discussion: Endogenous Signaling Games
Consider an “endogenous signaling” game in Figure A.1a where player 1 (P1) makes an un-


















y n y n y n y n
(b) Reordered Game
Figure A.1: Reordering Invariance Equilibrium
In this game, PBE does not put any restrictions on player 2’s beliefs about player 1’s unobserv-
able move on o -equilibrium paths. In and Wright (2018) note that the order of player 1’s two
moves does not matter for equilibrium outcomes, because the player does not gain any payo -
relevant information between moves. However, if player 1 makes the observable move first, his
subsequent unobservable move and player 2’s move constitutes a proper subgame of the reordered
game (Figure A.1b). By solving the Nash equilibrium of the subgame, one can confine player 2’s
beliefs about player 1’s unobservable move in a logically consistent way. The Reordering Invari-
ance (RI) equilibrium then selects the equilibrium outcomes that are also equilibrium outcomes
of the reordered game. Reordering Invariance equilibrium has been used in Li et al. (2012),
Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2017), Kang (2017), and Berentsen et al. (2017) to study the problem
of counterfeit assets.
In this paper, the game between sellers and the fiscal authority is similar to the endogenous
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signaling game. A seller makes an unobservable action (posting (q, p)) and an observable action
(reporting y) before the fiscal authority decides ÷. For any given y, the game between sellers
and the fiscal authority, which is described by (2.11) and (2.13), is similar to the subgame in the
reordered endogenous signaling game. Similar to the Reordering Invariance (RI) equilibrium, the
proposed refinement requires the same to be true for any o -equilibrium choice of y.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1: This proof has two parts. In part I, I solve for the Nash equilibrium
for any given ·(y) and y. In part II, I solve for the optimal choice of y. Throughout this proof,
I assume Rd > 0. The case with Rd = 0 is straightforward to solve using this proof.
Part I. In this part, I first solve the Nash equilibrium for any given ·(y) and y. It is easy to see
that (2.12) must bind because if it does not, a seller can be better o  by choosing a smaller q.
Also, it must be that n Æ 1 because otherwise a seller can lower n and make (2.12) slack while
not a ecting his surplus.
Next, there are two possible cases. First, suppose that Rd < (1 ≠ flm)÷/(1 ≠ ÷). This means
that the marginal cost of using cash is lower than bank deposits. However, since Rd > 0, the




{(1 ≠ flm÷)(y + m ≠ ·(y)) ≠ q} s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)m ≠ 1 + µ1 + Rd y + —u(q) = S. (A.1)
The first order condition is
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷) . (A.2)







= ·(y) ≠ R
dy




Hence, q is increasing in y and therefore ÷ is decreasing in y. Then, there exists y† such that for
all y Ø y†, if the seller continues using both bank deposits and cash, then Rd Ø (1≠flm)÷/(1≠÷).
In such case, the marginal cost of using cash becomes higher than bank deposits. This means
the seller has the incentive to deviate and use bank deposits. Suppose the seller chooses to use
only bank deposits. The seller solves
max
q,d
{(1 ≠ ÷)(d ≠ ·(y)) ≠ q} s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)d1 + Rd + —u(q) = S. (A.4)
The first order condition is
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ ÷)(1 + Rd) . (A.5)
In a Nash equilibrium, it must be that d ≠ ·(y) = C and ÷ œ (0, 1). That is, ÷ solves
d = 1 + R
d
1 + µ [—u(q) ≠ S] = ·(y) + C. (A.6)
It is easy to see that q is increasing in y and therefore ÷ is decreasing in y. This means that
there exists y‡ such that for all y < y‡, if the seller accepts only bank deposits, then Rd <
(1 ≠ flm)÷/(1 ≠ ÷). This means that the seller has the incentive to deviate and use both bank
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deposits and cash. Note that y† < y‡. To see this, suppose the seller uses bank deposits and
y = y‡. If the seller switches to a mixture of bank deposits and cash, then q will not change
because Rd = (1 ≠ flm)÷/(1 ≠ ÷). However, since flm(y + m ≠ ·(y)) < d ≠ ·(y) because Rd > 0
and flm < 1, the fiscal authority has to lower ÷ so that flm(y + m ≠ ·(y)) = C. Then it must
be that Rd > (1 ≠ flm)÷/(1 ≠ ÷), i.e., y > y†. This means that for any y† < y < y‡, there does
not exist an equilibrium where the seller plays a pure strategy. Instead, for all y† < y < y‡,
÷ = ÷Õ = Rd/(1 ≠ flm + Rd). For any y† < y < y‡, let (q†, m†) solve
uÕ(q†) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷Õ) , (A.7)
m† = 11 + µ
5




d‡ = 1 + R
d
1 + µ [—u(q
†) ≠ S]. (A.9)
It is clear that flm(y + m† ≠ ·(y)) < C and d‡ ≠ ·(y) > C for any y† < y < y‡. Also, both
flm(y+m† ≠·(y)) and d‡ ≠·(y) are decreasing in y. For any y† < y < y‡, there exists ‘(y) œ (0, 1)
such that
‘(y)flm(y + m† ≠ ·(y)) + (1 ≠ ‘(y))(d‡ ≠ ·(y)) = C. (A.10)
And ‘(y) is decreasing in y. Then, for all y† < y < y‡, the seller chooses (q†, m†) with probability
‘(y) and (q‡, d‡) with probability 1 ≠ ‘(y).
To summarize, for any ·(y) and y, the Nash equilibrium is given by the following. Define
÷Õ = Rd/(1 ≠ flm + Rd). Let q† solve
uÕ(q†) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷Õ) . (A.11)






= ·(y) ≠ R
dy




Define y‡ to be such that
1 + Rd
1 + µ [—u(q) ≠ S] = ·(y) + C. (A.13)
Then for all y Æ y†, d = y. m and q solve
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷) , (A.14)
m = 11 + µ
5
—u(q) ≠ S ≠ 1 + µ1 + Rd y
6
= ·(y) ≠ y + C
flm
. (A.15)
For all y Ø y‡, m = 0. d and q solve
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ ÷)(1 + Rd) , (A.16)
d = 1 + R
d
1 + µ [—u(q) ≠ S] = ·(y) + C. (A.17)
For all y† < y < y‡, the seller chooses (q†, m†) with probability ‘(y) and (q†, d‡) with probability
1 ≠ ‘(y), where (q†, m†) solve (A.7) and (A.8) and d‡ solves (A.9). ‘(y) is given by (A.10).
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Part II. In this part, I solve for the optimal y. First, suppose that the seller plays a pure strategy
and accepts both cash and bank deposits. Note that in such case, we have flm(d+m≠·(y)) = C.
Hence, the seller’s surplus is given by
(1 ≠ flm÷)C
flm
≠ q = (1 + µ)C
—flmuÕ(q) ≠ q, (A.18)






= ·(y) ≠ R
dy




Take the derivative of (1+µ)C—flmuÕ(q) ≠ q with respect to q and we have
≠(1 + µ)Cu
ÕÕ(q)
—flm[uÕ(q)]2 ≠ 1. (A.20)
Second, suppose that the seller plays a pure strategy and accepts only bank deposits. Note
that in such case, we have d ≠ ·(y) = C. The seller’s surplus is then
(1 ≠ ÷)C ≠ q = (1 + µ)C
—(1 + Rd)uÕ(q) ≠ q.
Take the derivative of the right-hand side with respect to q to get
≠ (1 + µ)Cu
ÕÕ(q)
—(1 + Rd)[uÕ(q)]2 ≠ 1. (A.21)
Third, suppose the seller plays a mixed strategy. In such case, his surplus is equal to when
y = y† and the seller accepts both cash and deposits, or when y = y‡ and the seller accepts only
deposits.
Fourth, suppose the seller reports truthfully. Since Rd > 0, the seller will only accept
deposits. The seller’s problem becomes
max
q,d
{d ≠ ·(d) ≠ q} s.t. ≠ 1 + µ1 + Rd d + —u(q) = S. (A.22)
Then, to determine the equilibrium, we can compare the seller’s surplus when he or she misreports
his income and when he or she reports truthfully.
Lastly, in equilibrium it must be that n(q, p) < 1 for some (q, p) since there are more sellers
than buyers. This means that (1) S must be such that sellers’ surplus in equilibrium is zero;
and (2) some sellers do not meet buyers in the DM. For these sellers, the dominant strategy is
to produce q = 0 and report y = 0. If the fiscal authority does not audit sellers who report
zero income, then all sellers will report zero income. Hence, these sellers must be audited with a
positive probability so that sellers who meet buyers are indi erent between reporting an income
of zero or a positive income. Consider one of such sellers. If the seller chooses to accept bank
deposits, he or she solves
max
q,d
{(1 ≠ ÷)d ≠ q} s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)d1 + Rd + —u(q) = S. (A.23)
For this to be part of an equilibrium, it must be that Rd > (1≠flm)÷/(1≠÷). If the seller chooses
to accept cash, he or she solves
max
q,m
{(1 ≠ flm÷)m ≠ q} s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)m + —u(q) = S. (A.24)
For this to be part of an equilibrium, it must be that Rd Æ (1 ≠ flm)÷/(1 ≠ ÷). Now let “ denote
the share of sellers who post either (q, d) or (q, m) that solves the above problems. In equilibrium,
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if the seller chooses to accept bank deposits, it must be that
“d
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.25)
If the seller chooses to accept cash, it must be that
“flmm
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.26)
⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.2: I prove the optimality of · ú(y) by showing that for any ·(y), there
exists a ·̃ such that all agents are (weakly) better o  while the fiscal authority receives (weakly)
higher net tax revenue.
First, for any ·(y), let Y denote the set of income reported in equilibrium. Let y¶ be given
by
y¶ œ arg max
yœY
·(y). (A.27)
There are two possible cases: (1) strategies (a) and (b) (see Proposition 2.1) are not played in
the equilibrium; and (2) either strategy (a) and/or (b) are played in the equilibrium.
First, in case (1), let ·̃ = ·(y¶). Then, as long as no sellers who meet buyers report
y œ (0, ·̃), agents under · ú(y) are (weakly) better-o  compared to ·(y) and the fiscal authority
receives (weakly) higher net tax revenue. Now, suppose sellers under · ú(y) have the incentive
to report some y° œ (0, ·̃). Assume sellers under ·(y) also report y°. If ·(y°) = y°, then the
seller obtain the same surplus by reporting y° under ·(y), which means the seller must have the
incentive to report y° under ·(y) as well, a contradiction. If ·(y°) < y°, consider strategy (a).
It is easy to show that ÷ must be larger so that flm(d + m ≠ ·(y)) = C holds. This means q must
be smaller. In other words, the seller obtains a higher surplus reporting y° under ·(y) compared
to reporting y° under · ú(y). If the seller plays strategy (b), then again the seller obtain the
same surplus when reporting y° under ·(y) or · ú(y). In both cases, the seller has the incentive
to report y° under ·(y) as well, a contradiction.
Second, in case (2), let ·̃ = ·(y¶) ≠ ‚ where ‚ > 0 is a small constant. Then, as long as no
sellers who meet buyers report y œ (0, ·̃), agents under · ú(y) are strictly better-o  compared to
·(y) and the fiscal authority receives a strictly higher net tax revenue. To see the latter point,
note that if all sellers who meet buyers report truthfully, the fiscal authority saves the audit
costs. Then as long as ‚ is small, the fiscal authority receives strictly higher net tax revenue.
Now, suppose sellers under · ú(y) have the incentive to report some y° œ (0, ·̃). Similar to case
(1), sellers under ·(y) can make the same report and receive at least the same surplus. Since
sellers who report truthfully are better-o  under · ú(y), this means sellers who reports y° under
·(y) are better-o  than they are under ·(y), a contradiction. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.3: First, it is easy to see that an increase in ·̃ leads to a decrease in
S. Now consider sellers who meet buyers in the DM but report y = 0. Since it must be that
(1 ≠ flm÷0)m0 ≠ q0 = 0 and m0 is given by
m0 = 11 + µ [—u(q
0) ≠ S], (A.28)
then ÷0 must decrease. We also have
S = —u(q0) ≠ 1 + µ1 ≠ flm÷0 q
0 = —u(q0) ≠ —q0uÕ(q0) (A.29)



















– ≠ 1 + “ = C, (A.32)
then “ must increase.
Second, suppose Rb increases. It is easy to see that it leads to increases in qh and S. Then
from the last case, we know that ÷0 must decrease and q0 must increase. In addition, m0 will
increase, and hence “ must decrease. Lastly, suppose flm increases. Then ÷0 must decrease to
keep (1 ≠ flm÷0) constant. There are otherwise no changes in the equilibrium. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.4: First, given Rd and µ, qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) . (A.33)








≠ q0 = 0, (A.34)
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷0) . (A.35)
“ is such that
“flmm0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.36)
The demand for cash is given by




1+Rb = —◊ +
(1≠◊)(1+µ)
1+Rd . Then, R
b is such that
f Õ(k) = 1 + R
b
1 + µ , (A.38)
(1 ≠ ◊)(kB + b̄) = (1 ≠ “)(qh + ·̃). (A.39)
Note that (A.39) defines b̄ as a function of Rb. Then,
m̄ + b̄ = q
h + ·̃




qh + ·̃ ≠ C(1 ≠ ◊)
flm
B
≠ f Õ(k)k + (– ≠ 1)C
flm
. (A.40)
Assume ·̃ ≠ C(1≠◊)flm Ø 0. Then m̄ + b̄ is decreasing in “. Note that “ is decreasing in m
0, which
is increasing in S. qh and S are increasing in Rb. Hence, “ is decreasing in Rb. Since kf Õ(k) is
increasing in k, k is decreasing in Rb. Hence, m̄ + b̄ is increasing in Rb, and there exists a unique
equilibrium. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.5: Consider an increase in µ and assume that 1+Rd
1+µ is unchanged.
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Then S is unchanged. This means that q0 is unchanged as well, Since
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷0) (A.41)
and µ is higher, 1 ≠ flm÷0 must increase. Because m0 = q0/(1 ≠ flm÷0), it is lower. Since
“flmm0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C, (A.42)
it means “ is larger. Now, recall that
m̄ + b̄ = q
h + ·̃




qh + ·̃ ≠ C(1 ≠ ◊)
flm
B
≠ k + (– ≠ 1)C
flm
(A.43)
is decreasing in “ so long as ·̃ ≠ C(1≠◊)flm Ø 0. This means that if µ is higher and
1+Rd
1+µ is unchanged,
m̄+ b̄ < D. Because m̄+ b̄ is increasing in Rb, in equilibrium it must be that 1+Rd
1+µ is larger. Then,
S and qh must be larger in equilibrium, and so is q0, which means that ÷0 must be smaller. Now,
if “ is unchanged, then m̄ is unchanged. However, because qh is larger and 1+Rd
1+µ k is smaller,
(A.39) suggests that b̄ is larger. Hence, m̄ + b̄ > D, so Rb needs to be smaller. Since “ is
decreasing in Rb, “ must be larger, and m̄ must be larger and b̄ must be smaller.
Lastly, the above results hold as long as there exist ÷0 œ (0, 1) and “ œ (0, 1) that are part of
an equilibrium. To see what this means, note that as µ increases, 1+Rd





— . Then even if ÷
0 = 0, it is not possible for (A.34) to hold. Hence, there exists
µÕ such that if µ Ø µÕ, the equilibrium described above does not exist. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.6: First, given Rd and µ, qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) . (A.44)
Next, given ·̃ , ÷0 is such that
—u(qh) ≠ —uÕ(qh)(qh + ·̃) = —u(q0) ≠ —uÕ(q0)q0, (A.45)
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flc÷0)(1 + Rc) . (A.46)
Let c0 = q0/(1 ≠ flc÷0). Then, “ is such that
“flcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.47)
The demand for CBDC is given by




1+Rb = —◊ +
(1≠◊)(1+µ)
1+Rd . Then, R
b is such that
f Õ(k) = 1 + R
b
1 + µ , (A.49)
(1 ≠ ◊)(kB + b̄) = (1 ≠ “)(qh + ·̃). (A.50)
Then,
c̄ + b̄ = q
h + ·̃




qh + ·̃ ≠ C(1 ≠ ◊)
flc
B
≠ f Õ(k)k + (– ≠ 1)C
flc
. (A.51)
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Now, consider an increase in Rc. If Rd is unchanged, then qh and q0 will be unchanged. But then
1≠flc÷0 will decrease, which means c0 will increase and “ will decrease. Hence, Rd must decrease,
which means qh and q0 will decrease. Finally, consider an increase in flc. If Rd is unchanged, then
qh, q0, and c0 will be unchanged, but “ will decrease. Hence, Rd must decrease, which means qh
and q0 will decrease. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.7: First, given R and µ, qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + R) . (A.52)
Then dh = qh + ·̃ . Next, given ·̃ , ÷0 is such that
—u(qh) ≠ —uÕ(qh)(qh + ·̃) = —u(q0) ≠ —uÕ(q0)q0, (A.53)
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flc÷0)(1 + R) . (A.54)
Let c0 = q0/(1 ≠ flc÷0). Then, “ is such that
“flcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C, (A.55)
The demand for government bonds is given by
f Õ(k) = 1 + R
b
1 + µ , (A.56)
(1 ≠ ◊)(kB + b̄) = ‘(1 ≠ “)(qh + ·̃). (A.57)
where Rb is given by 1+µ
1+Rb = —◊ +
(1≠◊)(1+µ)
1+R . Then, we have
c̄ + b̄ = (– ≠ 1 + “)C
flc
+ (1 ≠ ‘)(1 ≠ “)(qh + ·̃) + ‘(1 ≠ “)(q
h + ·̃)
1 ≠ ◊ ≠ f
Õ(k)k. (A.58)
Now, consider an increase in R. Then qh and q0 will increase. In addition, c0 will increase because
c0 = q0/(1≠flc÷0) = —(1+R)q0uÕ(q0)/(1+µ). This means “ and ‘ will decrease. Finally, consider
an increase in flc. If Rc is unchanged, then qh, q0, and c0 will be unchanged. However, this means
that “ will decrease. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.8: First, given Rc and µ, qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rc) . (A.59)
Next, given ·̃ , ÷0 is such that
—u(qh) ≠ —uÕ(qh)(qh + ·̃) = —u(q0) ≠ —uÕ(q0)q0, (A.60)
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ ÷m÷0) . (A.61)
Let m0 = q0/(1 ≠ flm÷0). And “ is such that
“flmm0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.62)
The demand for government bonds is given by
f Õ(k) = 1 + R
b
1 + µ , (A.63)
(1 ≠ ◊)(kB + b̄) = ‘(1 ≠ “)(qh + ·̃). (A.64)
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Then,
m̄ + c̄ + b̄ = (– ≠ 1 + “)C
flm
+ (1 ≠ ‘)(1 ≠ “)(qh + ·̃) + ‘(1 ≠ “)(q
h + ·̃)
1 ≠ ◊ ≠ f
Õ(k)k. (A.65)
Now, consider an increase in Rc while µ is held constant. Then qh and q0 will increase. In
addition, m0 will increase because m0 = q0/(1 ≠ flm÷0) = —q0uÕ(q0)/(1 + µ). Hence, “ will
decrease. Since the demand for government liabilities increases, ‘ must decrease. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.9: Let “bench and ÷bench denote the share of sellers who evade taxes and
the audit probability in the benchmark equilibrium, respectively. First, in a type-2 equilibria,
assume
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) =
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench . (A.66)
Then q0 and qh will be unchanged. However, c0 = q0/(1 ≠ flc÷bench) > m0 = q0/(1 ≠ flm÷bench)
because either Rc > 0 or flc > flm. This means that
“benchflcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ > C. (A.67)
Hence, Rd must decrease and “ < “bench. Now, from Proposition 2.6 we know that the “ is
decreasing in Rc and flc. This means that “ in a type-3 equilibrium must be smaller than in a
type-2 equilibrium.
Finally, given Rc, q0 are the same in both type-3 equilibria and type-4 equilibria. However,
m0 = q0/(1 ≠ flm÷0) in type-4 equilibria but c0 = q0/(1 ≠ flc÷0). Since flc Ø flm, m0 Ø c0. In a
type-4 equilibrium, “ is given by
“flmm0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.68)
In a type-3 equilibrium, “ is given by
“flcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.69)
Hence, “ is smaller in a type-3 equilibrium than in a type-3 equilibrium. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.10: Note that qh is given by
uÕ(qh) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) . (A.70)
And q0 is given by
S = —u(qh) ≠ —uÕ(qh)(qh + ·̃) = —u(q0) ≠ —uÕ(q0)q0. (A.71)
Hence, qh and q0 only depend on Rd. From the proof of Proposition 2.9, we know that Rd is
lower in a type-2 equilibrium than in the benchmark equilibrium. In a type-3 equilibrium or
a type-4 equilibrium, Rd = Rc. Hence, compared to the benchmark, q0 and qh are smaller in
type-2 equilibria, and larger in type-4 equilibria. Also, q0 and qh are smaller in type-3 equilibria
if Rc < Rbench but larger if Rc > Rbench. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.11: Since given Rc, “ is smaller in type-3 equilibria than in type-4
equilibria while q0 and qh are equal in the two types of equilibria, it is clear that the total surplus
in DM is the higher in type-3 equilibria than type-4 equilibria given Rc. Next, because when
Rc = Rbench, q0 and qh are equal in type-3 equilibria and the benchmark equilibrium but “ is
smaller in type-3 equilibria, the total surplus in DM is the higher in type-3 equilibria. This means
that there exists RcÕ < Rbench such that for any Rc Ø RcÕ, the total surplus in DM is higher in
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type-3 equilibria than in the benchmark equilibrium. Finally, recall that q0 and qh are lower in
type-2 equilibria than in the benchmark equilibrium, while “ is lower in type-3 equilibria than
in type-2 equilibria given flc. This means that there exists Rc† such that for any Rc Ø Rc†, the
total surplus in DM is higher in type-3 equilibria than in type-2 equilibria. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.13: First, in type-2 equilibria, suppose that for some flc Ø flm, Rc is
such that
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) =
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench . (A.72)
Because c0 = q0/(1 ≠ flc÷bench) > m0 = q0/(1 ≠ flm÷bench), it must be that
“benchflcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ > C. (A.73)
Hence, Rd must decrease and ÷0 > “bench. Next, from the proof of Proposition 2.6, it is easy to
see that ÷0 will further increase as Rc increases. Hence, ÷0 is larger in type-2 equilibria than in
the benchmark equilibrium.
Second, on the boundary of type-1 and type-3 equilibria, it must be that
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷bench)(1 + Rc) =
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷bench . (A.74)
From Proposition 2.7, we know that ÷0 will further increase as flc decreases. Hence, ÷0 is larger
in type-3 equilibria than in the benchmark equilibrium.
Finally, in a type-4 equilibrium, q0 is larger than its counterpart in the benchmark. Since
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ flm÷0) , (A.75)
it must be that ÷0 is larger in type-4 equilibria than in the benchmark equilibrium. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.14: I only need to show that for any given Rc, when flc = flc(Rc), “ is
larger in a type-4 equilibrium than in a type-3 equilibrium, while ÷0 is equal in type-3 and type-4
equilibria. Note that on the boundary of type-3 and type-4 equilibria, it must be that
1 + µ
(1 ≠ flc÷0)(1 + Rc) =
1 + µ
1 ≠ flm÷0 . (A.76)
Hence, ÷0 is equal in type-3 and type-4 equilibria. Next, note that c0 = q0/(1≠flc÷bench) > m0 =
q0/(1 ≠ flm÷bench). In addition, in a type-4 equilibrium“ is given by
“flmm0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.77)
In a type-3 equilibrium, “ is given by
“flcc0
– ≠ 1 + “ = C. (A.78)
Hence, “ is larger in a type-4 equilibrium than in a type-3 equilibrium. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.15: Following Proposition 2.9-2.13, if (Rc, flc) = (Rbench, flc(Rbench)),
then ÷0, q0, qh, and k in a type-3 equilibrium are all identical to their counterparts in the
benchmark equilibrium. However, “ is strictly lower. This means that the DM surplus is strictly
higher, while the audit costs are strictly lower. Hence, the aggregate welfare is strictly higher in
a type-3 equilibrium than in the benchmark equilibrium. In other words, if CBDC is deposit-like,
then introducing CBDC increases aggregate welfare. Next, consider cash-like CBDC. We know
that as long as (Rc, flc) are close to point A, then the change in “ and k will be small compared
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to the benchmark. However, ÷0 is strictly higher, while q0 and qh are strictly lower. Hence,
aggregate welfare is higher with deposit-like CBDC than with cash-like CBDC. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 2.16: If Assumption 2.5.1 holds, because the demand for CBDC is
strictly lower than D/(1 + Rd), compared to the benchmark, the central bank’s net revenue is
lower after introducing deposit-like CBDC. Next, consider cash-like CBDC. As long as (Rc, flc)
are close to point A, the central bank’s revenue will be close to (but strictly lower than) its
revenue in the benchmark. ⇤
A.3 Extension: Zero Lump-sum Transfer
In this appendix, I consider an alternative setup where the fiscal authority sets T = 0. It balances
the budget through issuing government bonds. I restrict my attention to the benchmark case.
The equilibrium characterization is similar to the original model. The main di erence is how
the nominal government bond rate, Rb, is determined in equilibrium. In the original model, the
demand for cash, m̄, and the demand for government bonds by bankers, b̄, must satisfy
m̄ + b̄ = D, (A.79)
where D is determined by the fiscal authority. It can be shown that m̄ is given by
m̄ = (– ≠ 1 + “)C
fl
, (A.80)
where “ is the proportion of sellers who evade taxes. b̄ is given by
b̄ = 1 ≠ “1 ≠ ◊ (q
h + ·̃) ≠ 1 + R
d
1 + µ k. (A.81)
where qh is the amount of DM good produced by sellers who report their income truthfully, and k
is loans to entrepreneurs. It can be shown that “ and k is decreasing in Rb, while qh is increasing
in Rb. If Cfl Æ ·̃ , then m̄ + b̄ is strictly increasing in R
b. Hence, there exists a unique Rb such
that m̄ + b̄ = D.
Now, suppose that ·̃ is fixed, while b̄ is adjusted to balance the budget. Define G(b̄) to be
G(b̄) = µm̄ ≠
3
1 ≠ 1 + µ1 + Rb
4
b̄ + (1 ≠ “)·̃ . (A.82)
Then G(b̄) represents the fiscal authority’s net revenue. One can conclude from the benchmark
model that b̄ is increasing in Rb. Hence, m̄ is decreasing in b̄. Because “ is decreasing in Rb, the
net tax revenue is increasing in b̄. Depending on parameter values, G(b̄) may not be monotonic
in b̄, as demonstrated by the numerical examples in Figure A.2.1
First, in panel (a) of Figure A.2, ·̃ is relatively large. Net government revenue first increases
with b̄, because the increase in net tax revenue o sets the increase in the cost of servicing
government bonds (the second term in (A.82)). However, as b̄ continues to increase, the cost of
servicing government bonds becomes the dominant force and net government revenue decreases.
In panel (b) of Figure A.2, ·̃ is low. In this case, the increase in the cost of servicing government
bonds is always larger than the increase in net tax revenue. Hence, the net government revenue is
always decreasing in b̄. In both cases, seigniorage income (the first term in (A.82)) also decreases
with b̄. However, as long as the seigniorage income is small, which happens when “ is small, its
1In both panels, u(c) = 2x0.5, f(k) = k0.3, µ = 1%, — = 0.99, fl = 0.5, C = 0.1, and – = 1.5. In
panel (a), ·̃ = 0.45. In panel (b), ·̃ = 0.2.
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Figure A.2: Net Government Revenue and the Supply of Government Liability (m̄ + b̄)
If net government revenue is a non-monotonic function of government liabilities, then there
may exist multiple equilibria as shown in Figure A.3. Specifically, there may exist an equilibrium
where b̄ and b̄ + m̄ are small and Rb is low, and another equilibrium where b̄ and b̄ + m̄ are large
and Rb is high. Multiple equilibria exist because a higher supply of government bonds drives
up Rb. For bankers, a higher bond return decreases the cost of holding government bonds as
collateral, which translates into a higher deposit rate. Then, fewer sellers choose to under-report
their income, and the net tax revenue increases. The fiscal authority can then use the additional
tax revenue to pay for the increase in the cost of servicing government bonds, which is why the
fiscal authority can maintain a net revenue of zero. Note that buyers are better o  in the high
Rb equilibrium.
0
Low Rb equil. High Rb equil.
m̄ + b̄
Net gov revenue
Figure A.3: Multiple Equilibria
A.4 Extension: Other Equilibria with CBDC
A.4.1 CBDC o ers less Anonymity than Bank Deposits
I assume that the fiscal authority can costlessly observe any income sellers receive in CBDC.
However, to observe income in bank deposits, the fiscal authority has to audit sellers. In equilib-
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rium, CBDC is accepted by sellers who report truthfully, while bank deposits compete with cash
in transactions involving tax evasion.
The strategies of sellers who evade taxes can be divided into the following three cases:
(1) Only cash is accepted by sellers who evade taxes: for this to be part of an equilibrium, it
must be that 1 + Rd < (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ ÷0).
(2) Only bank deposits are accepted by sellers who evade taxes: for this to be part of an equilib-
rium, it must be that 1 + Rd > (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ ÷0).
(3) Sellers who evade taxes are indi erent between cash and bank deposits: for this to be part
of an equilibrium, it must be that 1 + Rd = (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ ÷0).
In what follows, I focus my attention on case (3). Let d0 and m0 represent the deposit and
cash payments to sellers. Let the proportion of sellers who use bank deposits be “d and let the
proportion of sellers who use cash be “m. In equilibrium, the fiscal authority must be indi erent
between auditing sellers or not. Hence, “d and “m satisfy
“dd0
– ≠ 1 + “d + “m +
“mflm0
– ≠ 1 + “d + “m = C. (A.83)
The next proposition shows the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proposition A.1 There exist Dù and Dùù such that if D œ [Dù, Dùù] and C is small, there exists
a unique equilibrium where both cash and bank deposits are used by sellers who evade taxes. In
addition, increasing Rc while holding µ constant leads to increases in qh, q0, and decreases in Rb
and ÷0.
Proof: First, given Rc and µ, qh solves
uÕ(q) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rc) . (A.84)








≠ q0 = 0, (A.85)
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ fl÷0) . (A.86)
And Rd is given by 1 + Rd = (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ ÷0). It is easy to see that the following conditions
hold.
(1 ≠ ÷0)(1 + Rd)
1 + µ
C




≠ q0 = 0, (A.87)
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ ÷0)(1 + Rd) . (A.88)
“d and “m are such that
“dd0
– ≠ 1 + “d + “m +
“mflm0
– ≠ 1 + “d + “m = C, (A.89)
where d0 = q0/(1 ≠ ÷0) and m0 = q0/(1 ≠ fl÷0). The demand for government liabilities is given
by
D̃ = (1 ≠ “d ≠ “m)(qh + ·̃) + “
dd0
1 ≠ ◊ + “
mm0. (A.90)
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where D̃ = D + k. Then “d and “m solve (A.89) and (A.90). We have
“d = (flm
0 ≠ C)(D̃ ≠ qh ≠ ·̃) ≠ (m0 ≠ qh ≠ ·̃)(– ≠ 1)C
(d0/(1 ≠ ◊) ≠ qh ≠ ·̃)(flm0 ≠ C) ≠ (d0 ≠ C)(m0 ≠ qh ≠ ·̃) , (A.91)
“m = (d
0/(1 ≠ ◊) ≠ qh ≠ ·̃)(D̃ ≠ qh ≠ ·̃) ≠ (d0 ≠ C)(– ≠ 1)C
(d0/(1 ≠ ◊) ≠ qh ≠ ·̃)(flm0 ≠ C) ≠ (d0 ≠ C)(m0 ≠ qh ≠ ·̃) (A.92)
Then it is easy to see that there exist Dù and Dùù such that if D œ [Dù, Dùù], “d and “m will take
values between 0 and 1. ⇤
An equilibrium where sellers who evade taxes play a mixed strategy exists provided the total
supply of government debt, D, is neither too large nor too small. This is because if D is too large,
Rb may be so high that sellers who evade taxes only accept bank deposits. Then, the equilibrium
is the same as when CBDC replaces cash. If D is too small, government liabilities may not be
able to support DM consumption, which is determined solely by Rc, fl, and µ but not D.
Now, suppose the central bank increases Rc while holding µ constant. An increase in Rc
attracts sellers to accept CBDC and report their income truthfully. This lowers the fiscal author-
ity’s incentive to audit sellers, which leads to an increase in “c + “m. A lower ÷0 first increases
q0 and d0, but the subsequent increase in the demand of government bonds drives down Rb.
Nevertheless, the decrease in audit probability outweighs the decrease in Rb. In equilibrium, q0
increases.
A.4.2 CBDC o ers More Anonymity than Cash
I assume that if an agent is audited, the fiscal authority observes his or her income in CBDC
with probability flc < flm. Now, suppose a seller choose to evade taxes. If the seller chooses to
accept cash, he or she solves
max
q,m
{(1 ≠ fl÷0)m ≠ q} s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)m + —u(q) = S. (A.93)
For this to be part of an equilibrium, it must be that 1 + Rd Æ (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ ÷0) and 1 + Rc Æ
(1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0). The first condition guarantees that the seller does not have the incentive to
use bank deposits, and the second condition guarantees that the seller does not have the incentive
to use CBDC. If the seller chooses to accept CBDC, he or she solves
max
q,d
{(1 ≠ flc÷0)c ≠ q} s.t. ≠ (1 + µ)c1 + Rc + —u(q) = S. (A.94)
For this to be part of an equilibrium, it must be that (1 + Rd)/(1 + Rc) Æ (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ ÷0)
and 1 + Rc Ø (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0). The first condition guarantees that the seller does not have
the incentive to use bank deposits, and the second condition guarantees that the seller does not
have the incentive to use cash.
There are three possible equilibria:
(1) Only cash is accepted by sellers who evade taxes: for this to be part of an equilibrium, it
must be that 1 + Rc < (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0).
(2) Only CBDC is accepted by sellers who evade taxes: for this to be part of an equilibrium, it
must be that 1 + Rc > (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0).
(3) Sellers who evade taxes are indi erent between cash and CBDC: for this to be part of an
equilibrium, it must be that 1 + Rc = (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0).
In what follows, I focus on case (3). Let c0 and m0 represent the CBDC and cash payments
to sellers. Let the proportion of sellers who use CBDC be “c and let the proportion of sellers
A.4. Extension: Other Equilibria with CBDC 105
who use cash be “m. In equilibrium, it must be that the fiscal authority is indi erent between
auditing sellers or not. Hence, “c and “m must satisfy
“cflcc0
– ≠ 1 + “c + “m +
“mflm0
– ≠ 1 + “c + “m = C, (A.95)
where “c–≠1+“c+“m (
“m
–≠1+“c+“m ) is the probability that a seller who reports an income of zero
received CBDC (cash). To solve for the equilibrium, note that given Rc, fl, and flc, the condition
1 + Rc = (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0) determines ÷0. This means that q0 and S are determined by µ:
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ fl÷0) , (A.96)
S = —u(q0) ≠ (1 + µ)q
0
1 ≠ fl÷0 . (A.97)
Then, because sellers who report truthfully use bank deposits, S and µ determine Rd:
uÕ(qh) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) , (A.98)
S = —u(qh) ≠ (1 + µ)q
h
1 + Rd . (A.99)
This means that the terms of trade in the DM are determined by only four parameters: Rc, fl,
flc, and µ. Because 1 + Rc = (1 ≠ fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0), sellers who evade taxes produce the same
amount of DM good regardless of the payment method they use. Lastly, “c and “m are such
that (A.95) holds, and the total demand for government liabilities (cash, CBDC, and government
bonds) is equal to the supply of government liabilities prescribed by the fiscal authority, D. The
next proposition shows the e ects of Rc on the equilibrium.
Proposition A.2 Suppose the central bank increases Rc while holding µ constant. If flc < flm,
then ÷0 and k will decrease, while qh, q0, and Rb will increase.
Proof: First, if flc < fl, then ÷0 is decreasing in Rc. This means q0 and S must increase because
uÕ(q0) = 1 + µ
—(1 ≠ fl÷0) , (A.100)
S = —u(q0) ≠ (1 + µ)q
0
1 ≠ fl÷0 . (A.101)
Since
uÕ(qh) = 1 + µ
—(1 + Rd) , (A.102)
S = —u(qh) ≠ (1 + µ)q
0
1 + Rb , (A.103)
qh and Rb will increase as well. Next, note that because
c0 = q
0
1 ≠ flc÷0 =
—(1 + Rc)q0uÕ(q0)
1 + µ , (A.104)
m0 = q
0
1 ≠ fl÷0 =
—q0uÕ(q0)
1 + µ , (A.105)
and q0 increases, then m0 will increase but c0 will decrease. ⇤
If flc < fl, the e ect of an increase in Rc on the equilibrium is the opposite because (1 ≠
fl÷0)/(1 ≠ flc÷0) is decreasing in ÷0. Intuitively, because flc < fl, the payment in CBDC is smaller
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than the payment in cash (in real terms). An increase in Rc attracts sellers who evade taxes to
accept CBDC and decreases the left-hand side of (A.95). Hence, ÷0 must decrease. As a result,
more sellers evade taxes, and “c + “m increases. Note that in this case, Rc must be strictly
negative for sellers who evade taxes to accept cash.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Definition of Undefeated Equilibria
In this appendix I provide the definition of Undefeated Equilibria when there are two or more
types of sellers. Let j = 1, 2, ..., J denote the types of sellers. Let  j denote the proportion of
type j sellers.
Definition B.1 (Mailath et al., 1993) A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium characterized by {(Âúj , súj )}Jj=1
and “ú(j|Â, s) is defeated by an alternative Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium characterized by {(ÂÕj , sÕj)}Jj=1
and “Õ(j|Â, s) if
(a) ÷(ÂÕÕ, sÕÕ) œ {(ÂÕj , sÕj)}Jj=1 such that (ÂÕÕ, sÕÕ) < {(Âúj , súj )}Jj=1, and K = {j|(ÂÕj , sÕj) = (ÂÕÕ, sÕÕ)} ,
ÿ;
(b) ’j œ K, their utility is (weakly) higher in the alternative equilibrium; ÷j œ K such that her
utility is strictly higher in the alternative equilibrium; and
(c) ÷jÕ œ K such that “ú(jÕ|ÂÕÕ, sÕÕ) ,  jÕfi(jÕ)/(
qJ
j=1  jfi(j)) for any fi : {l, h} æ [0, 1] satisfying
i. fi(j) = 1 if j œ K and her utility is strictly higher in the alternative equilibrium; and
ii. fi(j) = 0 if j < K.
B.2 Proofs for Section 3.3.1
In this appendix I solve agents’ AM problem in Section 3.3.1 and prove Proposition 3.1. I also
solve agents’ problem in the CM (see Proposition B.5). Before I solve the AM problem, it is
convenient to define a belief system that will be useful later. First, define voj , j œ {l, h}, to be
the lowest possible surplus any asset seller can obtain from the AM. It is given by
voj = max
Â,s
u(z + Âs) ≠ u(z) ≠ ”js (B.1)
s.t. s[”l ≠ Â] Ø 0, (B.2)
Âs Æ z and s Æ a. (B.3)
Next, let vj(Â, s) = u(z + Âs) ≠ u(z) ≠ ”js for some (Â, s). Now, consider the following belief














h)} is some set of seller
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o ers, let “ú(j|Â, s) be given by
“ú(”h|Â, s) =
1(vh(Â, s) > voh)(1 ≠  )




1(vl(Â, s) Ø vol ) 
1(vl(Â, s) Ø vol )  + 1(vh(Â, s) > voh)(1 ≠  )
, (B.5)
where 1(.) is an indication function that equals one if the statement in the bracket is true. For






h)}, “(”l|Â, s) = 1.
To solve the equilibrium, I consider two possibilities: pooling (i.e., (Âl, sl) = (Âh, sh)) and
separating (i.e., (Âl, sl) , (Âh, sh)). In each case, I prove the proposed equilibrium satisfies
Definition 3.1. Lastly, I compare these two cases and determine which equilibrium satisfies
condition (3) of Definition 3.1.
Proposition B.1 Define ”̄ = (1 ≠  )”h +  ”l. The unique pooling equilibrium that satisfies
Definition 3.1 is characterized by “ú(j|Â, s) and (Â†l , s
†




h) = (Âp, sp) where Âp = ”̄,
sp = mp/Âp, and mp is given by (B.11).
Proof: Consider the following problem
max
Â,s
u(zs + Âs) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”hs (B.6)
s.t.u(zs + Âs) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”ls Ø vú, (B.7)
”̄ ≠ Â = 0, (B.8)
Âs Æ zb and s Æ a (B.9)
where vú = vol . To solve the problem, I find it is easier to define m = Âs. Let múl solves
uÕ(zs + múl ) = 1. We have
vú = u(zs + m) ≠ u(zs) ≠ m where m = min{múl , zb, ”la}. (B.10)
Next, let múh solves uÕ(zs +múh) = ”h/”̄ and let mh solves u(zs +mh)≠u(zs)≠”l/”̄mh = vú. Then
mp = min{max{múh, mh}, zb, ”̄a}. (B.11)
Now, I claim that (Âp, sp) = (”̄, mp/”̄) and “ú(j|Â, s) constitute a pooling equilibrium that
satisfies Definition 3.1. It is easy to see that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied. Now, consider
condition (3) (see Definition B.1). First, there is obviously no other pooling equilibrium that
o ers higher utility to high-quality sellers. Second, condition (c) of Definition B.1 is violated
if low-quality sellers want to deviate since “ú(”l|Â, s) = 1 for all (Â, s) , (Âp, sp). Hence the
proposed equilibrium is undefeated.
To show it is unique, note that high-quality sellers will be strictly worse o  if they deviate
from (Âp, sp) because it maximizes their surplus given the constraints. Then, such equilibria are
defeated by any equilibrium where high-quality sellers are strictly better o  while low-quality
sellers are at least as well o . In other words, the only undefeated pooling equilibrium is the one
that maximizes high-quality sellers’ surplus. ⇤
Now, I turn to separating equilibria.
Proposition B.2 The unique separating equilibrium that satisfies Definition 3.1 is characterized
by “ú(j|Â, s) and Â†l = ”l, Â
†
h = ”h, s
†
l = ml/Âl, and s
†
h = mh/Âh, where ml and mh are given by
(B.17) and (B.18).
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Proof: Consider the following problem
max
Â,s
u(zs + Âs) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”hs (B.12)
s.t. s(”h ≠ Â) = 0, (B.13)
vú Ø u(zs + Âs) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”ls. (B.14)














where vú = u(zs + ml) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ml, and
ml = min{mú, zb, ”la} (B.17)
and uÕ(mú) = 1. Now let the mh be given by




Then mh is the solution to the above problem.
Now I show that the proposed solution is an equilibrium that satisfies Definition 3.1. It
is easy to see that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied. Now consider condition (3). Among
all the separating equilibrium, this equilibrium maximizes high-quality sellers’ utility. Hence,
sellers have no incentive to deviate. Any other separating equilibrium is therefore defeated by
the proposed equilibrium. ⇤
The last step is to choose between the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium.
Proposition B.3 Whichever equilibrium that o ers higher utility to high-quality sellers is un-
defeated.
Proof: Firstly, if the pooling equilibrium o ers high-quality sellers strictly higher utility, high-
quality sellers have the incentive to deviate. In addition, the low-quality sellers will be strictly
better o  in the pooling equilibrium as well. To see this, note that
u(zs + mp) ≠ u(zs) ≠ mp
”h
”̄
> u(zs + mh) ≠ u(zs) ≠ mh

















∆u(zs + mp) ≠ u(zs) ≠ mp
”l
”̄














mh < 0. Then it is easy
to check that the separating equilibrium is defeated by the pooling equilibrium.
Next, if the separating equilibrium o ers high-quality sellers strictly higher utility, high-
quality sellers have the incentive to deviate. Then it is easy to check that the pooling equilibrium
is defeated by the separating equilibrium. ⇤
Before I discuss how the equilibrium depends on zs, I use the following lemma to show how
zs a ects constraint (B.7). Define L1 = min{zb, ”̄a} and L2 = min{zb, ”la}.
Proposition B.4 Given L1 and L2, there exists 0 Æ zÕÕs < ĝ such that for all zs < zÕÕs , constraint
(B.7) does not bind; for all zs Ø zÕÕs , constraint (B.7) binds.
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Proof: Define ĝ to be such that uÕ(ĝ) = ”h
”̄
. First, suppose that L1 < ĝ. Consider the case
where zs + L1 < ĝ. In this case, mp = L1 and (B.7) does not bind. Now consider the case where
zs +L1 Ø ĝ. If (B.7) does not bind, a low-quality seller’s surplus in a pooling equilibrium is given
by











u(zs + L2) ≠ L2, if zs + L2 Æ gú,
u(gú) ≠ gú + zs, if otherwise.
(B.20)










Ø 1. Note also that vpl (ĝ ≠ L1) > vcl (ĝ ≠ L1) and
(B.7) binds when zs = ĝ. Hence, there exists zÕÕs œ (ĝ ≠ L1, ĝ) such that v
p
l (zÕÕs ) = vcl (zÕÕs ). For all
zs < zÕÕs , constraint (B.7) does not bind. For all zs Ø zÕÕs , constraint (B.7) binds.
Next, assume L1 Ø ĝ. It is easy to see that this case is identical to the above case where
zs + L1 Ø ĝ. That is, there exists zÕÕs < ĝ such that for all zs < zÕÕs , constraint (B.7) does not bind
and that for all zs Ø zÕÕs , constraint (B.7) binds. ⇤
It should be noted that, since ĝ < gú for all ”l < ”h and   > 0, the proof of Proposition B.4
suggests that constraint (B.7) must bind for some zs < gú. Now I am ready to prove Proposition
3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The proof has two parts. The first part shows that there exists
a cuto  value zÕs such that sellers pool if zs < zÕs and separate if zs Ø zÕs. Part II shows zÕs
is decreasing in zb and a. Throughout this proof, the quantities ml, mh and mp are given by
Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2. Note that they are functions of zs, zb and a. I omit this
dependence so long as there is no confusion.
Part I. The cuto  value, zÕs, may depend on zb and a because trade in the AM can be constrained
by either zb or a. First, assume min{zb, ”̄a} < ĝ. I show that if the incentive constraint in the
pooling equilibrium, (B.7), binds, then the separating equilibrium is undefeated. Assume (B.7)
binds, we have
u(zs + mp) ≠ u(zs) ≠
”l
”̄




Note that mp > mh. Hence,
u(zs + mp) ≠ u(zs) ≠
”h
”̄






mh. That is, high-quality sellers strictly prefer the separating equilibrium.
In what follows, I assume (B.7) does not bind. i.e.„ zs Æ zÕÕs where zÕÕs is defined by Proposition
B.4. Define vpoolh (zs) = u(zs + mp) ≠
”h
”̄
mp and vseph (zs) = u(zs + mh) ≠ mh. Now, from previous















= uÕ(zs + mh) + [uÕ(zs + mh) ≠ 1]
uÕ(zs + ml) ≠ uÕ(zs + mh)
uÕ(zs + mh) ≠ ”l”h
> 0. (B.24)
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dvseph (zs)
dzs
decreases with zs. i.e.„ vseph is strictly increasing and strictly concave.









uÕ(zs + mh) ≠ ”l”h
[uÕ(zs + mh) ≠ uÕ(zs + ml)] > 0. (B.25)
That is, vseph (zs) is steeper than v
pool
h (zs) at least when zs + mp < ĝ.
Now define zÕs be such that v
pool
h (zÕs) = v
sep
h (zÕs). If such zÕs does not exist, then the equilib-
rium is always separating, as it is not possible that the equilibrium is always pooling because
Proposition B.4 shows constraint (B.7) must bind at some point. If it does exist, there are two
di erent cases to discuss.
Case I: zÕs +mp(zÕs, zb, a) < ĝ. First, because v
sep
h (zs) is steeper, we have v
pool
h (zs) > v
sep
h (zs) for all
zs < zÕs and v
pool
h (zs) < v
sep







. Recall that vseph is strictly concave and v
pool
h (zÕÕs ) < v
sep
h (zÕÕs ). Then we
must have vpoolh (zs) < v
sep
h (zs) for all ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a) < zs Æ zÕÕs . If not, because of the strict
concavity of vseph and the linearity of v
pool
h (zs) when zs > ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a), there must exist
z†s œ (ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a), zÕÕs ) such that v
pool
h (zs) > v
sep
h (zs) for all zs œ (z†s, zÕÕs ], which contradicts
with the earlier result that vpoolh (zÕÕs ) < v
sep
h (zÕÕs ).
Case II: zÕs + mp(zÕs, zb, a) Ø ĝ. First, note that if zÕs + mp(zÕs, zb, a) Ø ĝ, then it must be
that vpoolh (ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a)) Ø v
sep
h (ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a)), because as shown in case I, if v
pool
h (ĝ ≠
mp(zÕs, zb, a)) < v
sep
h (ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a)), then v
pool
h (zs) < v
sep
h (zs) for all zs Ø ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a).
Second, because (1) vpoolh (zÕÕs ) < v
sep
h (zÕÕs ), (2) v
sep
h is strictly concave, and (3) v
pool
h (zs) is linear,
there must exist a unique zÕs such that v
pool
h (zs) > v
sep
h (zs) for all zs < zÕs and v
pool
h (zs) Æ v
sep
h (zs)
for all zs Ø zÕs. Otherwise, there exists z††s œ (ĝ ≠ mp(zÕs, zb, a), zÕÕs ) such that v
pool
h (zs) > v
sep
h (zs)
for all zs œ (z††s , zÕÕs ], which again contradicts with the earlier result that v
pool
h (zÕÕs ) < v
sep
h (zÕÕs ).
Lastly, suppose min{zb, ”̄a} Ø ĝ. This case is similar to case II. Again, if zÕs does not exist,
the equilibrium is always separating.
Part II. I now discuss the e ects of zb and a. First, suppose the trade in both separating and
pooling equilibrium is constrained by zb. We have



























= vseph . (B.27)
That is, to obtain the e ect of zb on vpoolh and v
sep

















Õ(zs + zb) ≠ 1] ≠ mh[uÕ(zs + mh) ≠ ”l/”h]
z2b
[uÕ(zs + mh) ≠ ”l/”h]≠1.
(B.28)
Now consider the function f(”l/”h) = mh[uÕ(zs + mh) ≠ ”l/”h]. It is easy to see that f(1) =
1If the trade is constrained by a, then ml < mp, otherwise ml = mp.
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zb[uÕ(zs + zb) ≠ 1]. Now, note that dmhd(”l/”h) =
mh
uÕ(zs+mh)≠”l/”h . Hence,
f Õ(”l/”h) = mh + mh
C
mhuÕÕ(zs + mh)












< 0 for all ”l/”h < 1. Now, for some zs, let zb(zs) be such that vseph (zs, zb(zs)) =
vpoolh (zs, zb(zs)). First, suppose zs+zb(zs) < ĝ. It is easy to see that, if zb(zs) exists, v
pool
h (zs, zb(zs)) >
vseph (zs, zb(zs)) for all zb < zb(zs) and v
pool
h (zs, zb(zs)) Æ v
sep
h (zs, zb(zs)) for all zb(zs) Æ zb < ĝ ≠zs.









> 0, if zs + zb < gú;
= 0, otherwise.
(B.30)
Again, if zb(zs) exists, it is easy to see that vpoolh (zs, zb(zs)) > v
sep
h (zs, zb(zs)) for all zb < zb(zs)
and vpoolh (zb) Æ v
sep
h (zb) for all zb Ø zb(zs). In conclusion, in all cases, an increase in zb will
increase vseph (zs, zb(zs)) relative to v
pool
h (zs, zb(zs)), which means zÕs must be decreasing in zb.
Now suppose the trade is constrained by a. Suppose the trade in both separating and pooling
equilibrium is constrained by a. Define ”la = ẑ and let ”̂(ẑ) be such that
u(zÕs + ”̄a) ≠ ”ha = u(zÕs + ”̄/”lẑ) ≠
”h
”l













and separating if otherwise, where mh is given by




We already know that d
mh
ẑ


















which holds if ”̂Õ(ẑ) > 0. Then if there exists a ẑÕ such that g(ẑ) = 0, it must be that the
equilibrium is pooling if ẑ < ẑÕ and separating if ẑ Ø ẑÕ. Now I show ”̂Õ(ẑ) > 0. Note that
”̂Õ(ẑ) = ”lu
Õ(zÕs + ẑ) ≠ ”̄uÕ(zÕs + ”̄/”lẑ) + ”h ≠ ”̂(ẑ)
a
= ”lau
Õ(zÕs + ”la) ≠ u(zÕs + ”la) ≠ [”̄auÕ(zÕs + ”̄a) ≠ u(zÕs + ”̄a)]
a2
. (B.34)
where the second equality is because by definition of ”̂, we have u(zÕs + ”̄a)≠”ha = u(zÕs +”la)≠ ”̂a.
Now consider the function h(x) = xuÕ(zÕs + x) ≠ u(zÕs + x). It is easy to show that hÕ(x) < 0.
Hence, ”̂Õ(ẑ) > 0.
Lastly, suppose the trade in the pooling equilibrium is not constrained by a. Then an increase
in a has no e ect on vpoolh but it increases v
sep
h . Then it is easy to see that zÕs must be decreasing
in a. ⇤
In the last part of this appendix, I solve the agents’ problem in the CM. The following
proposition describes how the solution depends on µ.
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Proposition B.5 Given µ and A, there exist µ1 < µ2 such that
(1) For all µ Ø µ2 and µ Æ µ1, there exists a unique solution to problem (3.9);
(2) For all µ Ø µ2, the AM equilibrium is pooling; for all µ Æ µ1, the AM equilibrium is
separating.
(3) For all µ1 < µ < µ2, under certain conditions, symmetric solutions do not exist.
Proof: A symmetric solution to consumers’ problem (3.9) means that all consumers will choose
the same ẑ and â, but a consumer still takes other consumers’ choices as given when choosing
ẑ and â. When zs = zb in the AM, one can show, by following the proof of Proposition 3.1,
that given â, there exists a zÕ such that the AM equilibrium is pooling for all zs = zb < zÕ, and
separating for all zs = zb Ø zÕ. For the ease of exposition, I denote the trading volume in an AM
pooling equilibrium Âpsp as mp, and the trading volume in an AM separating equilibrium Âlsl
and Âhsh as ml and mh. (Âp, sp), (Âl, sl) and (Âh, sh) are given by Proposition 3.1. Note that
ml, mh and mp are functions of (ẑ, â).
First, I take â as given. One can rewrite the objective function (3.9) as
fi(ẑ, â, µ) = —Si(ẑ, â) ≠ (µ + 1 ≠ —)ẑ ≠ Ÿâ + —”̄â (B.35)
where i = {s, p} denotes separating or pooling equilibria and Si(ẑ, â) denotes consumers’ surplus.
In a separating equilibrium, Ss(ẑ, â) is given by
Ss(ẑ, â) = –{ [u(ẑ + ml) ≠ (ẑ + ml)] + (1 ≠  )[u(ẑ + mh) ≠ (ẑ + mh)]}. (B.36)











dẑ = ≠1, if u
Õ(ẑ + ml) = 1;
dml
dẑ = 0, if u













 [uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ 1] + (1 ≠  )[uÕ(ẑ + mh) ≠ 1]
C
uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ uÕ(ẑ + mh)







Hence, the FOC is




 [uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ 1] + (1 ≠  )[uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ ”l/”h]
C
uÕ(ẑ + mh) ≠ 1
















1 > 0 means that ẑ + mh is decreasing in ẑ. That is, the RHS of (B.38) is strictly decreasing in
ẑ.
Now I turn to the pooling equilibrium. Sp(ẑ) is given by
Sp(ẑ, â) = –[u(ẑ + mp) ≠ (ẑ + mp)]. (B.39)





dẑ = ≠1, if u
Õ(ẑ + mp) = ”h/”̄;
dmp
dẑ = 0, if u
Õ(ẑ + mp) > ”h/”̄.
(B.40)








–[uÕ(ẑ + mp) ≠ 1], if uÕ(ẑ + mp) Ø ”h/”̄;
0, if uÕ(ẑ + mp) < ”h/”̄.




(µ + 1)/— ≠ 1 = –[uÕ(ẑ + mp) ≠ 1], if µ Ø —{–[”h/”̄ ≠ 1] + 1} ≠ 1;
uÕ(ẑ + mp) = ”h/”̄, if otherwise.
(B.41)
In the latter case, if consumers carry more than ẑ, they will just sell less assets in the AM should
they become shoppers. Since it is costly to carry money, consumers do not carry more than ẑ.
Now, Let zs(µ) and zp(µ) denote the solutions in the separating and pooling cases, respec-
tively. Let µ‡ = —{–[”h/”̄ ≠ 1] + 1} ≠ 1. Note that the second term in the bracket of (B.38),





, is strictly larger than the first term, uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ 1, because
ml < mh so
uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ 1
uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ ”l/”h
<
uÕ(ẑ + mh) ≠ 1
uÕ(ẑ + mh) ≠ ”l/”h
. (B.42)





ˆẑ . Hence, it must be
zp(µ) < zs(µ). Since zp(µ) = zp(µ‡) for all µ < µ‡, we have zp(µ) < zs(µ) for all µ.
Now, let â = A and define Ÿp(µ) and Ÿs(µ) to be the equilibrium asset prices in the two
scenarios. If the trade in the AM is not constrained by assets, then Ÿp(µ) = Ÿs(µ) = —”̄. If the
trade in the AM is constrained by assets, then
Ÿp(µ) = —”̄
Ó









 [uÕ(zs(µ) + ml) ≠ 1] + (1 ≠  )[uÕ(zs(µ) + mh) ≠ 1]
uÕ(zs(µ) + ml) ≠ 1







We need to see if the above solutions, (zs(µ), Ÿs(µ)) and (zp(µ), Ÿp(µ)), are consistent with
Proposition 3.1. We have three possible cases: Case I: zp(µ) < zs(µ) < zÕ. Case II: zÕ <
zp(µ) < zs(µ). Case III: zp(µ) < zÕ < zs(µ). For zp(µ) or zs(µ) or both to be equilibrium
solutions, one needs to first check (1) conditional on other consumers choosing zp(µ) (or zs(µ))
and given Ÿ = Ÿp(µ) (or Ÿ = Ÿs(µ)), whether a consumer have the incentive to deviate, choose
a di erent ẑ and â, and make a separating (or pooling) o er in the AM; and (2) whether such
deviation is consistent with Proposition 3.1. If the answers to both questions are yes, then zp(µ)
(or zs(µ)) is not a solution. I show next that if µ is su ciently large or su ciently small, there
exists a unique solution.
First, define µÕ to be such that uÕ(zp(µÕ)+mp) = ”h/”̄. Define µÕÕ to be such that zs(µÕÕ) = zÕ.
Let µ2 = max{µÕ, µÕÕ}. If µ > µ2, we have case I, so (zs(µ), Ÿs(µ)) is not a solution. First, suppose
A is large so the trade in the AM is not constrained by assets. Consider a consumer who deviates
by holding more money and making a separating o er in the AM. Because in this case ml = mp,
the consumer’s expected surplus in a separating AM equilibrium is lower. Next, suppose the
trade in the AM is constrained by assets. Consider a joint deviation where a consumer choose
ẑÕ , zp(µ) and âÕ , A given Ÿp(µ) and µ, and make a separating o er in the AM.2 Note that the
2I thank one of the anonymous referees for pointing out the possibility of joint deviations.
B.2. Proofs for Section 3.3.1 115









 [uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ 1] + (1 ≠  )[uÕ(ẑ + mh) ≠ 1]
uÕ(ẑ + ml) ≠ 1












ˆẑ = (µ + 1)/— ≠ 1. However, this means
ˆSs(ẑÕ,â)
ˆâ < Ÿ
p. In other words, Ÿp(µ) is too high and the consumer is better o  holding only
money. Hence, âÕ = 0, which obviously does not o er higher utility compared to the pooling
equilibrium.
Next, I show that the separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for small µ. First,
given â, for all µ < µÕ, consumers’ value in a pooling solution is
fp(µ) = —–[u(ĝ) ≠ ĝ] ≠ (µ + 1 ≠ —)(ĝ ≠ mp) ≠ Ÿâ + —”̄â, (B.46)
which does not approach the first best (i.e.„ g = gú) as µ æ — ≠ 1. Hence, there must exist µ†
such that for all µ < µ†, consumers prefer choosing a larger ẑ and separating in the AM. Now
consider if a consumer would deviate from separating to pooling. The highest this consumer can
get from pooling is
fp(µ) = —–[u(ĝ) ≠ ĝ] ≠ Ÿâ + —”̄â, (B.47)
in which case the consumer does not carry any money because other consumers carry enough to
support ĝ. But this is still not the first best, so as long as µ is su ciently small, consumers do
not deviate. Lastly, consider a joint deviation where a consumer chooses ẑÕÕ , zs(µ) and âÕÕ , A
given Ÿs(µ) and µ, and makes a pooling o er in the AM. Because Ÿs > —”̄, the consumer will
carry just enough assets to consume ĝ. That is, ”̄â = ĝ. However, as long as µ is su ciently
small, such deviation is not profitable.
Lastly, when µ1 Æ µ Æ µ2, a symmetric solution may not exist. For example, suppose that
A is large so the trade is not constrained by assets. A consumer may deviate by choosing a
di erent ẑ. First, assume all other consumers choose zp(µ) and zp(µ) < zÕ. Suppose there exists
zd
1
Ø zÕ such that
—Ŝs(zd
1
, A) ≠ (µ + 1 ≠ —)zd
1





, A) = –{ [u(zd
1
+ ml(zp(µ))) ≠ (zd1 + ml(zp(µ)))]
+ (1 ≠  )[u(zd
1
+ mh(zp(µ))) ≠ (zd1 + mh(zp(µ)))]}.
I use ml(zp(µ)) and mh(zp(µ)) to emphasize the dependence of ml and mh on zp(µ). If the
inequality holds, a deviation to (zd
1
, A) is profitable. Next, assume all the other consumers
choose zs(µ) and zs(µ) Ø zÕ. Suppose there exists zd
2
< zÕ such that
—Ŝp(zd
2
, A) ≠ (µ + 1 ≠ —)zd
2





, A) = –[u(zd
2
+ mp(zs(µ))) ≠ (zd2 + mp(zs(µ)))].
Then a deviation to (zd
2




exist simultaneously, there does not exist
a symmetric solution. ⇤
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B.3 Proofs for Section 3.3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.2: There are in principle fifteen types of equilibria (compared to only
two types in the benchmark model). The list of possible types of perfect Bayesian equilibria is
given by the following.
(1) (Âul , sul ) , (Âuh , suh) , (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âdh, sdh); (2) (Âul , sul ) = (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âuh , suh) , (Âdh, sdh);
(3) (Âul , sul ) , (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âuh , suh) = (Âdh, sdh); (4) (Âul , sul ) = (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âuh , suh) = (Âdh, sdh);
(5) (Âul , sul ) = (Âuh , suh) , (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âdh, sdh); (6) (Âul , sul ) , (Âuh , suh) , (Âdl , sdl ) = (Âdh, sdh);
(7) (Âul , sul ) = (Âuh , suh) , (Âdl , sdl ) = (Âdh, sdh); (8) (Âul , sul ) = (Âdh, sdh) , (Âuh , suh) , (Âdl , sdl );
(9) (Âul , sul ) , (Âdh, sdh) , (Âuh , suh) = (Âdl , sdl ); (10) (Âul , sul ) = (Âdh, sdh) , (Âdl , sdl ) = (Âuh , suh);
(11) (Âul , sul ) = (Âdh, sdh) = (Âuh , suh) , (Âdl , sdl ); (12) (Âdh, sdh) = (Âuh , suh) = (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âul , sul );
(13) (Âul , sul ) = (Âuh , suh) = (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âdh, sdh); (14) (Âdh, sdh) = (Âul , sul ) = (Âdl , sdl ) , (Âuh , suh);
(15) (Âdh, sdh) = (Âul , sul ) = (Âdl , sdl ) = (Âuh , suh).
Some cases can be ruled out. Specifically, when sellers’ distress statuses are revealed, undistressed
low-quality (or high-quality) sellers cannot pool with other sellers without also pooling with
undistressed high-quality (or low-quality) sellers. It is the same for distressed sellers. To see
why, suppose, for example, that undistressed low-quality sellers are in a pool of sellers without
undistressed high-quality sellers. Then, buyers will recognize undistressed low-quality sellers and
only accept a low price Â = ”l from them. This eliminates cases (8)-(14).
Now I solve the equilibrium. In cases (1)-(4), low-quality sellers and high-quality sellers make
di erent o ers. Hence, these cases can all be solved by following the proof of Proposition B.2.
Specifically, for (Âul , sul ) and (Âuh , suh), the solution is the same as those proposed in Proposition
B.2. However, (Âdh, sdh) must be such that undistressed sellers do not have the incentive to mimic
this o er. Case (5) can be solved by solving a pooling problem for undistressed sellers and a
separating problem from distressed sellers. However, the o ers must be such that distressed
high-quality sellers and undistressed high-quality sellers do not have the incentive to mimic each
other’s o ers. Next, for case (6), one can solve (Âul , sul ) and (Âuh , suh) by following the proof of
Proposition B.2 and (Âdl , sdl ) and (Âdh, sdh) by following the proof of Proposition B.1. Similar to
(5), undistressed high-quality sellers must not have the incentive to make the pooling o er and
distressed high-quality sellers must not have the incentive to make the separating o er. Case
(7) is similar to (5) and (6). Lastly, in case (15), an equilibrium is such that low-quality sellers’
participation constraints are satisfied, and distressed and undistressed high-quality sellers cannot
both be made better-o .
Next, I apply the undefeated equilibrium to select the equilibrium. First, suppose zs Ø zÕs so
without the liquidity shock sellers separate in the equilibrium. When ÷d is small, all sellers may
separate in equilibrium. Now, suppose ÷d is large. Case (6) is the unique undefeated equilibria
if distressed sellers prefer to pool while undistressed sellers prefer to separate. The latter is true
by the assumption that zs Ø zÕs. Now, consider the former. Suppose that ÷d is su ciently large
so that ÷duÕ(zs + min{”la, zb}) > 1 and ÷duÕ(zs + min{”̄a, zb}) > ”h”̄ . Define
vpoolh (÷




where mp = min{”̄a, zb}. Define
vseph (÷
d) = ÷du(zs + mdh) ≠ mdh; (B.51)
where mdh is given by
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and ml = min{”la, zb}. One can rewrite vseph (÷d) as v
sep
h (÷d) = ÷du(zs +ml)≠ml ≠ (1≠ ”l/”h)mdh.
Then
dvpoolh (÷d)





because mp Ø ml and
dmdh
d÷d > 0. First, suppose mp = ”̄a and ml = ”la. Then, for su ciently
large ÷d,
vpoolh (÷
d) =÷du(zs + mp) ≠ mp ≠ (”h/”̄ ≠ 1)mp
>÷du(zs + ml) ≠ ml ≠ (1 ≠ ”l/”h)mdh = vsep(÷d). (B.54)
Second, suppose that mp = ml = zb and ”h/”̄ < 2 ≠ ”l/”h. Because lim÷dæŒ mdh = ml = mp, for
su ciently large ÷d, (”h/”̄ ≠ 1)mp < (1 ≠ ”l/”h)mh, and hence vpoolh (÷d) > vsep(÷d).
Lastly, suppose zs < zÕs so without the liquidity shock sellers pool in the equilibrium. From
the proof of Proposition B.5, we know that in this case, asset trade is constrained either by sellers’
assets or buyers’ money. Then, case (15) can be solved by following the proof of Proposition B.1.
Note that because asset trade is constrained, maximizing undistressed high-quality sellers’ surplus
will also maximize distressed high-quality sellers’ surplus. Similar to the case when zs Ø zÕs,
distressed sellers prefer to pool if ÷d is large and ”h/”̄ < 2 ≠ ”l/”h. Since without the liquidity
shock sellers pool in equilibrium, all sellers are better o  in case (15) than in cases (1)-(7). Hence,
the only undefeated case is (15). ⇤
Proof of Proposition 3.3: I start by ruling out equilibria that cannot exist. First, suppose
distressed low-quality sellers and undistressed low-quality sellers do not pool (i.e., (Âul , sul ) ,
(Âdl , sdl )). We have
u(zs + Âul sul ) ≠ ”lsul Ø u(zs + Âdl sdl ) ≠ ”lsdl , (B.55)
÷du(zs + Âul sul ) ≠ ”lsul Æ ÷du(zs + Âdl sdl ) ≠ ”lsdl , (B.56)
where at least one inequality is strict. For both inequalities to hold at the same time, it must be
that Âul sul < Âdl sdl . Note that since
u(zs + Âdl sdl ) ≠ u(zs + Âul sul ) Æ ”l(sdl ≠ sul ) < ”h(sdl ≠ sul ), (B.57)
undistressed high-quality sellers do not pool with distressed low-quality sellers either. Similarly,
if distressed high-quality sellers and undistressed high-quality sellers do not pool (i.e., (Âuh , suh) ,
(Âdh, sdh)), then distressed low-quality sellers do not pool with undistressed high-quality sellers
either. This eliminates cases (9), (10), (12) and (13).
Now I solve the equilibrium. First, cases (1)-(4) are similar to when distressed status is
revealed. Second, consider cases (5)-(8). Unlike when distressed status is revealed, undistressed
or distressed low quality sellers can deviate unilaterally without being detected by buyers. Hence,
it is not enough that high-quality sellers do not have the incentive to deviate – low-quality sellers
must not have the incentive to deviate either. Third, consider cases (11), (14), and (15). In (11)
and (15), an equilibrium is such that low-quality sellers’ participation constraints are satisfied, and
distressed and undistressed high-quality sellers cannot both be made better o . (14) can be solved
by maximizing distressed high-quality sellers’ utility subject to the participation constraints of
low-quality sellers. The pooling o er in (11) must also prevent distressed low-quality sellers from
deviating, while undistressed high-quality sellers in (14) must prevent other sellers that pool from
deviating.
Next, I apply the undefeated equilibrium to select the equilibrium.
Part I. Suppose that zs < zÕs. As shown in the proof of Proposition 3.2, distressed sellers
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prefer to pool if ÷d is large and ”h/”̄ < 2 ≠ ”l/”h. Since undistressed sellers also prefer to pool,
cases (1)-(7) are defeated by (15). Hence, we are only left with cases (8), (11), (14), and (15).
Consider cases (8) and (14). Let ”̂(8) = [ (1 ≠ fi)”l + (1 ≠  )fi”h]/[ (1 ≠ fi) + (1 ≠  )fi] and
”̂(14) = [ ”l +(1≠ )fi”h]/[ +(1≠ )fi] be the average quality of the asset pool in (8) and (14).
Let mp = Âpsp (in case (8) and (14)), mh = Âuhsuh, and ml = Âdl sdl (in case (8) only). We have
÷du(zs + mh) ≠ mh Æ ÷du(zs + mp) ≠
”h
”̂(8)
mp (replace ”̂(8) with ”̂(14) in (14)), (B.58)
u(zs + mh) ≠
”l
”h
mh Æ u(zs + mp) ≠
”l
”̂(8)
mp (replace ”̂(8) with ”̂(14) in (14)), (B.59)
÷du(zs + mp) ≠
”l
”̂(8)
mp Æ ÷du(zs + ml) ≠ ml, (B.60)
÷du(zs + mh) ≠
”l
”h
mh Æ ÷du(zs + ml) ≠ ml. (B.61)
(B.58) and (B.59) ensure that pooling sellers do not have the incentive to deviate, and (B.60)
and (B.61) ensure that in case (8), distressed low-quality sellers do not have the incentive to
deviate. It is easy to show that as long as ÷d”l/”h > 1, (B.59) binding implies (B.58). (B.58) and
(B.60) together imply (B.61). This means that in cases (8) and (14), undistressed high-quality
sellers only have to prevent undistressed low-quality sellers from deviating. In other words, (B.59)
always binds.
Now, suppose that (i) fi is large, (ii) a is small (so asset trade is constrained by sellers’
assets), and (iii) 2 ≠ ”l/”h < ”̄/”l. First, undistressed low-quality sellers are better o  in (14)
than in (8). To see this, first note that mp in (8) never exceeds ml. If a is small and fi is large,
ml = ”la and in (14) mp = ”̂1a. Then
”l(1 ≠ ”l/”̂(8)) < ”̂(14)(1 ≠ ”l/”̂(14)) ∆ ”l(uÕ(zs) ≠ ”l/”̂(8)) < ”̂(14)(uÕ(zs) ≠ ”l/”̂(14))
∆u(zs + ml) ≠
”l
”̂(8)
ml < u(zs + mp) ≠
”l
”̂(14)
mp when a is small. (B.62)
If 2 ≠ ”l/”h < ”̄/”l, then ”l(1 ≠ ”l/”̂(8)) < ”̂(14)(1 ≠ ”l/”̂(14)) when fi is large. This means that
for undistressed low-quality sellers, the larger trading volume in (14) provides a higher surplus
than the higher price in (8). Because (B.59) binds, undistressed high-quality sellers are better
o  in (14) as well. Since distressed sellers prefer to pool, they are better o  in (14) too. This
means (8) is defeated by (14). Next, undistressed low-quality sellers and distressed sellers are
better o  in (14) than in (11) because one, the larger trading volume in (14) provides a higher
surplus than the higher price in (11), and two, distressed sellers prefer to pool. When fi is
large, undistressed high-quality sellers are better o  in (8) than in (11). To see this, note that
distressed and undistressed low-quality sellers’ surplus in (8) and (11) are similar because if
fi is large, pooling sellers’ average quality is similar with or without undistressed high-quality
sellers. Then undistressed high-quality sellers can benefit from making a separating o er that
satisfies (B.59). This means undistressed high-quality sellers are better o  in (14) than in (11)
as well. Lastly, when fi is large, undistressed high-quality sellers are better o  in (14) than in
(15) because distressed and undistressed low-quality sellers’ surplus in (14) and (15) is similar,
and undistressed high-quality sellers can benefit from making a separating o er. In conclusion,
only (14) is undefeated.
Next, suppose fi is small so that u(zs + mp) ≠ ”l”̂ mp = v
o
l in both case (8) and (14).3 Then
3See problem (B.1) for the definition of vol .
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all sellers are better o  in (15) than in case (8) and (14). When fi is small, all sellers are better
o  in (15) than in (11) as well because undistressed sellers no longer have to prevent distress
low-quality sellers from deviating. Hence, (15) is the unique undefeated equilibrium. Lastly, if fi
is large and a is large (asset trade is constrained by buyers’ money), then distressed sellers are
better o  in (14) than in (8) because they can pool. However, undistressed low-quality sellers
may be better o  in (8) than in (14) because in (8), mp approaches to ml if ÷d is large. Recall
that when ÷d is large so asset trade is constrained by money, mp in (14) is equal to ml in (8).
In other words, undistressed low-quality sellers are better o  in (8) than in (14), and so are
undistressed high-quality sellers because (B.59) binds. This means (14) and (8) are defeated by
each other. Since similar to before (11) is defeated by (8) and (15) is defeated by (14), there are
no undefeated equilibria.
Part II. Suppose that zs Ø zÕs. First, consider cases (1)-(4). It must be that (Âuh , suh) = (Âdh, sdh)
so that undistressed low-quality sellers do not have the incentive to deviate. This means only
cases (3) and (4) are possible, and we have case (4) if low-quality sellers are constrained by either
money or assets without the shock and (3) if they are not. Without loss of generality, in what
follows I focus on case (3). Because zs Ø zÕs, undistressed sellers prefer to separate. Hence, cases
(5), (7), and (15) is defeated by (3). Next, in (6), distressed high-quality sellers only pool with
distressed low-quality sellers. That is, we have




A necessary condition for (B.63) to not bind is that uÕ(zs + mp) < 1. Hence, ÷d, a and zb need
to be large. In such case, (3) is defeated by (6). In what follows, assume ÷d, a and zb are large.
Consider cases (8), (11), and (14). Suppose fi is small so that u(zs + mp) ≠ ”l”̂ mp = v
o
l in case
(8) and (14). Then distressed sellers are better o  in (6) while undistressed sellers are as well
o  as in (8) and (14). When fi is small, all sellers are better o  in (6) than in (11) because in
(11), undistressed sellers have to pool while distressed high-quality sellers have to separate from
distressed low-quality sellers. Hence, (6) is the unique undefeated equilibrium. If fi is large so
that u(zs + mp) ≠ ”l”̂ mp > v
o
l , then undistressed sellers are better o  in either (8) or (14), while
distressed sellers are better o  in (6). Distressed sellers are also better o  in (6) than in (11).
Hence, there are no undefeated equilibria.
Now assume a is small so (B.63) binds. We are left with cases (3), (6), (8), (11), and
(14). First, (6) cannot exist because if (B.63) binds, distressed low-quality sellers’ participation
constraint is violated. If ÷d is large so that ÷du(zs + ml) ≠ ”h”l ml > ÷
du(zs + mh) ≠ mh where
ml and mh are given by Proposition B.2, then (3) cannot exist because distressed high-quality
sellers would prefer pooling with low quality sellers to any separating o er. Next, suppose fi is
small so that u(zs + mp) ≠ ”l”̂ mp = v
o
l in case (8) and (14). Undistressed high-quality sellers are
better o  in (8) and (14) than in (11) because they do not pool with undistressed low-quality
sellers in (8) and (14). Distressed high-quality sellers and undistressed low-quality sellers are
better o  in (8) than in (14) since they do not have to pool with distressed low-quality sellers.
Since (B.59) binds, undistressed high-quality sellers are better o  in (8) than in (14) as well.
Hence, (8) is the only undefeated equilibrium. Lastly, assume (i) fi is large, (ii) a is small, and
(iii) 2 ≠ ”l/”h < ”̄/”l. Following the arguments in part I, (14) is the only undefeated equilibrium.
If fi is large and a is large (asset trade is constrained by buyers’ money), then similar to part
I, distressed high-quality sellers are better o  in (14), while undistressed high-quality sellers are
better o  in (8). So (14) and (8) are defeated by each other. Since (11) is defeated by (8), there
are no undefeated equilibria. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 3.4: First, suppose zs < zÕs. When the distress statuses are revealed,
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all sellers pool. It is easy to see that in the semi-pooling equilibrium, undistressed low-quality
sellers are worse o  because they are pooling with distressed sellers, and the average asset quality
is below the average asset quality of the market. For the same reason, distressed sellers are also
worse o . Undistressed high-quality sellers, however, are better o  because case (15) is defeated
by (14) (see the proof of Proposition 3.3).
Second, suppose zs Ø zÕs. In the semi-pooling equilibrium, undistressed low-quality sellers
are better o  because they pool with distressed sellers. For the same reason, distressed sellers’
surplus is lower. In the semi-pooling equilibrium, undistressed high-quality sellers’ surplus is
u(zs + mh) ≠ mh (B.64)
where mh solves
u(zs + mh) ≠
”l
”h




Note that mp = ”̂a (asset trade is constrained by a) and ”̂ = [ ”l + (1 ≠  )fi”h]/[  + (1 ≠  )fi].
When the distress statuses are revealed, let ml = ”la and mÕh be given by
u(zs + mÕh) ≠
”l
”h
mÕh = u(zs + ml) ≠ ml. (B.66)
Then undistressed high-quality sellers’ surplus is
u(zs + mÕh) ≠ mÕh. (B.67)
Since mh > mÕh, undistressed sellers’ surplus is higher in the semi-pooling equilibrium. ⇤
B.4 Proofs for Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.5: First, note that because zs Ø zÕs, for any amount sellers borrow from
the discount window, the equilibrium in the asset market must be separating. It is clear that
low-quality sellers do not benefit from discount window loans as long as rD > 1, and they are
indi erent if rD = 1. Note that if low-quality sellers choose mimic high-quality sellers’ strategy
in the asset market, the former will also borrow the same amount from the discount window as
the latter even though borrowing from the discount window is unobservable. This is because
all sellers’ preferences over money are the same and their assets have the same capacity when
serving as collateral.
Now, let v0 = u(zs + mú) ≠ u(zs) ≠ mú where mú solves uÕ(zs + mú) = 1. Let mDs denote
the amount of discount window loan by high-quality sellers. Let mDh denote the amount of real





u(zs + mDs + mDh ) ≠ RDmDs ≠ mDh (B.68)
s.t. u(zs + mDs + mDh ) ≠ u(zs) ≠ RDmDs ≠
”l
”h
mDh Æ v0. (B.69)
Constraint (B.69) must bind, otherwise high-quality sellers can decrease mDs and increase mDh to
increase their surplus. Suppose that mDs = 0. If uÕ(zs + mDs + mDh ) > RD, high-quality sellers
can increase mDs whiling decreasing mDh so that constraint (B.69) still holds. This increases
high-quality sellers’ surplus because for any mDÕh < mDÕÕh , we have
u(zs + mDÕs + mDÕh ) ≠ u(zs) ≠ RDmDÕs ≠
”l
”h
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So
u(zs + mDÕs + mDÕh ) ≠ u(zs) ≠ RDmDÕs ≠ mDÕh
> u(zs + mDÕÕs + mDÕÕh ) ≠ u(zs) ≠ RDmDÕÕs ≠ mDÕÕh . (B.71)
Hence, the optimal mDs and mDh solve
uÕ(zs + mDs + mDh ) = RD, (B.72)
u(zs + mDs + mDh ) ≠ u(zs) ≠ RDmDs ≠
”l
”h
mDh = v0. (B.73)
It is easy to see that if RD = 1, mDh = 0. Next, if RD Ø RDÕ © uÕ(zs + mDh ) where mDh solves
u(zs + mDh ) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”l”h m
D
h = v0, then high-quality sellers do not borrow from the discount
window.
Lastly, suppose a is small and the AM equilibrium is pooling. Let mD denote the amount of
discount window loan, and let mDp denote the amount of real balances obtained by sellers from
the asset market. Consider the problem below.
max
mD,mDp




s.t. u(zs + mD + mDp ) ≠ u(zs) ≠ RDmD ≠
”l
”̄







I assume a is su ciently small so that (B.76) binds. Suppose that (1) RD = 1; (2) zs +m† < zÕs(a)
where m† © ”la; and (3) uÕ(zs + m†) > ”h≠”l”̄≠”l . Now, assume m
D = m†. Substitute (B.76) into
the objective function and take the derivative of the objective function with respect to mDp at
mDp = 0. We have
(1 ≠ ”l/”̄)uÕ(zs + m†) ≠ (”h ≠ ”l)/”̄ > 0 (B.77)
because of assumption (3). Then as long as ”h
”̄
< uÕ(zs + ”̄a) < ”h≠”l”̄≠”l , the optimal m
D and mDp
satisfy 0 < mD < m† and mDp > 0. Because zs + m† < zÕs(a), zs + mD is small enough that
high-quality sellers will want to pool in the asset market. It is also clear that high-quality sellers
will prefer borrowing from the discount window and then pooling in the asset market to only
borrowing from the discount window. Then, it is easy to that the total liquidity shoppers bring
to the GM, zs + mD + mDp , is less than what sellers would have brought to the GM if there was
no discount window and the equilibrium was pooling. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 3.6: First, let zùs be such that uÕ(zùs ) = 1/(1 ≠  ). Let vsh = u(zs +
Âhsh) ≠ u(zs) ≠ ”hsh denote high-quality sellers’ surplus in a separating equilibrium and let
vph = u(zs +Âpsp)≠u(zs)≠”hsp denote high-quality sellers’ surplus in a pooling equilibrium. The
terms of trade are given by Proposition 3.1. It is easy to see that both vsh and v
p
h are increasing
in ”l. Next, note that
lim
”læ0







0, if zs Ø zùs ;




where uÕ(zs + mp) = 1/(1 ≠  ). If zs < zùs , as ”l æ 0, v
p
h goes to a strictly positive value while




h and the pooling
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equilibrium is undefeated. If zs > zùs , let ”ùùl solve
uÕ(zs) =
”h
 ”ùùl + (1 ≠  )”h
. (B.80)
Then vph = 0 for all ”l < ”ùùl while vsh > 0, so the separating equilibrium is undefeated. In this
case, when ”l = 0, there is no trading in the AM and vsh = v
p
h = 0. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 3.7: Let ‘ denote the amount of bad assets purchased by the government
as a percentage of the total assets. First, the increase in welfare as a result of the program is
given by
W = u(zs + mp) ≠ (zs + mp) ≠ [u(zs) ≠ zs], (B.81)
where mp is given by















(1≠ )uÕÕ(zs+mp) , if ‘ <  ;




= ≠   ≠ ‘1 ≠  
1
(1 ≠  )uÕÕ(zs + mp)
. (B.84)
To derive the cost of purchasing assets, first note that sellers with bad assets must be indi erent
between selling to the government and selling in the asset market. This means the government
pays mp to obtain the bad assets from each seller. Hence, the total cost of the program is.
C = mp‘. (B.85)







mp ≠ ‘(1≠ )uÕÕ(zs+mp) , if mp = m
ú
p and ‘ <  ;
mp, if ‘ =  .
(B.86)
Since uÕÕ(zs + mp) is finite, dWd‘ goes to zero as ‘ æ  . However,
dC
d‘ is always strictly positive.
Hence, the optimal proportion of bad assets purchased must be strictly less than  .
Lastly, note that the government o ers mp to purchase all assets from a seller. In the asset
market, the sale quantity sp is determined by high-quality sellers who solve ”̄uÕ(zs + ”̄sp) = ”h.
Because it is not optimal for the government to purchase all bad assets, we have ”̄ < ”h so
high-quality sellers do not sell all assets. Since sellers sell less asset in the market but obtain the
same amount of money, the market price must be higher. ⇤
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs for Section 4.3
In this appendix, I show how to solve the competitive equilibrium in period 2. Following Guerrieri
and Shimer (2014), I first take buyer’s search value kú as given. I then endogenize kú to solve for
the full equilibrium.
To solve the partial equilibrium where kú is given, I follow Guerrieri et al. (2010) and solve
a set of problems {P (”j)}Jj=1 first. And then I prove any solution to {P (”j)}Jj=1 is a partial
equilibrium and any partial equilibrium is a solution to {P (”j)}Jj=1.
Let
v̄b = u(cú) ≠ u(b) ≠ (cú ≠ b)
denote highest possible trade surplus. For any j œ J and k œ [0, v̄b], problem P (”j) is given by
vs,j = max
◊,z,s
{p(◊)[u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”js]} (C.1)
s.t. k Æ q(◊)(s”j ≠ z) (C.2)
vs,jÕ Ø p(◊)[u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕs] for all jÕ < j. (C.3)
The first constraint says (z, s) must satisfy buyer’s participation constraint. The second con-
straint requires that no sellers with quality worse than j have the incentive to deviate.
Before solving the problem let me first prove a lemma that will simplify the problem.
Lemma C.1 Constraint (C.2) binds for all j.
Proof: First it is easy to see that constraint (C.2) binds for j = 1 where constraint (C.3)
disappears. Next, suppose constraint (C.2) binds for all jÕ = 2, ..., j≠1 and suppose the inequality
is strict for P (”j) with the solution being {zj , sj , ◊j}. Now pick {zÕ, sÕ, ◊Õ} such that
p(◊j)(u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”j≠1sj) = p(◊Õ)(u(b + zÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”j≠1sÕ)
k Æ q(◊Õ)(sÕ”j ≠ zÕ)
zÕ = zj
sÕ < sj
◊Õ < ◊j .
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Now let us check constraint (C.3). For any ”jÕ < ”j≠1, we have
p(◊j)(u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsj) + p(◊j)sj(”jÕ ≠ ”j≠1)
=p(◊Õ)(u(b + zÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsÕ) + p(◊Õ)sÕ(”jÕ ≠ ”j≠1).
Since sÕ < sj and ◊Õ < ◊j , we have
p(◊j)(u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsj) > p(◊Õ)(u(b + zÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsÕ)
so constraint (C.3) is still satisfied. But similarly we have
p(◊Õ)(u(b + zÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jsÕ) > p(◊j)(u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jsj),
a contradiction. ⇤
The next proposition characterizes the solution to this set of problems.
Proposition C.1 Assume k < v̄b. The unique solution {(◊j , zj , sj)}Jj=1 to {P (”j)}Jj=1 is given
by (1) z1 = zú where uÕ(b + zú) = 1; ◊1 solves
q(◊) + ◊qÕ(◊) = k
u(b + z1) ≠ u(b) ≠ z1
; (C.4)
and s1 = (k/q(◊1) + z1)/”1. (2) For all j > 1, zj and ◊j solve
uÕ(b + zj)[(◊jqÕ(◊j) + q(◊j))zj + k] = (◊jqÕ(◊j) + q(◊j))[u(b + zj) ≠ u(b)], (C.5)
vs,j≠1 = ◊jq(◊j)
C







and sj = (k/q(◊j) + zj)/”j.





u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ z
$
≠ ◊k. (C.7)
It is straightforward to formulate the solution: z1 = zú, and ◊1 solves
q(◊) + ◊qÕ(◊) = k
u(b + z1) ≠ u(b) ≠ z1
. (C.8)
Since pÕ(◊) < 0 and ku(b+z1)≠z1≠u(b) < 1, there exists a unique solution of ◊1 > 0.
Next let us look at j = 2. It must be that constraint (C.3) binds. Suppose not, then problem
P (”2) is the same as P (”1) except for the di erence in tree quality. Then j = 2 sellers will choose
z2 = z1 and ◊2 = ◊1. But this is strictly better than what j = 1 sellers have: if they deviate
they receive ◊1q(◊1)
Ë
u(b + z1) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”1”2 z1
È
≠ ”1”2 ◊1k. So it is a contradiction. Using the binding





u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ z
$
≠ ◊k (C.9)
s.t. vs,1 = ◊q(◊)
C







The solution is given by
uÕ(b + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + k] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(b + z) ≠ u(b)], (C.11)
vs,1 = ◊q(◊)
C
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uÕÕ(b + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + k]
u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ uÕ(b + z)z > 0, (C.13)
because 2qÕ(◊) + ◊qÕÕ(◊) = pÕÕ(◊) < 0. Next, the RHS of (C.12) is strictly increasing in ◊ because
(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”1/”2z] ≠ ”1/”2k > (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ z] ≠ k > 0.
(C.14)
It is also increasing in z because z Æ zú. It is then easy to check that there exists a unique
solution to (C.11) and (C.12), and that ◊1 > ◊2 and z1 > z2.
For cases where j > 2, the following claim gives the solution.
Claim A.2: For all j > 2, constraint (C.3) binds for jÕ = j ≠ 1 and is slack for all the other jÕ’s.





u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ z
$
≠ ◊k (C.15)
s.t. vs,1 = ◊q(◊)
C
















First, by the same reasoning in P (”2), at least one of the two resource constraints must bind.
Now suppose constraint (C.16) binds but constraint (C.17) is slack. Then the problem is very

































































◊3k + ◊2[z2q(◊2) + k]
”1 ≠ ”2
”2













where the last inequality is because ◊2 > ◊3 and ◊2q(◊2)z2 > ◊3q(◊3)z3. This contradicts with
the assumption that (C.17) is slack. Now, suppose constraint (C.17) binds but constraint (C.16)
is slack. Follow similar arguments and it is easy to see that all the constraints are satisfied and
◊3 is now given by a binding constraint (C.17) and (C.11). Lastly, it is not possible that both
constraints bind. Hence, only jÕ = 2 constraint binds.
Now suppose that the claim holds for all jÕ < j. For P (”j) we can rewrite constraint (C.3)



























































Again, at least one of the j ≠ 1 constraints must be binding. Let one of the binding constraints
be jÕ œ {1, ..., j ≠ 1}. Now suppose jÕ < j ≠ 1. We have
◊jÕ+1q(◊jÕ+1)
C




















and again ◊j < ◊jÕ+1 and zj < zjÕ+1. Similar to the j = 3 case, this implies that
vs,jÕ+1 = ◊jÕ+1q(◊jÕ+1)
C














































+ ◊jÕ+1[zjÕ+1q(◊jÕ+1) + k]
”jÕ ≠ ”jÕ+1
”jÕ+1














contradicting with the assumption that constraint jÕ + 1 does not bind. Hence, only constraint
j ≠ 1 binds. ⇤
The next proposition shows the connection between {P (”j)}Jj=1 and the equilibrium defined
in Definition 4.1. In short, any solution to {P (”j)}Jj=1 is an equilibrium and any equilibrium is a
solution to {P (”j)}Jj=1.
Proposition C.2 (1) For any solution to {P (”j)}Jj=1, for all j, let   = {(zj , sj)}Jj=1 and
◊(zj , sj) = ◊j; let “(zj , sj ; ”) = 1 if and only if ” = ”j; and let vús,j = vs,j. Then { , {vús,j}Jj=1, ◊(.), “(.), F (.)}
is an equilibrium;
(2) For any equilibrium, let (zj , sj) be such that “(z, s; ”j) > 0 and let ◊j = ◊(zj , sj). Then
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{(zj , sj , ◊j)}Jj=1 solves {P (”j)}Jj=1.
Proof: Note that because the above solution to {P (”j)}Jj=1 is unique, this proof implies that the
equilibrium is unique.
Part 1: To show that the solution to {P (”j)}Jj=1 is an equilibrium, I look for for an equilibrium
characterized by (◊j , zj , sj). For all j, let   = {(zj , sj)}Jj=1 and ◊(zj , sj) = ◊j ; let “((zj , sj); ”) = 1
if and only if ” = ”j ; let vús,j = vs,j ; and let dF (zj , sj) =  j .
Let us check Condition (1) to (4). Condition (1) and (2) hold by construction. Buyer’s
optimal behavior also holds because for all j, (zj , sj , ◊(zj , sj)) o ers utility k to buyers. We need
to show that Seller’s optimal behavior is satisfied and Condition (4) satisfied.
By construction, for all j and for all jÕ < j, jÕ will not deviate to j. We only need to prove








u(b + zj+1) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jsj+1
$
. (C.20)
Since ◊j Ø ◊j+1 and sj Ø sj+1 imply that ◊jq(◊j)sj Ø ◊j+1q(◊j+1)sj+1, we have
◊jq(◊j)[u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”j+1sj ] < ◊j+1q(◊j+1)[u(b + zj+1) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”j+1sj+1]. (C.21)
Now suppose for some jÕ > j + 1, the above equation is also true for jÕ ≠ 1:
◊jq(◊j)[u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕ≠1sj ] < ◊jÕ≠1q(◊jÕ≠1)[u(b + zjÕ≠1) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕ≠1sjÕ≠1]. (C.22)
Note that ◊jq(◊j)sj Ø ◊jÕ≠1q(◊jÕ≠1)sjÕ≠1 and ”jÕ > ”jÕ≠1, which imply that
◊jq(◊j)[u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsj ] < ◊jÕ≠1q(◊jÕ≠1)[u(b + zjÕ≠1) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsjÕ≠1]. (C.23)
Apply (C.21) again to get
◊jÕ≠1q(◊jÕ≠1)[u(b + zjÕ≠1) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsjÕ≠1] < ◊jÕq(◊jÕ)[u(b + zjÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsjÕ ]. (C.24)
The last two inequalities imply
◊jq(◊j)[u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsj ] < ◊jÕq(◊jÕ)[u(b + zjÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jÕsjÕ ], (C.25)
which is what we want.
Now suppose there exists a set S that satisfies condition (4.10) to (4.12). Let jú = min S.
Then for all j < jú, sellers have no incentive to deviate. Now consider the belief system that
assigns all the weights to ”jú . That is, “(zÕ, sÕ; ”jú) = 1. By assumption, (z, s) must be accepted
by buyers under “. Then we have a contradiction: ”jú seller is strictly better o  while not
violating any constraints in P (”jú).
Part 2: In this part I show that any equilibrium defined by Definition 4.1 is a solution to
{P (”j)}Jj=1. Aggregate consistency implies that for all j there exists (z, s) such that “(z, s; ”j) > 0.
Denote such (z, s) as (zj , sj). Let ◊j = ◊(zj , sj). I first show that (zj , sj , ◊j) satisfies constraints
(C.2) and (C.3) for all j. Then I show that {(zj , sj , ◊j)}Jj=1 solves {P (”)}.
First, note that Buyer’s optimal behavior and Active markets together imply that
k = q(◊j)(sj”j ≠ zj)
for all j and that resource constraints are satisfied. That is, constraint (C.2) and (C.3) are
satisfied.
Next, Equilibrium beliefs and Seller’s optimal behavior imply that
vús,j = p(◊j)[u(b + zj) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jsj ]
and that
vús,j Ø p(◊jÕ)[u(b + zjÕsjÕ) ≠ u(b) ≠ ”jsjÕ ] for all jÕ.
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Hence, constraint (C.3) is satisfied as long as vs,j = vús,j .
Lastly, I prove that vs,j = vús,j for all j. That is, {(zj , sj , ◊j)}Jj=1 is a solution to {P (”)}. Let
me proceed by induction. First, it is easy to see that vs,1 = vús,1. Next, suppose vs,jÕ = vús,jÕ for
all jÕ < j. Now suppose vs,j > vús,j . That is, some (◊, z) satisfies the constraints of P (”j) and
delivers higher utility to sellers. That is,
vús,j < p(◊)[u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ (k + z)] (C.26)
vús,jÕ Ø p(◊)[u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ (k + z)”jÕ/”j ] for jÕ = j ≠ 1 (C.27)
where (C.27) uses the induction assumption. Now let the o -equilibrium o er be (zÕ, sÕ, ◊). Then
there exists S such that j œ S and jÕ < S for all jÕ < j. Then (4.10) and (4.11) are satisfied by
definition. (4.12) is satisfied because for all jÕ œ S, ”jÕ Ø ”j . Hence, Condition (5) is violated.
That is, it must be that vs,j = vús,j . ⇤
Proof to Proposition 4.2: Recall that d◊





uÕÕ(b + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + k]




p(◊)pÕÕ(◊) is increasing in ◊. Assume also that
≠zU Õ(z)








z2uÕÕ(b + z)(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))
u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ uÕ(b + z)z +
kzuÕÕ(b + z)
u(b + z) ≠ u(b) ≠ uÕ(b + z)z
B
. (C.29)
Notice that (1) p
Õ
(◊)
p(◊)pÕÕ(◊) < 0 and is increasing in ◊ and therefore increasing in z; (2)
z2uÕÕ(b+z)(◊qÕ(◊)+q(◊))
u(b+z)≠u(b)≠uÕ(b+z)z <
0 is increasing in z because ◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊) > 0 is decreasing in ◊ and ◊ is increasing in z; and (3)
kzuÕÕ(b+z)




U(z) < 0 is increasing
in z. In conclusion, dp(◊)
dz
z
p(◊) is decreasing in z. ⇤
C.2 Proofs for Section 4.4
Proof to Proposition 4.3: First, recall that z1 is given by z1 = zú where ÷ûÕ(b + zú) = 1.
Hence, z1 is increasing in ÷. ◊1 is given by
q(◊) + ◊qÕ(◊) = k
÷û(b + z1) ≠ ÷û(b) ≠ z1
. (C.30)
It is therefore easy to see that ◊1 is also weakly increasing in ÷. Second, ◊2 and z2 are given by
ûÕ(b + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + k] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[û(b + z) ≠ û(b)], (C.31)
◊1q(◊1)
#
÷û(b + z1) ≠ ÷û(b) ≠ z1
$
≠ ◊1k = ◊q(◊)
C







If ◊2 and z2 are unchanged after the increase in ÷, then the RHS of (C.32) will be smaller than
the LHS because ◊1q(◊1)
#




÷û(b + z2) ≠ ÷û(b)
$
. This means the ◊2
and z2 must be strictly increasing in ÷. Following the same argument, it is easy to show that ◊j
and zj are increasing in ÷ for all 1 < j Æ J . ⇤
Proof to Proposition 4.4: First, recall that z1 is given by z1 = zú where ÷ûÕ(b + zú) = 1.
Hence, z1 does not change after the shock. ◊1 is given by
q(◊) + ◊qÕ(◊) = k
÷û(b + z1) ≠ ÷û(b) ≠ z1
. (C.33)
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It is therefore easy to see that ◊1 also does not change after the shock. Second, ◊2 and z2 are
given by
ûÕ(b + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + k] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[û(b + z) ≠ û(b)], (C.34)
◊1q(◊1)
#
÷û(b + z1) ≠ ÷û(b) ≠ z1
$
≠ ◊1k = ◊q(◊)
S

























This means the ◊2 and z2 must be smaller in ÷. Following the same argument, it is easy to show
that ◊j and zj are smaller for all 1 < j Æ J . ⇤
C.3 Proofs for Section 4.5
Proof to Proposition 4.5: The process of solving the partial equilibrium is almost identical
to the process of solving the equilibrium in Section 4.3 and therefore is omitted. I repeat the
partial equilibrium. Assume vb < v̄b. The unique partial equilibrium {(◊j , zj , sj)}Jj=1 is given by
(1) z1 = min{zú, bl} where uÕ(be + zú) = 1; ◊1 solves
q(◊) + ◊qÕ(◊) = vb
u(be + z1) ≠ u(be) ≠ z1
. (C.37)
(2) For all j > 1, zj and ◊j solve
uÕ(be + zj)[(◊jqÕ(◊j) + q(◊j))zj + vb] = (◊jqÕ(◊j) + q(◊j))[u(be + zj) ≠ u(be)], (C.38)
vús,j≠1 = ◊jq(◊j)
C







It is easy to see that both ◊1 and vús,1 are decreasing in vb. Now, consider ◊2. It is given by
uÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be)], (C.40)
◊1q(◊1)
#
u(be + z1) ≠ u(be) ≠ z1
$
≠ ◊1vb = ◊q(◊)
#
u(be + z) ≠ u(be) ≠ ”1/”2z
$
≠ ”1/”2◊vb. (C.41)
To see how vb a ects ◊2, consider vÕb > vb. Let ◊a2 solve
uÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vÕb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be)], (C.42)
◊1(vb)q(◊1(vb))
#
u(be + z1) ≠ u(be) ≠ z1
$
≠ ◊1(vb)vb = ◊q(◊)
#




It must be that ◊a
2
< ◊2, because otherwise ◊2 is (weakly) larger and z2 is strictly larger, which











































uÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vÕb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be)], (C.46)
◊1(vÕb)q(◊1(vb))
#
u(be + z1) ≠ u(be) ≠ z1
$
≠ ◊1(vÕb)vb = ◊q(◊)
#
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Lastly, let ◊2(vÕb) solve
uÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vÕb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be)], (C.49)
◊1(vÕb)q(◊1(vb))
#





u(be + z) ≠ u(be) ≠ ”1/”2z
$
≠ ”1/”2◊vÕb. (C.50)
Then ◊2(vÕb) < ◊b2 because ◊1(vÕb) > ◊b2, and hence ◊2 must be smaller so (C.50) holds. In addition,
because z2(vÕb) < zb2,
◊2(vÕb)q(◊2(vÕb))
Ë














In conclusion, ◊2 and ◊2q(◊2)
#
u(be + z2) ≠ u(be) ≠ z2
$
are decreasing in vb.
Now, suppose that for all jÕ < j, ◊jÕ and ◊jÕq(◊jÕ)
#
u(be + zjÕ) ≠ u(be) ≠ zjÕ
$
are decreasing in
vb. For j, the proof follows closely the case with j = 2. Let ◊aj solve
uÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vÕb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be)], (C.52)
◊j≠1(vb)q(◊j≠1(vb))
#









It must be that ◊aj < ◊j . In addition, it must be that
◊aj q(◊aj )
Ë
u(be + zaj ) ≠ u(be) ≠ zaj
È
≠ ◊aj vb < ◊jq(◊j)
#
u(be + zj) ≠ u(be) ≠ zj
$
≠ ◊jvb. (C.54)
Since ◊aj < ◊j , it must be that
◊aj q(◊aj )
Ë




u(be + zj) ≠ u(be) ≠ zj
$
, (C.55)
Next, let ◊bj solve
uÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vÕb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be)], (C.56)
◊j≠1(vÕb)q(◊j≠1(vb))
#









According to the induction assumption, ◊j≠1 and ◊j≠1q(◊j≠1)
#
u(be + zj≠1) ≠ u(be) ≠ zj≠1
$
are




u(be + zbj) ≠ u(be) ≠ zbj
È
< ◊aj q(◊aj )
Ë
u(be + zaj ) ≠ u(be) ≠ zaj
È
, (C.58)
Lastly, let ◊j(vÕb) solve
uÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vÕb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[u(be + z) ≠ u(be)], (C.59)
◊j≠1(vÕb)q(◊j≠1(vb))
#









Then ◊j(vÕb) < ◊bj and zj(vÕb) < zbj . Hence,
◊j(vÕb)q(◊j(vÕb))
Ë




u(be + zbj) ≠ u(be) ≠ zbj
È
. (C.61)
In conclusion, ◊j and ◊jq(◊j)
#
u(be + zj) ≠ u(be) ≠ zj
$
are decreasing in vb. Hence, I have estab-














Now consider vb = 0. Let ◊̄ be such that p(◊̄) = 1. It is easy to show that solution to the P (◊)
problem is that for all j, ◊j = ◊̄, and zj is given by binding constraint j ≠1 (see (C.3)). If ◊̄ < Œ,
then g(0) < Œ and it is possible that g(0) < 1≠–– . In such case some late consumers do not
participate in the asset market. If ◊̄ = Œ, vúb > 0 as long as – > 0.
Next, consider when vb = v̄b. Then we have q(◊) = 1. Then all sellers are indi erent
between selling or not, and the incentive constraints (see (C.3)) are satisfied automatically. Hence,
g(v̄b) = ◊, and it constitutes as an equilibrium only when – Ø 1/(1 + ◊). This means that as long
as – < 1/(1 + ◊), vúb < v̄b. ⇤
Proof to Proposition 4.6: The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 4.2 and therefore
is omitted.
Proof to Proposition 4.7: First, consider an increase in ÷. Recall that z1 is given by z1 =
min{zú, bl} where ÷ûÕ(be + zú) = 1. Hence, z1 is increasing in ÷. ◊1 is given by
q(◊) + ◊qÕ(◊) = vb
÷û(be + z1) ≠ ÷û(be) ≠ z1
. (C.64)
It is easy to see that ◊1 is also weakly increasing in ÷. Second, ◊2 and z2 are given by
ûÕ(be + z)[(◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))z + vb] = (◊qÕ(◊) + q(◊))[û(be + z) ≠ û(be)], (C.65)
◊1q(◊1)
#
÷û(be + z1) ≠ ÷û(be) ≠ z1
$
≠ ◊1vb = ◊q(◊)
C







If ◊2 and z2 are unchanged after the increase in ÷, then the RHS of (C.66) will be smaller than
the LHS because ◊1q(◊1)
#




÷û(be + z2) ≠ ÷û(be)
$
. This means the
◊2 and z2 must be strictly increasing in ÷. Following the same arguments, it is easy to show that
◊j and zj are increasing in ÷ for all 1 < j Æ J . From the proof to Proposition 4.5, we know that
vúb must increase so that condition (4) of Definition 4.2 is satisfied. Next, consider an increase
in –. It is clear that vúb must increase so that condition (4) of Definition 4.2 is satisfied. Lastly,
it is easy to see that z1 and ◊1 are weakly increasing in bl. This means that if ◊2 and z2 are
unchanged, then the RHS of (C.66) will be larger than the LHS. Following the same arguments,
it is easy to show that ◊j and zj are increasing in bl for all 1 < j Æ J . Hence, vúb must increase
so that condition (4) of Definition 4.2 is satisfied. ⇤
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